UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-19-2010

Taylor v. AIA Services Corp. Clerk's Record v. 5
Dckt. 36916

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Taylor v. AIA Services Corp. Clerk's Record v. 5 Dckt. 36916" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1217.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1217

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF IDAHO

Reed J. Taylor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

FILED - CDPY

v.
AlA Services Corporation, et al,

FEB 192 10

Defendants-Respondents.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
VOLUME V

Appealed from the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Nez Perce
The Honorable Jeff M. Brudie
Supreme Court No. 36916-2009

RODERICK C. BOND
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
GARY D. BABBITT
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT AlA CORP-RESPONDENTS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
)

P laintiff-Counterdefendant -AppellantCross Respondent,

) SUPREME COURT NO. 36916-2009

)
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
) TABLE OF CONTENTS
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
) VOLUMEV
)
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, )
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person )
and JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
)
)
Defendants-Counterclaimants)
Respondents-Cross Appellants-Cross
Respondents,
)
)
)
and
)
)
CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
an Idaho corporation;
)
)
Defendant-Respondent -Cross Respondent, )
)
)
and
)
)
401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION,
)
)
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross
)
Respondent.
)

v.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

Opinion & Order on Plaintiff s Motion for
Reconsideration, Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
and Motion for Restraining Order filed May 31,2007 .. .......... ... ..... ....... ... ........ 739-752
Defendants Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos' Joinder in
Motion to Dismiss Filed by AlA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance Inc. filed June 1, 2007 ..... ..... ..... ...... ........... .... ..... ... ........ .... 753-754
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed June 4, 2007 ... .... .... ...... ..... .... ..... 755-774
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Amended Motion and
Memorandum of Law to Amend and Supplement
Complaint filed June 7, 2007 .... ... ........ ......... .......... .. ......... ......... .. ........... .......... 775-815
Status Conference Memorandum filed June 19,2007 ........ ........... ........ ........... . 816-821
Opposition to Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend
Complaint filed June 21 , 2007 ........ .... ..... .. ....... ... ... .. .................. ... .. ... ... ... ........ . 822-837
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint
filed June 21, 2007 ....... ... ..... .. ........... ..... ...... ... ........ ..... .. .... ... ........... ............. ..... 838-842
R. John Taylor's Joinder in Opposition to Plaintiff Reed
Taylor's Motion to Amend Complaint filed June 22,2007 ......... ............ .......... 843-844
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of his Amended
Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, Objection to
Defendant R. John Taylor's Joinder, Reply in to Defendant
Connie Taylor's Response and Supplemental Response in
Opposition to Defendant's 12(B)(6) Motion filed June 26,2007 ........ ... ...... ..... 845-861
Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Support of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's
Motion to Amend and in Opposition to Connie Taylor's
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed June 26, 2007 ........ ..... ..... .. .. .... .. ... ................. 862-893
Errata Sheet for Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of
Motion to Amend Complaint, Objection to Defendant R. John
Taylor's Joinder, Reply to Defendant Connie Taylor's
Response and supplemental Response in Opposition to
Defendant's IRCP 12(b)(6) Motion filed June 27,2007 .............. ... .................. 894-895
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion and Memorandum of Law
to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction against Reed J. Taylor
filed June 28, 2007 ......... .......... ...................... ..................... .. ........ .. ................... 896-899

TABLE OF CONTENTS

11

Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel Production of Documents
from AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
filed June 28, 2007 ............................................................................................. 900-920
Affidavit of Allan Muchmore in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel filed June 28, 2007 .............................................................. 921-928
Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman Jr. in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel Production of Documents filed June 28,2007 .................... 929-939
Continued to Volume VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant)
Cross Respondent,
) SUPREME COURT NO. 36916-2009
)
)
v.
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
) INDEX
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
) VOLUMEV
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
)
TAYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, )
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person )
and JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
)
Defendants-Counterclaimants)
Respondents-Cross Appellants-Cross
)
Respondents,
)
)
and
)
)
CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
)
an Idaho corporation;
)
)
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Respondent, )
)
and
)
)
40 1(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION,
)
)
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross
)
Respondent.
)
)
REED J. T AYLOR, a single person,

INDEX

I

Affidavit of Allan Muclunore in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel filed June 28, 2007 .............................................................. 921-928
Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman Jf. in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel Production of Documents filed June 28,2007 .................... 929-939
Continued to Volume VI

Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Support of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's
Motion to Amend and in Opposition to Connie Taylor's
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed June 26, 2007 ................................................ 862-893
Defendants Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos' Joinder in
Motion to Dismiss Filed by AlA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance Inc. filed June 1,2007 ........................................................ 753-754
Errata Sheet for Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of
Motion to Amend Complaint, Objection to Defendant R. John
Taylor's Joinder, Reply to Defendant Connie Taylor's
Response and supplemental Response in Opposition to
Defendant's IRCP 12(b)(6) Motion filed June 27, 2007 ................................... 894-895
Opinion & Order on Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
and Motion for Restraining Order filed May 31,2007 ...................................... 739-752
Opposition to Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend
Complaint filed June 21, 2007 ........................................................................... 822-837
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint
filed June 21, 2007 ............................................................................................. 838-842
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Amended Motion and
Memorandum of Law to Amend and Supplement
Complaint filed June 7, 2007 ............................................................................. 775-815
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion and Memorandum of Law
to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction against Reed J. Taylor
filed June 28, 2007 ............................................................................................. 896-899
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of his Amended
Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, Objection to
Defendant R. John Taylor's Joinder, Reply in to Defendant
Connie Taylor'S Response and Supplemental Response in
Opposition to Defendant's 12(B)(6) Motion filed June 26, 2007 ...................... 845-861

INDEX

II

R. John Taylor's Joinder in Opposition to Plaintiff Reed
Taylor's Motion to Amend Complaint filed June 22, 2007 ............................... 843-844

Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel Production of Documents
from AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
filed June 28, 2007 ............................................................................................. 900-920
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed June 4,2007 ............................... 755-774
Status Conference Memorandum filed June 19,2007 ....................................... 816-821

INDEX

III

F\lED
7!Ul liV\Y 31 PM

2,..

U

(\ iJ:! r: c

c

r'GF

::'~U:~~rT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof,
)
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV07-00208
OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
AND MOTION FOR
RESTRAINING ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the following Motions filed by the Plaintiff: (1) Motion
for Reconsideration; (2) Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and, (3) Motion for Restraining
Order. Hearings on the motions were held March 29, 2007. Defendants AlA Services
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor were represented by attorney Michael E.
McNichols. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was represented by attorneys Paul R. Cressman, Jr. and
Roderick C. Bond. The Court, having read the motions, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the
Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
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parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby
renders its decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
AlA Insurance Inc. is a business under the umbrella of AlA Services Corporation.
Plaintiff Reed Taylor founded the business. Eventually the Plaintiff's brother, Defendant R.
John Taylor, joined the business and together, the brothers developed the parent company into a
holding for numerous diversified insurance businesses. In 1995, Plaintiff Reed Taylor decided to
retire. In order to effectuate his retirement, Reed Taylor and AlA Services, along with counsel
for the respective parties, entered into a stock redemption agreement. The agreement included a
promissory note payable to Reed Taylor in the amount of $6,000,000.00 plus interest, which was
executed on August 1, 1995. 1 In 1996, the agreement was amended and the parties executed an
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security
Agreement. 2
Some ten years later, in a letter dated December 12, 2006, Plaintiff Reed Taylor's
attorney notified Defendant John Taylor and AlA Services Corporation that AlA Services was in
default under several sections of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, including but not
limited to failure to pay the $6 million promissory note. 3 The letter further notified the
Defendants that Plaintiff intended to exercise his right to vote the redeemed shares pursuant to a
reversion of voting rights upon default as provided for in the Pledge Agreement. Included in the
letter was Plaintiff's demand for a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing
a new board of directors, with the special meeting to occur on December 26,2006. Plaintiff's
demand for a December 26,2006 special shareholder's meeting was rejected.
Plaintiffs Exhibit "A".
Plaintiffs Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "E".
3 Plaintiffs Exhibit "F".
1

2
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On January 29, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed the above-entitled action seeking
recovery of amounts owed under the Promissory Note\ but making no claim seeking
enforcement of other terms of the parties' written agreements. On an unknown date, Plaintiff
made a second demand for a special shareholder's meeting to occur on February 5,2007.
Plaintiffs second demand for a special shareholder's meeting was denied by the Board's
secretary, JoLee Duclos, in a letter dated February 1,2007. 5 On February 5,2007, Plaintiff filed
an Amended Complaint adding as Defendants Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos and asserting
several additional claims. 6
On February 22, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special
Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Inc., in which Plaintiff removed the current AlA
board members and elected himself, Reed Taylor, the sole board member. 7 At 3:00 a.m. on
Sunday, February 25, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor went to the business offices of AlA Services
Corporation along with a locksmith and security personnel hired by the Plaintiff, and changed
the locks on certain doors within the building housing AlA Insurance. 8 However, the activity
caused an alarm system to go off and police arrived on scene. The police determined the matter
was civil in nature, the old locks were put back in place and both parties had a representative
remain at the premises.
On Monday morning, February 26, 2007, Defendants John Taylor and AlA Services
Corporation filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Later the same day, Plaintiff filed
an Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors Resolution, (2) to

Plaintiffs Complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and constructive trust.
Plaintiffs Exhibit "H".
6 Plaintiffs Amended Complaint added claims for fraudulent transfer, fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, alto
ego, equitable indemnification, account statedJmonies due, unjust enrichment and director liability.
7 Plaintiffs Exhibit "K".
8 The building houses other business as well that lease space from AlA Services Corporation.
4

5
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Confirm Termination of Counsel for AlA Insurance Inc. along with affidavits and a Motion for
Order to Shorten Time. The Court took up the motions of the parties on the afternoon of
February 26, 2007 and entered a Temporary Restraining Order against the Plaintiff and granted
Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten Time. The Court then set a hearing on March 1, 2007 for
Defendant's motion for preliminary injunction and the Plaintiff's pending motion.
At the March 1, 2007 hearing, the Court informed the parties that, after reviewing the
flurry of pleadings and other documents filed over the three days, including several binders
worth of exhibits, the Court had determined it would not hear the Plaintiff's lengthy and complex
motion upon the grounds stated in open Court. The Court then proceeded on the preliminary
injunction hearing only.
On March 8,2007, the Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. The Court granted the Defendants' Motion for preliminary injunction
after finding the risk of irreparable harm to all of the parties, including the Plaintiff, of sufficient
significance to merit granting the motion until the complex legal issues asserted by the Plaintiff
could be determined on the merits.
On March 6,2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On March 12,
2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order entering a
preliminary injunction against the Plaintiff. On March 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Second
Amended Complaint asserting a claim for enforcement ofrights. 9 On March 28,2007, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Restraining Order.

Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint incorrectly lists two of his claims as his "seventh" claim, causing his total
number of claims to be incorrectly reflected as ten claims rather than eleven. Plaintiffs most recent claim is based
on his assertion that he became the sole stockholder upon nonpayment of the promissory note and, therefore, he
seeks enforcement of his asserted rights as sole shareholder.

9
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ANALYSIS
(1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).
When a motion for reconsideration is brought pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), a trial court is to
consider any new facts presented by the moving party that bears on the correctness of the court's
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990).
In the instant case, the Plaintiff presents the Court with no new facts. Rather, Plaintiff asserts the
Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for preliminary injunction because (1) Defendants
had filed no counterclaim as required under LR.C.P. 65(e), and (2) Defendants failed to meet the
necessary burden of showing a likelihood of prevailing at trial andJor irreparable injury. Plaintiff
further contends the Court failed to make critical findings of fact in its decision.
Plaintiffs contentions are not supported by the Court's written opinion but instead
exhibit Plaintiff s misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the Court's articulation of its opinion.
The "critical findings" Plaintiff contends the Court failed to make are findings on the merits of
Plaintiffs action brought against the Defendants. In its opinion, the Court articulated at length
the facts presented to the Court by the parties and referenced within the factual portion of the
opinion numerous exhibits submitted by the parties. What the Court did not do was decide the
merits of the case, nor could the Court decide the merits of the case within the context of the
hearing on Defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction.] 0 Plaintiff argues that the Court was

10 In Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, he argues the Court did not maintain the status quo by entry of the
preliminary injunction. Plaintiff argues the "status quo" is that Defendants are in default, making Plaintiff the sole
shareholder, who then voted himself president, vice president and treasurer of the corporation. This argument
presumes Plaintiffs claims to be correct and true. As the Court stated before and states again, the complexity of the
issues did not, and do not, allow the Court to decide the merits of the case at the outset of the case. Therefore, this
argument by Plaintiff will not be addressed separately in this opinion.
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required to determine whether Defendants are in default and, if in default, whether certain
shareholder rights transferred to and were rightfully exercised by Plaintiff. 11 The Court is not
persuaded. In the context of a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court is to look at whether
the moving party is likely to prevail, not determine a prevailing party. The Court must also look
at the potential for irreparable harm. The Court weighed both of these questions in deciding
whether to grant the Defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction.
As the Court stated in its prior opinion, the issues in the instant matter are complex, as is
evident by the multiple volumes of documents submitted by the Plaintiff. The complexity of the
issues cannot be altered or minimized simply because Plaintiff argues that the case is a simple
matter of contract breach. Plaintiff clearly expects the Court to lightly decide matters that
Plaintiff concedes took multiple attorneys months to formulate and that resulted in the drafting of
complex legal documents that are intertwined with the unique and complex business of
Insurance.
The Court did not treat the substantial issues in the instant matter lightly when it entered
its opinion on Defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction nor will the Court do so now
based on Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. The Court articulated its analysis of the issues in
its earlier opinion. The arguments of the Plaintiff on motion for reconsideration have not altered
the Court's opinion that the issues are complex and not conducive to being decided in a hearing
on a motion for preliminary injunction. Therefore, the Court must reject Plaintiffs assertion that
the Court failed to make critical findings in its March 8, 2007 Opinion and Order.

II It is evident from Plaintiff's filing of his lawsuit that he recognizes the question of default must be determined
through the judicial process. Even so, approximately three weeks after filing his lawsuit, Plaintiff apparently selfdeclared that default had occurred, declared himself the sole holder of the corporate shares, and attempted a hostile
take-over ofthe corporation despite the fact that no legal determination of the issues had been rendered. Plaintiff
cannot provide himself with a remedy but must instead allow the judicial process to run its course.

Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
Opinion & Order on n's Motions for Reconsideration,
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order

6

Next, Plaintiff contends the Defendants' motion for preliminary injunction failed to fall
within the requirements ofI.R.C.P. 65(e) and, therefore, should not have been granted. Rule
65(e)(5) provides that "[a] preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the
defendants upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of the grounds
mentioned above in this section, subject to he same rules and provisions provided for the
issuance of injunctions on behalf of the plaintiff."
Plaintiff contends, and correctly so, that the Defendants in the above-entitled action filed
no counterclaim. The Court recognizes the Defendants chose to bring their motion within the
confines of the already pending action though no counterclaim had been filed. As the Court
contemplated the issue of a preliminary injunction, the Court considered the following: (1) no
counterclaim was filed by the Defendants; (2) an independent action for a preliminary injunction
may have been available to the Defendants; (3) requiring the Defendants to bring an independent
action would not be in the interests of judicial economy; (4) the actions of the Plaintiff created a
high risk of irreparable harm to all of the parties, including the Plaintiff; and (5) the grant or
denial of a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court. After
consideration of these factors, the Court determined the lack of a counterclaim was not fatal to
the Defendants motion. The Court continues to be of the same opinion.
Plaintiff next argues the Defendants failed to show a likelihood of prevailing at trial and
failed to present sufficient evidence of irreparable harm. The Court's prior opinion clearly
weighed the evidence presented on the two prongs of the required showing and stated:
Given the substantial risk of financial loss that all ofthe parties will suffer if this
matter is not addressed with a greater degree of composure and temperance, the
Court finds irreparable harm is likely if Plaintiff's conduct is not kept in check
while the critical issues are researched and resolved. Which party is likely to
prevail on the question of default and voting rights has yet to be determined.
Nevertheless, the Court finds the risk of irreparable harm of sufficient
Taylor v. AlA Services, et af.
Opinion & Order on n's Motions for Reconsideration,
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order

7

significance to merit granting a preliminary injunction that will provide a degree
of protection for all the parties until the complex legal issues can be determined.
Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, entered March 8, 2007,
page 6.

Contrary to Plaintiff s argument, the Court was not prevented from entering the requested
preliminary injunction simply because the Court found the issues in the pending action complex,
making it difficult to determine which party is likely to prevail at trial. "Whether to grant or
deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the trial court." Brady v. City of
Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997). As the Court stated after noting the
difficulty in determining which party is likely to prevail, "Nevertheless, the Court finds the risk
of irreparable harm of sufficient significance to merit granting a preliminary injunction that will
provide a degree of protection for all the parties until the complex legal issues can be
determined." In entering its Order, the Court acted within its discretionary powers and within
the boundaries established by law.
Plaintiff next argues the Court failed to set security for the preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff's argument is without merit. When the temporary injunction was entered in this action,
the Court ordered the Defendants on the record to post a $10,000.00 bond as security in the
matter. Defendants posted the bond on February 27,2007 and the bond continues to be held by
the Court. After further review, the Court believes that the bond amount posted is inadequate
and will require that Defendants post bond in the increased amount of $200,000.00.
Plaintiffs final two arguments are that (1) the Court incorrectly stated in its Opinion that
Plaintiff was required to seek a judicial order for a shareholder's meeting pursuant to 1. C. § 30-1703 and (2) the Court failed to correctly evaluate the credibility of John Taylor and his
testimony. At no point in the opinion did the Court state, or even imply, that the Plaintiff was
Taylor v. AlA Services, et at.
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required to seek a judicial order for a shareholder's meeting when his written requests were
rebuffed by Defendants. Rather, the Court clearly stated that it was an option available to the
Plaintiff and one that would have been preferable to the non-judicial option Plaintiff attempted.
As for Plaintiffs argument that "the Court should have considered John Taylor's lack of
credibility", such comment and argument is improper. As noted by Plaintiff in his own brief,
"The credibility of witnesses who testify in open court is for the trier of fact to determine." The
Court was the trier of fact in the hearing on the preliminary injunction and any determination on
witness credibility was the Court's to make.
In a supplemental filing, Plaintiff contends the Court failed to put forth its findings as
required by LR.C.P. 52(a). Plaintiffs arguments attempts to set form over substance. While the
Court did not entitle its document "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order", the
Court's written opinion met all the requirements ofLR.C.P. 52(a). First, the Court articulated its
factual findings. Next, the Court set out the standards applicable to the issue before it. Finally,
the Court articulated its analysis of the law and, acting within the Court's discretion powers
applicable to the issue, entered its Order granting a preliminary injunction to the Defendants.
Therefore, the Court adopts as its findings of fact and conclusions of law the Opinion and Order
entered by the Court on March 8, 2007.
(2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is simply a back-door attempt by Plaintiff to
persuade the Court to rule on the merits of Plaintiff s lawsuit without allowing the parties the
opportunity for trial on the merits. The Court provided the parties with its analysis of the nature
of the issues in the lawsuit, informing the parties in clear and unambiguous language that the
issues are complex legal issues that require trial on the merits after sufficient opportunity to
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engage in discovery and case preparation. In order to grant Plaintiff s motion for preliminary
injunction, the Court would have to find, or at minimum presume, that Defendants are in default
and that Plaintiff is the sole shareholder of the corporation and the only individual who may
lawfully run the corporation. The Court is unwilling, and unable, to make such a finding given
the complexity of the issues in the instant matter and the many relevant facts in dispute.
As stated by the Court in its March 8, 2007 Opinion and Order, and as reiterated by the
Court in its analysis of Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration: (1) the issues in the instant matter
are complex, (2) the complexity of the legal issues makes it extremely difficult to determine
which party is likely to prevail; (3) the situation created by Plaintiff by his attempt at a hostile
take-over poses a significant risk of irreparable financial harm to all of the parties, including the
Plaintiff; and, (4) as a result, an injunction maintaining the status quo of the parties as it existed
at the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint is necessary in order to allow the case to be tried on the
merits.
It is the opinion of the Court that the temporary injunction it entered on March 8,2007 is

in the best interest of all the parties. The injunction as it currently exists provides the only
equitable remedy available given the complexity of the legal issues and given the right of all the
parties to properly litigate the issues. While the Court understands the Plaintiffs concern that
corporate assets are potentially being siphoned off into another corporation to the benefit of
Defendant John Taylor and to the detriment of Plaintiff Reed Taylor, the issue of default and
corporate voting rights must be decided only after appropriate litigation processes have occurred.
Giving due regard to the concerns of the Plaintiff, the Court is not willing to set aside due
process and decide such complex matters without affording all the parties the ability to defend
against Plaintiff s claims.
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(3) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

The Plaintiff seeks to have the COUli enjoin Defendant AlA Services Corporation from
paying legal fees incurred by Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jo1ee Duclos in
defending against this action. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and
J olee Duclos, acting in their capacity as members of the AlA board of directors, scheduled a
shareholder meeting to gain approval to pay their attorneys' fees and costs from the corporate
assets.
Idaho Code § 30-1-853 reads:
(1) A corporation may, before final disposition of a proceeding, advance funds to
pay for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party
to a proceeding because he is a director ifhe delivers to the corporation:
(a) A written affirmation of his good faith belief that he has met the relevant
standard of conduct described in section 30-1-851, Idaho Code, or that the
proceeding involves conduct for which liability has been eliminated under a
provision of the articles of incorporation as authorized by section 30-1202(2)(d), Idaho Code; and
(b) His written undertaking to repay any funds advanced if he is not entitled to
mandatory indemnification under section 30-1-852, Idaho Code, and it is
ultimately determined under section 30-1-854 or 30-1-855, Idaho Code, that
he has not met the relevant standard of conduct described in section 30-1-851,
Idaho Code.
(2) The undertaking required by subsection (1 )(b) of this section must be an
unlimited general obligation ofthe director but need not be secured and may be
accepted without reference to the financial ability of the director to make
repayment.
(3) Authorizations under this section shall be made:
(a) By the board of directors:
(i) If there are two (2) or more disinterested directors, by a majority vote of
all the disinterested directors, a majority of whom shall for such purposes
constitute a quorum, or by a majority of the members of a committee of two
(2) or more disinterested directors appointed by such a vote; or
(ii) If there are fewer than two (2) disinterested directors, by the vote
necessary for action by the board in accordance with section 30-1-824(3),
Idaho Code, in which authorization directors who do not qualify as
disinterested directors may participate; or
(b) By the shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the control of a
director who at the time does not qualify as a disinterested director may not be
voted on the authorization.
Taylor v. AlA Services, et at.
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Idaho's statutory scheme specifically provides for payment of legal fees reasonably
incurred by a corporate director, who is a party to an action because of the individual's status as
a director, to be paid by the corporation if the statutory requirements are met. The Court's
record in the above-entitled matter reflects I.C. § 30-1-853 has been met by Defendants John
Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclose.1 2 Therefore, the Court will not order AlA Services
Corporation to refrain from paying legal expenses reasonably incurred by the Defendants.

(4)

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
Rule 54(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
Certificate of Final Judgment. When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim,
or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the
parties shall not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties. If any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other
such as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall
be offset against each other and a single judgment for the difference between the
entitlements shall be entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment.
In the event the trial court determines that a judgment should be certified as final
under this Rule 54(b), the court shall execute a certificate which shall
immediately follow the court's signature on the judgment and be in substantially
the following form: ...

The Court finds Rule 54(b) certification inapplicable to the Court's entry of the
preliminary injunction at issue. The Court made no entry of judgment upon any claim of the
Plaintiff and, therefore, the Court carmot direct the entry of a final judgment as to any claim for

12

Exhibits C, D and E of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
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relief. The Court's entry of the preliminary injunction in this matter does nothing more than
maintain the status of the parties as they were at the time of the filing of the above-entitled action
until such time that a determination on the merits may occur. Therefore, the Court declines to
issue a Rule 54(b) certification on the Court's entry of the preliminary injunction and/or the
Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.

ORDER
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED, except that bond to be posted
by the Defendants as a condition of the previously issued preliminary injunction is HEREBY
increased to the amount of $200,000.00.
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiffs Motion for Restraining Order is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiffs request for Rule 54(b) certification is hereby DENIED.

Dated this
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Roderick Bond
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Paul Cressman
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Gary Babbitt
PO Box 1617
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Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 Seventh Street
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Telephone: (509) 758-2501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; and, JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208

DEFENDANTS BRYAN FREEMAN
AND JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER
IN MOTION TO DISMISS FILED
BY AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
AND AlA INSURANCE, INC.

COMES NOW Defendants, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos, by and through their attorney,
David A. Gittins, and joins in the Motion to Dismiss filed by AlA Services Corporation and AlA
Insurance, Inc., and joins in and adopts the supporting memorandum.
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DATED this 7/'':'day of May, 2007.
LA W OFFICES OF DAVID A. GITTINS
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David A. Gittins, 1136514
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman
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Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617 ·
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation
and AlA Insurance. Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

Case No . CV-07-00208

)

)

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS

)

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC.) an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR. individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

-----------------------------------)
Defendants AlA Services Corporation CAlA Scrvices

H
)

and AIA lnsumnce, Inc. ("AlA

Insurance") (collectively referred to as 'LAIA") submit this reply brief in support of their Motion
to Dismiss
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I. INTRODUCTION
AlA filed a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. PIaintiffrecites the
rule that "[o]n a motion to dismiss for failure La state a claim. the Court looks only ut the
pleadings ... ". but then Plainliffimmediately proceeds to introduce a litany of factual assertions
that arc not contained within the four corners of the complaint, effectively attempting to convert
the motion into a motion for summary judgment.
OLherthan improperly introducing facts not pled in the complaint, Plaintiff's Response
Bricfdocs very little to counter AIA's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff begins with an assertion that
the motion to dismiss sboulcl be disregarded because such motrons are "disfavored." See
Plaintiff's Response Brief, p. 9 (citing Wackerl), v. Martindale. 82 Idaho 400, 404,353 P.2d 782
(1960».

or course, right after the lVackerly

Court described the caution it applies with regard to

a motion to dismiss, it explained the circumstances under which a motion to dismiss is
commonly granted:
A (complaint) may be dismissed on motion if clearly without
merit; and this want of merit may consist in an absence ofluw to
support a claim of the sort mude. or of facts sufficient to make a
good claim. or in th(! disclosure ofsomc fact which will necessarily
defeat the claim.
ld. (quoting 2 Moore's Federal Practice (2d cd.) Sec. 1208) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff's complaint is precisely the type of complaint where a motion to dismiss is
proper because it discloses facts that demonstrate, on the face of the complaint, that it is barred
by the statute of limitations. Moreover. it contains numerous causes of action that fail as a

maHer oflaw. The complaint is a classic example of throwing mud at the wall. hoping some of
the mud sticks. Plaintiff is attempting to twist his breach of contract cause of action into a
variety oflegallhcories that either (I) simply do not fit the facts alleged (Le., fraud, conversion.
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unjust enrichment, equitable indemnification. and account stated) or (2) arc not causes of action
at an (i.c., aller ego, constructive trust, and director liability) 1.
AIA's motion to dismi.ss serves the important purposes of wiping the excess mud off the
,\-vaU - eliminating the causes of action that fail to state a claim - so the parties can prepare for
trial under the proper legal theories.

H. ARGUMENT
A.

PlaintifPs Complaint Is Barred By The Statute Of Limitations

1.

PlaintifPs Breach of Contract Accrued More Than Five Years Before
Plaintiff Filed Suit

PlaintifTargues that H[wJhcn questions exist as to whether a cause of action has accrued
and the Statute has begurr to run, dismissal under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) is improper." See Plaintiff's
Reply Brief, p. 10 (emphasis added). For this proposition. Plaintiff cites to Singlet Oil v. Forster,
98 Idaho 149, 151,559 P.2d 765 (1977), which expressed reluctance to grant a motion to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds whcre is was "unclear at what point a cause of action came into
existence." Id. The facts before the Court now arc not the situation contemplated by Singlcton
·where t11e date the cause of action accrued is in question. Here, Plaintiff's own complaint makes
it clear that the stntutc oflimitations has already run.

1 Plaintiffhas objected generally La AlA's Motion to Dismiss on grounds that certain of the

causes of action, accor-ding to Plaintiff, are pointed more at the director Defendants. This
objection is irrelevant. The complaint docs not make clear exactly who the account statcd
cause of action is asserted against. The Halter ego" cause of action is asserted against not
only the directors, but also "ccrtairr shareholders of AIA Services." AIA has an interest in
protecting its unnamed shareholders from faciaI1y invalid causes of action. Moreover, the socalled "causes of action" that Plaintiff asserts are only directed at the other defendants fail as
a matter onaw on their face, so it should not particularly mattcr which defendant moves to
dismiss them as all defcndants have an intcrest in having a clean and appropriate complaint

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMlSS - 3
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PlaintiITs Complaint alleges that the Amended Agreements were entered into in 1996.
See Second Amended Complaint, 'iJ 2.10. The Complaint then asserts that AIA services would
be in breach ofthe Amended Agreements and in default if, for example, AIA Services failed to
nlake timely interest payments (8 114% on the $6,000,000 note); became insolvent; failed to
llluintain a Lock Box to hold insurance commissions; failed

(0

keep Plaintiffon AIA Services'

Board of Directors; or several other events of default. Id. at 'iJ 2.12.
The CompIaint then alleges that Defendants breached the agreement in several respects
TIlore lhan five years prior to Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit. See e.g., id. at'iJ 2.13. ("In cxeess of
six years, AIA Services. John Dudas and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed
to the Board as I"cquired."); id. at'iJ 2.15 ("During all relevant times, the value of AIA Services
...vas less than the aggregate amount orits debts, which constitutes AIA Services' insolvency.
During a1] rdevant times, AIA Services was in default ofvarious provisions of the agreements
"\....ith Reed, insolvent andlor unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During ail relevant times,
AlA Services has failed to comply with the temlS ofthe promissory note.") (emphasis added).
Plaintiff now attempts to take back those statements by disingenuously arguing that he
only aUeged breaches "at aU relevant times" and did not spccifical1y give a date for the alleged
breaches. See Plaintiff's Response Brief, p. 11, footnote L This argument misrepresents not
only the unambiguous allegations onhe complaint - see id. at

~

2.13 (<LIn excess ofsix years,

AIA Services. John Duclos an dIo I." Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed

10

the

Boa.rd as required.") - but also the position Plaintiff has taken throughout tbis litigation. For
example. in Reed Taylor'S Affidavit in Support of Emergency Motion "iJ 35, Reed Taylor aUaches

for purposes of preparing for trial. Finally, the director Defendants have joined in the Motion
to Dismiss. rendering Plaintiffs objection moot.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 4
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the financial statements for AIA Services AlA Insurance for 2001-2002 and asserts that "these
Financial Statements show that AlA Services was insolvent in 2001 and 2002," which is more
than five years before Pluiotifffiled his complaint.
With regard to payments on the note, PlaintiIrs Response Brief, page 5, sets forth the
total payments made per year by AlA between 1997 and 2006. According to PlaintifPs
Compiaint, AlA was to make interest payments of8 114% on the $6,000,000 note, which is
$495,000 per year or $41.250 per month. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to meet those
contractual obligations in any single year between 1997 and 2005. See id. (setting forth
payments of$229,689 in 1997, $318,605 in 1998, etc.) Thus, according to plaintiff. Defendants
have been in breach of their payment obligations since 1997.
With rcgard to the Lock Box, PJaintiffstated under oath at the preliminary injunction
hearing that he docs not remember the lock box eve. being used other than around the time: it was
set up (1996), and that he was not particularly concerned about whether it was being used:
Q: Let me ask you to refer to paragraph 21 on page 5. "Plaintiff
now aUeges as an egregious event of default that the company
alIed to provide a lock box that diminished his security. In fact,
Plaintiff consented to and was intricately involved in the
termination ofihe lock box agreement by his efforts and consent to
assist in thc transfer ofthe AIA Insurance block ofheaIth
insurance business in 1997 from Universal Life and Centennial
Life insurance companies to Trustmark Insurance." Do you agree
with that?
A: No, other than when it was initially set up, I have no
recollection of anything about a lock box. And. frankly, I don'1
understand his previous discussion of why we didn't need it with a
different company because we always usc thc same: system.
Frankly. I wasn"t too concerned. \YC had so much money coming
in, mine was of smaB amount ofthc. tolaL

Hearing Transcript. p. 171.
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In Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Audit briefing, he asserts even more alleged breaches
that fall outside of the statute oflimitations. In his Second Supplemental Memorandum In
Support OfRis Motion To Compel Audit, page 3, Plaintiff asserts the "Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement requires that AlA Services be audited annually," and that Defendants
are in breach oflhat agreement because "AlA Services was last audited in 1999."
All oflhese allegations demonstrate. beyond any doubt, that praintiffis now bringing a
breach ofcontrnct cause of action aI1eging breaches that accrued more than five years before
PlaintiiTmed suit. 2 Despite Plaintifrs attempt to now take back the allegations of his complaint.
it is clear that Plaintiff is aHeging breached going back as far a ten years and, in any event, well

beyond lhe five-year statute oflimitations. This is not a case where it IS unclear when Plaintiff's
cause of action accrued. and the motion to dismiss is, therefore. appropriate.
As set forth in AlA's opening brief, there 1S no question that Plaintiff's breach of contract
cause ofaclion accrued mOTe than five years prior to Plaintiff's filing ofthe complaint. AJA
cited multiple Idaho Supreme Court cases holding that a breach of contract cause of action
accrues, and the statute of limilations begins to run, upon the first breach. (see I"'femorandum In
Support OrMation To Dismiss, pp. 4-6). Plaintiff's Reply Briefignores these authorities.
Plaintiff's Reply Brief further ignores AlA's citation to the Idaho Supreme Court
decision that dooms Plaintiff's case, Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,484 P.2d 728 (1971).

2 Although Plaintiff, htmsclf, invites the court to look at these facts outside of the four corners of
the complaint, the Court need not do so for purposes of this motion to dismiss in light of the
allegations in (he complaint that Defendants have been in breach "in excess of six years" and
"at all relevant times." These facts. all of which are taken from Plaintiff, himselt: are merely
recited to expose Plaintiff's misrepresentation that he is not really alleging breaches beyond
the statute of limitations.
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There, because the plaintiff alleged a breach in a lease agreement that occurred more than five
years prior to the filing of his complaint, the court held that the alleged breaches were barred by
the statute of limitations. Not only were they barred, but the Court explained that:
[I)t is evident that more than five years e1apsed between the time
the cause of action accrued and the time suit was instituted. The
lcnsens (lessors) wcre entitled to rely on the statute of limitations
as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim since actions in contract
must be brought within five years in this jurisdiction.... In view
of the length of time that Skaggs rested on their rights, it 'would
be inequitable in this Court's opinion to allow them to now
bring suit. By failing to object within a reasonable time aftei"
tIlC·Y felt their rights were being violated, they ratified and
modified the restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force.

lei., 94 Idaho

at 180.484 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added).

PlaintiffaUeges mUltiple breaches that occurred well over five years ago, including
failure to make the required interest payments, failure La put Reed Taylor on the board of
directors. insolvency. failure to maintain the lockbox. and failure to audit AlA Services. As
explained in Skaggs, "By failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their rights
were being violated, they mti fied and modified the restrictive provisl0n[s], thus: vitiating [their]
force." Ie!. (emphasis added).
2.

Plaintiff's Time-Barred Complaint Is Not Saved By Idaho Code § 5-23!l Or
Any Of The Other Theories Raised By Plaintiff

Piaintiffasscrts that his breach contract cause of action is not time-barred under Idaho
Code § 5-238, which provides:
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence ofa new or
continuing contract by which to lake the case out ofthe operation
of this chapter, unless the same is contained in some \vriling,
signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any paym.ent of
principal or interest is equivalent to a new promise in wrHing,
duly signed> to pay the residue ufthe debt.
[d. (emphasis added).
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Undcr Idaho raw, the stutute oflimitations "must be applied in all cases whe.c an
exception is not specifically made." Melldini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. 313.314 (1929).
"Statutes creating exemptions [to the statute of limitations] arc to be strictly construed al,d will
not be extended by implication." lei. The Court must apply the clear language ofthe statute,
strictly construed, which provides that payrrlent of principal or interest creates a "new promisc"
to "pay the residue of the debt." By the clear language ofthe statute. the part payments do not
toll the statute of limitations as to the obligations under the original contract. Rather, they create
a "new promise." That new promise is not the same as the original time-barred contract, but,
ruther, is a new promise only "to pay the residue oflhe debt." See also ]ylendini, 47 Idaho 439,
276 P. at 314 (applying the predecessor statute to Idaho Code § 5-238, and explaining that the
acknowledgment of the debt «did not therefore continue an existing contract, but created a neW
one"); Brower v. E.1. DuPoHt De Nemollrs and Co.• 117 Idaho 780,792 P.2d 345,347 ("[Idaho
Code § 5-238] provides that an acknowledgment or promise in writing and signed by tbe party to
be charged may constitute sufficient evidence ofa new or continuing contract in order to allow
recovery for a debt where the statute of lim ita lions bars recovelV under the original contract.")
(emphasis added).
AIA will concede, for purposes of this Motion to dismiss only. that PIaintiff's invocation
of Idaho Code § 5-238 prevents the Court fi-om concluding at this point whether or not AlA is
obligated "to pay the residue ofthe debt." However. Idaho Code § 5-238 docs not remove the
bar with regard to the alleged breaches of coo tract - aU of which accrued more than five years
prior Lo Plaintiff's filing oflhe complainl-- because Section 5-238 only creates n new promise to
pay the residue onhe debt. It does not res.urrect the other time-barred breach ofcontracl
allegations.
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This same conclusion is reached whether by application of the clear language of Idaho
Code § 5-238 orby application ofIdaho case law as set forth in Skaggs, 94 Idaho at 180. By
failing to file suit within five years, Plaintiff"ratified and modified the restrictive provIsion, thus
vitiating its force." Id. at 180. Either way, Plaintiffcannot assert the time-barred breaches (i.e.,
the alleged failure to make the required interest payments, failure to put Reed Taylor on the
board of directors, insolvency, failure to maintain the 10ckbox, and failure to audit AIF. Services)
because those breaches arc time-barred.
Finally, the srune conclusion is also reached through application of the PlaintifTs citation
to Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 91 Idaho 488,492,426 P.2d 209 (l967}. There. the
court addressed the statute onimitations with regard to an installment contract in which one of
two installments was due more than five ycars before the filing of the complaint. and the second
installment was due within the five yearpcriod. The court held that "[w]here money is payable
in installments, the statute of limitations begins to run against a cause of action for the recovery
ofa delinquent installment as of the time it becomes due." ld. Thus, the five-year statute of
limitations barred the corporation's action for :recovery oflhe first installment payment, but not
the second. Under this theory, at bes!, payments due iller January 0[2002 would bc the only
obligations not barred by the statute of limitations. Again, this theory would not resurrect the
other aileged breaches that arc already time-barred.
Given that Plaintiff's complaint establishes that aU of the aUeged breaches arc time
barred, the motion to dismiss should be grantcd ...vith leave for Plaintiff to amend the complaint
to allege facts supporting his claim that AlA is obligated <Lto pay the residue of the debt"
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-238.
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Third Cause of Action - IVUsrcpresentation/Fraud.

B.

Plainti.ff's cause ofaclion for fraud must be dismissed [or failure to plead ftuud with
particularity. As set forth previously. Plninti.fPs complaint docs not aHege with particularity a

single specific misrepresentation. PJaintiffresponds by asserting that he "spccificnHy pled all
nine required clements of fraud," (Response Brief, p. 20). but the fact remains that Plaintiff"s
Complaint does not allege the who, when, where, or what of any specific misrepresentations.
In apparent recognition of the lack of specificity, Plaintiff now sels forth at pages' 21 to
22 ofllis Response Brief essentially what he would allege in the complaint if given another
opportunity:
..
II>

"Reed relied on the representation that he would be a member of the board of directors."
"Reed relied on the representation that he would have a security interest in all
commissions"
«Reed again relying on the fact that he had a valid and perfected security interest in all
commissions"

"

«Reed relying on the Defendants' representations that tile corporation would be operated
in accordance with applicable legal standards"

..

"Reed relying on the fact. or omission. thereof, that all available sums would be paid on
his Note und/or that the corporations ,vouid be operated in accordance with legal
standards."
Even jgnoring the fact that these aIIegations stiH lack specificity as to who made what

specific misrepresentations, none of these representations support a cause of action for fraud
because they arc aUeged representations as to future actions rather than :representations of current
facts. Gillespie v. ivE01f11fa(n ParkEs/ales, L.L.C., 142 Idaho 671.674. 132 P.3d 428,430-31
(2006) ("As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in nature tbat

relate to future actions or upon the mere failure Lo perform a promise or an agreement to do
something in the future .... The allegedly false representation must concern past or existing
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material facts."); Thomas v. Medical CeWer Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,207,61 P.3d 557,
564 (2002) C"An action for fraud or misrepresentation wiii not lie for statements of future events .
. . . The law requires the plaintiff to fonn his or her own conclusions regarding the occurrence of
future events.").
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, ifhis actual fraud cause of action fails. he has stated a valid
cause of action for constructive fraud. Even ignoring the fact that Plaintiirs complaint docs not
allege "constructive fraud," that cause of action fails as a matter of law. As recognized in even
the authorities cited by Plaintiff, constructive fraud can only exist where a defendant owes
fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.. See, e.g., 37 Am.Jur2d Fraud and Deceit, § 9 (2007)
('<Constructive Fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
to another that induces justifiable reliance by the other to his or her prejudice.") (emphasis
added) (cited at p. 20 ofPlaintiWs Response Brief); see also Hilles v. Hilles. 129 Idaho 847,934
P.2d 20. 26 (1997) ("An action in constructive fraud exists when there has been a breach ofa
duty arising from a relationship oftrust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty."); J..lcGllee v.

McGbee. 82 Idaho 367, 371,353 P.2d 760, (1960) ("Constructive fraud usually arises from a
breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists.").
Here, tilere is no fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. The parties arc in a cI"cditordebtor relationship, which does not create fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Idaho First Nat. Bank v.

Bliss Valley Foods. Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277,824 P.2d 841,852 (1991) ("'the relationship in a
tender-borrower situation is a debtor-creditor relationship. and not a fiduciary relationship")
(citations omitted). PlaintiiT, a sophisticaled, multi-millionaire,businessman and founder ofa
successful insurance agency entered into an anus-length creditor-debtor relationship in which aIL
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parties were representcd by counsel. That creditor-debtor re1ationship does not give rise to
fiduciary duties and cannot, as a matter of law, support a constructive lraud cause of action.
C_

Fourth Cause of Action - Conversion.
In its opening brief, AlA set forth the general rule that the fallure to pay money due under

a contrnct is actionable in contract, but, as a mattcr of law, does not constitute conversion.
Indeed, Idaho courts expressly hold that a cause of action for conversion requires and affinnative
act, i.e., that the defendant takes property lrom the plaintiff's possession. See e.g., Peasley

Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho at 743 CHA [conversion] right of action accrues in favor ofihe
owner ofpropcrty as soon as the property is wrongfully taken froITl his possession or wrongfully
converted.") (emphasis

addcd)~

see, also, 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 21 ("Some affirmative

act on the part of the defendant is usually regarded as necessary to constitute a conversion .. _
Even where it results in the loss ofthc property, the failure to perfoffil an act made obligatory by
contract will not amount to a conversion."). Here, plnintiffaUeges that he was not paid funds
due to him, not that any property has been taken from his possession.
PlaintiITdoes not offer any countcr to the above authorities, other than the unsupported
argument that allegations of misappropriation ofcorpornle assets "have historically been
regarded as conversion." See Response Brief,. p. 24-25. The authorities citcd by Plaintiff,
however, do not support his proposition. PlainlifPs citation to Nelson

Y.

Jones, 38 Idaho 664,

224 P. 435 (1924), is not helpful. Nelson did not involve a conversion cause of action at alL
Rather, it involved a lraudulent transfer cause of action. Id. at 437. The court affinned the
fraudulent transfer judgment, noting in passing ahat the fraudu1ent transfer «was in legal effect an
unlawful conversion of this property to his

O\\ITI

use:' ki at 438. The court did not address a

conversion cause of action. much less hold that failure to pay a debt constitutes conversion.
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Lussier v. Mall Van Development, Inc.• 667 P.2d 804, 814 (Hawaii App. 1983). similarly
did not involve a conversion cause of action at alL Moreover, it involved a shareholder
derivative action, not an action by a creditor against a corporation. Rather than allege a cause of
action for conversion. the shareholder brought a claim for "misuse of corporate funds," i.e., a
claim by the shareholders that the directors had misappropriated corporate assets to the detriment
of the shareholders. In affinning summary judgment in favor of1he directors, the Court noted
that "directors and officers must use corporate funds for corporate purposes only or they will be
liable [or misappropriation, diversion. or conversion of corporate assets." Id. at 814. Oicourse.
all this statement means is that the directors may be liable to the corporation and/or its
slmreholdcrs for misappropriation, diversion, or conversion of corporate assets. This case docs
not support Plaintiff's argument that failure to pay a contractual obligation to a creditor satisfies
the clements of conversion.

The only case ci1ed by Plaintiff that even addresses an actual conversion cause ofactlon
is Western Farm Services, Inc. v. OlselT, 90 P.3d 1053 (\Vn. 2004). and that case is easily

distinguishable because it involved an affirmative act of conversion. There, Key Bank held a
security interest in potato crops purchased by Simp]ot. Key Bank scnt notice to Simp lot that Key
Bank should be listed as a co-payee on any check wriHen by Simplot to the seller ofthc potatoes.
Simplot,.l1Dwcvcr, issued a check made payable only to the seller, not to Key Bank. Thus, unlike
a si.mple failure to perfolln contractual obligations, IVestern Farm Sen/ices involved an

affirmative act of conversion.

D.

Fifth Cause of Action - Alter Ego.
As set forth previously, the rule recognized both by the courts and leading treatises is that

"aller ego" is not an independent cause ofaction at all. Plaintiff's response is that the Court
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should not fo11o"" this well-settled rule because there does not appear to be an Idaho case directly
on point. Of course, the fact that there is not a single Idaho case recognizing ''-aIter ego" as an
independent cause of action actually provides addition support that it is not recognized as a cause
ofacLion in Idaho. 3
Plainlifffurther argues that the Court should be reluctant Lo dismiss the alter ego cause of
action (and Llle constnlctive Lrust and director liability causes of action) "','vher-e the asserted
theory ofEability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories be explored
and assayed in the light of actual facts, not apleader's supposition." See Plaintiff's Response
Brief, p. 27 (citing Stewart v. Arrington COllst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531 (19G8). However, there is
nothing «novel or unusual" about these theories. They arc remedies that arc triggercd by other
valid causes of action, not independent causes of action in and of themselves.
Finally, for the reasons previously set forth in detail, alter ego liability is inappropriate
under the facts pled by Plaintiff.
E.

Sixth Cause of Action - Equitable Indemnification.
Under clear Idaho law, and as accepted by leading treatises and courts across the country,

PlalntiWs contract cause of action cannot support a claim for the tort cause of action of equitable
indemnification. Plaintiffsirnply ignores AIA's citation to the Idaho authority directly on point.

See Mitchell v. Valerio. 124 Idaho 283.285, 858 P.2d 822. 824 (Idaho App. 1993) (HAn
indemnity relationship between tortfeasors exists when the parties share a common liability for

3 Plaintiff ciles A£agic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. KoloHeh. 123 Idaho 434. 849 P.2d 107 (1993),
as u case that UrccognizIes] alter ego as a claim." See Plaintiff"s Response Brief. p. 27
(emphasis added). That case, however, only discusses an alter ego "claim" in the context of
a rcs judicata analysis, and docs not address whether alter ego is an independent cause of
action.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 14

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Hawley Troxell

6/4/2007 3:19

PAGE 16/21

FAX:

(208)342-3829

the same barrn") (emphasis added); see, also, 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity, § 20 ("For
indemnification

imp1ied~jn-iav... ,

more an equitable remedy than an action in and ofitself, there

must be an underlying injury sounding in tort, and the party seeking indemnity must have
imputed or derivative liability for the tortious conduct from which indemnity is sought.... The
doctrine of equitable indemnity applies only among defendants who are jointly and severally
liable 10 the plaintiff.").
Morcover. as set forth previously - but whoUy ignored by Plaintiff - any claim for
indemnification is not ripe because Plaintiff's own complaint states that he has not paid anything
to

Donna Taylor. See May Trllck-ing Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319,322, 543

P.2d 1159, 1162 (1975) (explaining that an indemnity cause of action arises at "the time of
paym.ent or settlement by the indenmitee," and that, "[iJn this case lhe record is unclear as to
when. if ever, May Trucking Company paid Fanner for the damage").
The equitable indemnification cause of action should be dismissed both because there is
no joint tortfeasor relationship and because any indemnity cause of action has yet to accrue.
F.

Seven tIl

C~use

of Action - Account Statcdfl\1onies Due.

PlnintiffwhoHy fails to respond to AIA's argument with regard to 1he account stated
cause ofactioo. As set forth prevlously, an account stated cause of action must be supported by
a writing that "exhibits the state of account bet"\vccn parties and the balance owed one to the
other,

UIld

when assented la, either expressly or irnpliedly. it becomes a new contract.... [T]he

account, in order to constitute a contract, should appear to be something more than a mere
memorandum; it should show upon its face that it was intended to be a final settlement up

10

date, and this should be expressed with cleanlcss and certainty..... The transaction must be
understood by the parties as a final adjustment of the respective demands between them and of
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the amount due." 1l1oden: A1ills, IHc. v. Havens. 112 Idaho 1101, 1105-06,739 P.2d 40D. 40405 (Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added) (citations oITliHed).

The complaint demonstrates that there is no written agrecITlent establishing a final
adjustment as to the "runount due." Rather, it alleges that the account stated "remains unpaid,
along with any oLbers which mav have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at this time, the
dates and exact amount of which wi]] be proven at tria1." Second Amended Complaint, "il9.2.
Plaintiff's Reply Brief does nothing to save 11[S account stated cause of action. It refers
the court to Exhibit AJ. from the preliminary injunction hearing. Even lfthe court reaches
outside the four corners of the complaint to consider that document, it certainly does not "show
upon its face that it was intended to be a final settlement up 10 date," much less with the required
"clearness and certainlY" required by Alodern1vIiiTs. Moreover, it docs not set forth a ba1ance
owed as admitted even by Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff's Response Brief continues to concede that
it docs not set forth a specific balance due. See p. 30 (stating that defendants owe "at least
$307,271") (emphasis added). Moreover. Exhibit AJ is an internal ALA. accounting document,

not a writing that the parties understood to be a final settlement of an amount due.
G.

Seventh Cause of Action - Unjust En!"ichment.
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment cause ofaction should be dismissed for two reasons. First,

under any interpretation ofPlaintifPs complaint, even accepting all inferences as true. Plaintiff
cannot satisfy the first element of an unjust claim - that a benefit is conferred upon defendant Qy
plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts only that:

AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John. Duclos, andior Freeman have
retained the benefit of their fraudulent, >V"rongful, improper andIor
overreaching conduct amito. transfers.
John and/or anyone o. more oflhc othel Defendants would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets,
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 16
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securities, loans. advances and/or other services received through
AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance, aU ofwhich funds should
have been paid to Reed.

See Second Amended Complaint, 'lI 10.2 (emphasis added).
Second, Plaintiff's allegations ofa written contract governing I.he alleged obligations to
Plaintiff precludes a separate cause of action .for unjust enriclunent. This clear rule of Idaho law
is set forth in the four Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals cases cited previously,
to which Plaintiff offers no counter. Pl.aintiffstates that "Defendants appear to be suggesting that
Reed Taylor cannot requests relicf under alternative theDries of contract and quasi.contmctJunjust enrichment." See PlatntifI's Rcsponse Brief, p. 2. \Vith aU due respect, it is nDt

AlA that is "suggesting" such a rule. ActuaUy, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically so held
an numerous occasions. and Plaintiff has presented no authority to the contrary.
H.

Eighth Cause of Action- Constructive Trust.
Plaintiffhas done nothing to rebut the universally recognized rule thut "constructive

tiUst» is a remedy that is availab1e in the event that a plai"ntiffprevails on certain causes of action
that trigger such a remedy. but tIltlt it is not an independent cause of action.
Like the other improper causes of action, the constructive fraud cause of action should be
dismissed, leaving Plaintiffwith the option of seeking the remedy ifhe prevails on any causes of
action that would entitled him to the remedy ofa constructive trust. See, e.g, Fujisawa

Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor. 16 F.Supp.2d 941. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (HA constructive
trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action .... Accordingly, while the
claim is dismissed. it is understood Fujisawa may attempt to prove a constructive trust is an
appropriate equitable remedy should it prevail on other claims."); 3Com Corp. v. Electronics

Recovery Specialists, inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 932.942 (N.D. III. 2000) (same).
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Ninth Cause of Action - Dircdor LiabUity.
Like the alter ego and constructive trust causes o!action, "director liability" is nDt a cause

of action. Plaintiff's only response is to assert that it need not engage in a "battle ofoul-of-slate
authority," followed by a citation 10 Ong Hillg v. Arizona Harness Raceway. Inc., 459 P .2d 107
(Ariz. App. 1969). That case, however, just proves Defendants' point that Hdirector liabIHty" is

not a separate cause of action. Plaintiff cites the case as one ·<recognizing a cause of action for
director liability;' but it certainly does not. Plaintiff apparently is relying on one sentence in the
decision that states: '<'Ne find that Count III ofPlaintifrs complaint states a cnuse of action for
individual corporate director liability." Id. at ll5. However,just a few paragraphs prior to that
statement, the court explains that "Count ill ofPfaintifi's complaint was an action for wrongful
interference with contractual relations. The claim was asserted against the individual directors
and personal liability sought to be imposed." Id. at 114. In other words. the actual cause of
action \vas for wrongful interference with contractual relations that was being asserted against
the directors personally, not a separate cause of action for "director liability" with no real cause
of action attached to it. The court's statement that "Count ilr of Plaintiff's complaint states a
cause of action for individual corporate director liability" simply means that the PlaintUTstated a
cause of action - for wrongful interference with contractual relations - and that the cause of
action was facially valid against the individual directors.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, AIA respectfully requests that its motion to dismiss be
granted.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMlTTED THIS

UtI..,.

-L day ofJune. 2007.

HAVlLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA\VLEY LLP

BY~~
_J

shby ISB No. 7228

'A .omeys for Defendants AlA Servlces

Corporation and AlA Insurance. Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~taay of June, 2007, I caused to be serVed a true
copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISM1SS by the method
indicated below. and addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
SlTIith. Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintifl]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mnil
_ _ Telecopy

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
AJ1\crs & Cressman PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Deliver-ed
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston. W A 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

---A:- Em ail

-X- EmaiI
_ _ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~Email

1Y1ichael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
32l 13th Street
Lewiston, lD 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Tclecopy

----X.- Email

Jonatban D. Hany
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 8350J
[Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor)

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
...:;L-Email
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone:. (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
AMENDED MOTION AND
MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO
AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT
COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend and
Supplement his Complaint in the form attached as Exhibit A to this Motion:

III
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO
AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT - 1

77~

ORIGI Al

I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This Amended Motion and Memorandum of Law to Amend and Supplement Complaint,
the attached Exhibit A, and the Court's file.

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires ... " LR.C.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to supplement a
"pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sough to be supplemented ... " LR.C.P. 15(d). "Great liberty should be shown in
allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82
Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960).
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend and supplement his Third Amended
Complaint in the form attached as Exhibit A to this Amended Motion. The attached proposed
Fourth Amended Complaint supersedes and replaces that proposed Fourth Amended Complaint
attached to Reed Taylor's original Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint.
The purpose of the amendment and supplement is to: (1) incorporate events which have
transpired since the filing of the Second Amended Complaint; (2) clarify claims, causes of action
and requested relief; (3) allege new claims and causes of action against present and new
defendants; and (4) to name new defendants.

III
III
III
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III. CONCLUSION
Reed Taylor should be permitted to file his Fourth Amended Complaint in the form
attached as Exhibit A to this Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint.
DATED: This 7th day of June, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

BY:~~-Rodenck C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Hearing, Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Amend and
Supplement Complaint (including Exhibit A - Plaintiffs Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint)
and Proposed Order on Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement on the following party(s)
via the methode s) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 l3 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829

Signed this 7th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderick C.

0
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single
person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Fourth Amended Complaint against the Defendants
alleging as follows:
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.1

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of Lewiston,

Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.2

Defendant AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") is an Idaho corporation

with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.3

Defendant AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") is an Idaho corporation with

its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. AlA Insurance
is a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services.
1.4

Defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie") is a single person residing in Lewiston, Nez

Perce County, Idaho.
1.5

Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife until on or

about December 16, 2005 (collectively "John") and at all relevant times were residents of
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. All references to "John" are for acts, omissions, claims,
causes of action, and/or liabilities that accrued on or before December 16, 2005, are for John
individually, and were also performed on behalf of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's marital
community (which benefited from R. John Taylor's acts andlor omissions) as to divided and
undivided community property. All references to "John" for acts, omission, claims, causes of
action, and/or liabilities that accrued after December 16, 2005, are for John individually and
pertain to Connie as to their divided and undivided community property.
III
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1.6

Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos")

IS

a single person residing in Clarkston,

Washington.
1.7

Defendant Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in Lewiston,

Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.8

Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Crop USA")

IS

an Idaho

corporation.
1.9

Defendant James Beck and Corrine Beck (collectively "Beck") are residents of

the state of Minnesota. All references to "Beck" are for acts, omissions, claims, causes of action,
and/or liabilities that accrued are for James Beck individually, and were also performed on
behalf of James Beck and Corrine Beck's marital community (which benefited from James
Beck's acts and/or omissions) and pertain to Corrine Beck as to acts and/or omissions on behalf
of the community and as to all community property.
1.10

The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under I.e. § 1-705.

1.11

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce

County pursuant to I.C. § 5-404.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2.1

John, was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AIA Services, AIA

Insurance, and Crop USA. During the certain relevant times in which John was a director and
officer of AIA Insurance and AlA Services, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single
largest creditor of AIA Insurance and AlA Services.

John and Connie are the majority

shareholders in AlA Services and own approximately 40% of the outstanding shares of Crop
USA.
III
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2.2

R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor were divorced through an Interlocutory Decree

filed on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community assets were divided
and other property remained undivided.

This action includes, but is not limited to, acts,

omissions, transactions, debts, claims, andlor causes of action which accrued prior to R. John
Taylor and Connie Taylor's dissolution. All references to "John" in this Complaint are for
claims, breaches of duties, acts, omissions and liabilities incurred by R. John Taylor on behalf of
the marital community of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, together with their community
property, whether divided or not through the effective date of their dissolution decree entered on
or about December 16,2005.
2.3

After the effective date of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's decree of

dissolution, all references to "John" in this Complaint are for claims, breaches of duties, acts,
omissions and/or liabilities incurred by R. John Taylor individually. One of the reasons Connie
Taylor is named as a party in this action for her derivative liability by virtue of her marriage to R.
John Taylor and her interest in the community property of the marriage (including all divided
and undivided community property of their marriage) all of which is subject to liability for the
allegations in this Complaint of the acts, breaches of duties, claims, omissions, and conduct of R.
John Taylor on and prior to December 16, 2005.
2.4

During the certain relevant times that Connie Taylor ("Connie") was a director of

AIA Insurance and AIA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor
of the corporations. Connie is also individually liable for all claims, breaches of duties, acts,
omissions and/or liabilities during certain relevant times in which she was a member of the board
of directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
III
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Duclos is, and was at certain relevant times, an officer and director of AlA

Services, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA. Duclos is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop
USA. During the certain relevant times that Duclos was a director and officer of AIA Insurance
and AlA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the
corporations.
2.6

Freeman is, and was at certain relevant times, a director of AlA Services, AIA

Insurance, and Crop USA. Freeman is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop USA. During the
certain relevant times that Freeman was a director of AIA Insurance and AIA Services, he owed
fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the corporations.
2.7

Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor own approximately 40% of Crop

USA, which remained undivided community property at the time Reed filed his original
Complaint.
2.8

Defendant Beck is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop USA. During the

certain relevant times that Beck was a member of the board of directors of AIA Insurance and
AIA Services, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the corporations.
2.9

Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services. In 1995, John

desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA Services through a stock
redemption agreement. Upon the closing of the transaction of AlA Services' redemption of
Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AIA Services.
2.10

AIA Insurance, a subsidiary of AIA Services, is wholly owned by AIA Services

and where virtually all of AlA Services' revenues are derived. AlA Insurance is lessee of the
office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.
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2.11

On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed entered into a Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the terms of
the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AIA Services agreed to execute
promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down Payment Note") and
$6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the rate of

8~%

per annum

("Promissory Note").
2.12

The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AlA Services on or

about August 1, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AlA Services was required to
timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of $6,000,000, plus all
accrued but unpaid interest was due and payable on August 1,2005.
2.13

Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA Services and AIA

Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge
Agreement, among other agreements and documents. The Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock
Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all either authorized by the Board of Directors
of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance and/or approved by a shareholder vote.
2.14

When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption

Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John (on behalf of AlA Services)
entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations.

In 1996, AlA

Services, AIA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and
executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Restructure Agreement").
Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the parties executed an
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement") and an
Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended Security Agreement").
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Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the Promissory Note

remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000 principal amount, due
date, and required monthly interest payments).

Under the terms of the Amended Security

Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AIA Services and AlA Insurance's
commissions and related services (and all proceeds thereof) and AlA Services and AlA
Insurance were required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the benefit of Reed.
2.16

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services pledged

all of the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AlA Services'
indebtedness to Reed under the agreements. Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, AlA Services' failure to timely pay Reed interest or principal under the Promissory
Note or Down Payment Note constituted an Event of Default. In an Event of Default for failure
to timely pay interest or principal under the Promissory Note, AIA Services' insolvency, or AlA
Services' failure to maintain the required Lock Box (among other Events of Default), AlA
Services' right to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance ceased and terminated and vested
exclusively in Reed.
2.17

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed was required to

be a member of the board of directors of AlA Services until Reed was paid in full or sufficient
security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory Note. AIA Services never posted
bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory Note. In excess of six years, AlA
Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Board
as required. A new right to be a member of the board of AlA Services is created every year as
directors are elected yearly. Despite Reed's demands and AlA Services' contractual obligations
to keep Reed on the board of directors, AlA Services, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or
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Beck have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services as required.
Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by AlA Services' Board
were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AlA Services; and such acts are the
personal actions of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck during their tenure on the board
of AlA Services.
2.18

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services agreed to not loan

money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary. AIA Services has loaned money to
or provided other services or benefits to affiliates and other parties in violation of the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, and such loans or benefits were made during times in which John,
Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were Board members.
2.19

The Promissory Note required monthly interest payments with an acceleration

clause if payments were not properly made to Reed. The acceleration clause requires written
notice from Reed to AIA Services of default and AIA Services would be entitled to a five day
opportunity to cure before Reed could exercise his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement or Amended Security Agreement.

The obligations owed to Reed under the

Promissory Note are independent of any other obligations owed by the Defendants and secured
by the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement.
2.20

During relevant times, the value of AlA Services and AlA Insurance was less than

the aggregate amount of their total debts, which constitutes AIA Services and AIA Insurance's
insolvency. During relevant times, AlA Services and AIA Insurance were unable to pay their
debts as they became due, which constitutes AIA Services and AIA Insurance's insolvency.
2.21

During certain relevant times, Reed was the largest and only significant creditor

of AIA Services.

Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay creditors as
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required during certain relevant times andlor was insolvent, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and
Beck owed fiduciary duties to creditors and, specifically Reed because of his status as AlA
Services' largest creditor.
2.22

During certain relevant times, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were in default

of various provisions of the agreements with Reed, insolvent andlor unable to timely pay its
debts to Reed and/or other creditors. During certain relevant times, AIA Services has failed to
comply with the terms of the Promissory Note.
2.23

Instead of paying Reed as required, AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos,

Connie, Beck, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to make
investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of John and/or
entities operated andlor partially owned by John, Connie, Beck, Freeman, Duclos and/or one or
more of the other Defendants.
2.24

On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AlA Services written notice of

default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation, AlA Services'
failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure to maintain the Lock
Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including guaranteeing the $15 Million
revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), failure to provide all required
financial information, and other defaults as set forth in the notice.

AlA Services and AlA

Insurance have failed to timely cure the defaults and all applicable cure periods have expired. As
of the date of this Complaint, the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of
$6,000,000, plus accrued interest of over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required.
III
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2.25

Prior to Reed's Notice of Default dated December 12, 2006, Reed had never

accelerated any of the indebtedness due under the Promissory Note. Even though AlA Services
and AIA Insurance failed to cure such defaults set forth in Reed's Notice of Default dated
December 12, 2006, AlA Services continued to make partial interest payments before and after
the date of Reed's original Complaint. All amounts due under the Promissory Note are secured
by the remedies available under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security
Agreement.
2.26

Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos,

Connie and/or Beck have failed to comply with the terms of the Restructure Agreement,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. Under the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AlA Insurance's shares ceased and terminated
for AIA Services and became vested in Reed when AIA Services failed to timely pay the
required monthly interest payments due under the Promissory Note and its subsequent failure to
pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the Promissory Note on August 1, 2005. AlA Services
was in default before Reed demanded to exercise his right to hold a special shareholder meeting
to vote the shares to appoint a new board of directors for AIA Insurance.
2.27

On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a special

shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance for the purpose of removing and appointing new board
members on December 26, 2006. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman
refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special shareholder meeting by representing that
AlA Insurance's offices were closed on December 26,2006.
2.28

Through a letter dated January 3, 2007, John acknowledged Reed's rights under

the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement when he stated "I fully recognize that [Reed] Taylor may
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take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special shareholders meeting."
2.29

On or about January 25,2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a special

shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for February 5,
2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Through a letter from
Duclos, AIA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he had the right to call a meeting
to vote the AlA shares.

Despite Reed's demands, AIA Insurance refused to hold a special

shareholder meeting.
2.30

Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services and AlA Insurance failed to cure the

numerous Defaults under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as described above).
Through the date of this Complaint, AIA Services and AlA Insurance's Defaults were not timely
cured and they remained in Default.
2.31

On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares by

executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Insurance removing John,
Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself the sole Board Member,
pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Because AIA Services' right to vote the pledged shares had ceased and terminated when it
became in Default and failed to timely cure such Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in
AIA Insurance vested exclusively in Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares
pursuant to the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AIA
Insurance. Because the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AlA
Insurance, Reed had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the
formality of holding a shareholder meeting. Because Reed appointed himself as the sole director
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Insurance through a Consent in Lieu of a Board Meeting.
2.32

In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that more

than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AIA Services had failed to service
its debt to Reed. In 2004, AIA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares
in AIA Services from Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an entity in which John was the single
largest shareholder (John holds approximately 40% of the outstanding shares in Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) and Beck also owns a substantial stake. This transaction inappropriately
and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AlA Insurance's funds to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. when such funds should have been tendered to Reed and/or used to pay the holder
of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services. This $1,510,693 transfer occurred at a time in
which AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were insolvent as defined above. This $1,510,693
transfer also occurred at the same time that AlA Services' 401(k) Plan (the "Plan") held over
$750,000 in Preferred C Shares in AlA Services. No shares were purchased or redeemed from
the Plan, even though John and Duclos were the Co-Trustees of the Plan at the time of the
transfer.
2.33

Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered into a

lease agreement with AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance to lease the parking lot from him for
$1,250 per month. This transaction was also the fraudulent transfer of funds to John and funds
which should have been paid to Reed during a time in which AIA Services was unable to service
its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. The parking lot is not utilized by AlA Insurance or
AlA Services. Such acts and/or transfers have occurred during John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie
andlor Beck's tenure as members of the Board of AlA Insurance and/or AIA Services.
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Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together with

transactions referenced in the foot notes to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's financial
statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, payments, advances
and other actions which occurred during times AlA Services defaults and inability to timely pay
Reed and at times in which AlA Services was insolvent. Upon information and belief, Reed
believes that forensic accounting and further scrutiny of AlA Insurance and AlA Services' books
and records will reveal additional improper and actionable activities.
2.35

During times in which John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck owed Reed

fiduciary duties, they have used AlA Services and AIA Insurance as their personal source of
funds and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets, rescourses, and/or funds
to Crop USA, Sound Insurance and/or other entities partially owned or controlled by John;
entered into transactions which constitute a violation of AlA Services' Articles of Incorporation;
made transfers and/or entered into transactions which benefited them; and provided services for
entities partially owned by them without such actions being arms-length transactions. The above
acts occurred when John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were directors and/or officers of
AlA Services and AIA Insurance. All of the above acts occurred during certain relevant times in
which AIA Services was not current with payments to Reed under the Promissory Note and was
insolvent.
2.36

On February 22,2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder

Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate all officers, terminate
the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other actions deemed
appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the Consents described
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above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos andlor Freeman refused to abide by the
Consents.
2.37

Donna Taylor, the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services,

subordinated all of her rights to payment of the redemption of her shares in favor of the Plaintiff
Reed J. Taylor. Through the date of Reed's original Complaint, AlA Services had not timely
and properly paid all sums owed to Donna Taylor.
2.38

During the relevant times that John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were

directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, they failed to take appropriate legal action on
behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA Services.

During the relevant times that John, Duclos,

Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, they breached
their fiduciary duties owed to Reed.
2.39

Sometime after filing Reed's original Complaint, Freeman and Duclos resigned as

members of the board of directors of AlA Insurance and AlA Services. John, in breach of his
fiduciary duties owed to Reed and in violation of Reed's vote of the pledge shares in AlA
Insurance, appointed Connie and Beck to the board of AIA Insurance. John also appointed
Connie and Beck to the board of AIA Services in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Reed.
These appointments were conflicts of interest and breaches of John's fiduciary duties owed to
Reed.
2.40

During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were directors of AIA

Services and AlA Insurance, they failed to take appropriate legal action on behalf of AlA
Insurance and AlA Services. During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were
directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, they breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed.
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2.41

Reed has a valid and perfected security interest in all commissions from sale of

insurance and related services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, AlA Insurance and AIA
Services, and interest thereon. Reed demanded that no funds which he had a security interest in
and/or which should be paid to him could be used to pay the legal fees of John, Duclos or
Freeman. Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Connie and/or Beck
have unlawfully, improperly and inappropriately diverted funds to pay John, Duclos and/or
Freeman's attorneys' fees and costs. Because all of AlA Services' revenues are derived from
AlA Insurance's commissions and related services that Reed has a valid security interest in, such
payments also constitute an illegal and/or unauthorized dividend from AIA Insurance to AIA
Services, conversion, fraud and fraudulent conveyances.
2.42

Prior to the filing of Reed's original Complaint and without Reed's knowledge or

consent, John paid a debt he owed to AIA Services in the amount of $307,271 by transferring
said indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note.

Such payment constitutes fraud (as set forth

below), an account stated and/or moneys personally owed to Reed from John (including Connie)
as the payment was reflected on AlA Services' financial statements.
2.43

After the filing date of Reed's original Complaint, Duclos and Freeman resigned

as directors of AlA Services and AIA Insurance.

John appointed Connie and Beck as

replacement board members without holding a shareholder vote of AlA Services or AlA
Insurance.

John's appointment of Connie and Beck as directors of AlA Services and AlA

Insurance was a conflict of interest and breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Reed and other
creditors.
2.44

Sound Insurance has been operating through AlA Services and/or Insurance and

with funds, assets, rent, and/or services provided by AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance during
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certain relevant times that John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck owed fiduciary duties to
Reed. Since the filing of Reed's Original Complaint and upon information and belief, Crop USA
purchased Sound Insurance from John and/or other unknown parties. The Defendants' operation
of Sound Insurance and subsequent sale constitutes breaches of fiduciary duties, converSIOn,
fraud and/or a fraudulent conveyance.
2.45

Global Travel was a tenant

III

ALA Insurance's office building located in

Lewiston, Idaho. Since the filing of Reed's original Complaint, Global Travel has relocated as a
tenant in an office building owned by R. John Taylor. Such actions are a breach of R. John
Taylor, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and Beck's fiduciary duties owed to Reed, fraud and/or a
fraudulent conveyance.
2.46

Through a letter dated February 27, 2001, John represented to Reed that AlA

Services and/or AlA Insurance was developing a new crop insurance program through a new
company called Crop USA. Reed relied on John's representation that ALA Services and/or AlA
Insurance were the owners of Crop USA, when John's representation was false in that Crop USA
was not owned by ALA Insurance or AlA Services, but instead owned by John, Beck, Freeman,
and Duclos.
2.47

John made representations to Reed that he would not be taking a salary in certain

year(s). Reed relied on John's false representation and in late 2006 or early 2007 learned that
John had in fact taken a salary during the respective times.
2.48

John made representations and/or omitted material facts to Reed that AlA

Services and AlA Insurance were being operated for the benefit of AlA Services and ALA
Insurance. AlA Services and AlA Insurance made representations and/or omitted material facts
to Reed through their financial statements that they were being operated for the benefit of the
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corporations. Reed relied on AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John's false representations and/or
omissions of material facts when in fact AlA Services and AIA Insurance were not being
operated for the benefit of the corporations, but instead were being operated for the benefit of
John, Freeman, Duclos, Crop USA, Sound Insurance, and/or Beck. As directors, Freeman, John
and Duclos also made the false representations and/or omitted material facts by and through the
corporations' financial statements.
2.49

John, Freeman, and Duclos breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor

when AlA Insurance guaranteed a $15,000,000 loan for Crop USA. This guarantee is also a
violation of AIA Insurance's Bylaws and the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
AIA Insurance received no benefit from this loan and received no consideration.
2.50

After the inappropriate and fraudulent transfer of $1,510,693 to Crop USA

described above, the wrongful transfer was misrepresented on the financial statements of AlA
Insurance as an investment with a value of approximately $1,500,000, when the "investment"
was worthless. John, Duclos and/or Freeman were aware, or should have been aware, of this
false fact as AIA Services was insolvent.
2.51

Reed believes that there are other acts, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties,

wrongful transfers and/or fraudulent transactions that he will itemize and detail through future
amended complaints upon completion of discovery and/or at trial.

By and through this

paragraph, the Defendants should be placed on notice that Reed intends to recover every dollar
of funds, assets, services, loans, barters and the like that were utilized and/or transferred through
fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, fraudulent conveyances, and any other
causes of action set forth below.
III
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2.52

The unity of ownership of AIA Services, AlA Insurance and/or Crop USA is such

that the separate personalities of the corporations and the individuals no longer exist. Equity
should prevent the acts and omissions from being solely those of AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and/or Crop USA. As a result of the unlawful acts, conduct, omissions, fraud, failure to observe
corporate governance, and breaches of fiduciary duties as set forth in this Complaint, AIA
Insurance, AlA Services and/or Crop USA are the alter-egos of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie
and/or Beck and such corporate veils should be pierced thereby imposing personal liability on
John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and Beck.
2.53

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie andlor Beck

unlawfully provided Crop USA, Sound Insurance, and/or other entities with rent, labor, funds,
services, resources, and/or other assets without adequate compensation to the detriment of AlA
Services, AIA Insurance and Reed.

III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT
3.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
3.2

AIA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions and failure to

pay Reed the amounts owed and/or comply with the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement constitute a breach of
their contractual obligations owed to Reed. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and/or John's acts
and/or omissions constitute the breach of obligations owed to Reed under the Promissory Note,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Restructure Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and
monies owed to Reed.
III
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3.3

As a result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions

which constitute numerous breaches of contractual obligations, Reed has suffered and is entitled
to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in an amount to be determined at trial to be
allocated between the defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial.

In addition, Reed is

entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121.

IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
4.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
4.2

The Defendants' actions constitute fraudulent transfers and/or conveyances under

I.e. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common law doctrine of Fraudulent Conveyances.
4.3

As a result of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck's participation and/or

approval of the fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck are personally
liable for all fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at trial. All
fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded and/or all assets placed in a constructive
trust for the benefit of Reed.
4.4

Crop USA is and/or was the recipient of various fraudulent transfers from AlA

Services andlor AlA Insurance, and should be required to return all funds, rescind all
transactions, and/or the ownership interest in Crop USA should be placed in a constructive trust
for the benefit of Reed.
III
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v.
5.1

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONSIFRAUD
(Fraud and/or Constructive Fraud)
Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
5.2

AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or John made statements of fact andlor omitted

material statements of fact, including, without limitation those facts set forth in Paragraphs 2.33,
2.42, 2.44, and 2.45-2.48 above; such statements of fact were false or omitted material facts;
such false statements or omitted facts were material; AIA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John
knew or should have known the falsity of such statements; AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor
John intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the falsity of such statements and/or
omissions; and Reed relied on such statements and/or omissions; Reed had a right to rely on such
false statements and/or omissions.
5.3

By and through their fraudulent acts and/or omISSIons, including, without

limitation, the allegations set forth in this Complaint and in Paragraphs 2.33, 2.42, and 2.45-2.48
above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck's acts and/or
omissions constitute fraud, constructive fraud, and/or fraud as set forth in Smith v. Great Basin
Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977), and Reed is entitled to recover all damages

attributable to such fraud. Under the theory set forth under Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., AlA
Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie andlor Beck are liable for all funds,
assets, and services that were unlawfully and/or inappropriately transferred and/or utilized to
their benefit during their tenure as officers, directors, and/or shareholders in AlA Services and
Crop USA.
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5.4

As a result of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie,

and/or Beck's acts, false statements, omissions, and/or fraud, Reed was damaged as consequence
or proximate result of such acts, false statements, omissions, and/or fraud and is entitled to
recover such damages from the responsible Defendants.

VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION
6.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
6.2

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Connie, Freeman and/or

Beck's conduct constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money which
should have been paid to him and/or money in which he had a valid security interest (whether
through UCC filings andlor through security interests in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement),
without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of such money and/or
property.

Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were recipients of the

converted assets, funds, and/or services (including for any attorneys' fees and costs paid on their
behalf by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance).
6.3

As a result of the AlA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos,

Freeman, Connie andlor Beck's unlawful acts and/or conduct, Reed has been damaged and is
entitled to damages proven at trial.

VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTEREGO/PIERCING CORPORATE VAIL
(As a Cause of Action and/or as Notice of Personal Liability)
7.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
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7.2

Reed also specifically re-alleges and incorporates Paragraph 2.52 above.

7.3

Because of the lack of proper corporate governance, lack of capitalization, fraud,

and the unlawful and/or inappropriate acts and/or omissions of AIA Insurance, AlA Services,
Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Beck, and Connie, the corporate veil of AlA Services, AIA
Insurance and Crop USA should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie
and/or Beck personally liable for all indebtedness to Reed as equity requires such action.

VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION
8.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Compliant necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
8.2

Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services, and

such shares were issued to her as a result of a dissolution action between Donna Taylor and
Reed. AlA Services was required to pay all sums owed to Donna Taylor by a contract also
signed by Reed.

AlA Services and John have failed to redeem Donna Taylor's shares as

required. But not for AlA Services, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's fraudulent, wrongful and/or
inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares would have been redeemed by AlA
Services. As of the date of Reed's original Complaint, over $500,000 must be paid to Donna
Taylor to redeem her Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services.
8.3

In addition, John personally guaranteed all deferred payments to Donna Taylor

through a letter dated February 27, 2001. As of the date of Reed's original Complaint, all of
Donna Taylor's shares should have been redeemed thereby paying her in full. John has failed to
pay the deferred payments to Donna Taylor which constitutes the full balance owed to Donna
Taylor. John and Connie are personally liable for all amounts owed to Donna Taylor through the
theory of Equitable Indemnification.
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8.4

Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AlA Services, John, Duclos,

Connie and/or Freeman for any sums owed to Donna Taylor and paid by Reed because of their
failure to redeem the Series A Preferred Shares as required.
IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ACCOUNT STATED/MONIES DUE
9.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
9.2

In or about 2002 or 2003, John owed AlA Services at least $307,271. In order to

extinguish John's liabilities to AIA Services, John debited Reed's Promissory Note with a
payment of at least $307,271 and credited John's indebtedness with a payment of at least
$307,271. John did not obtain Reed's approval or consent to transfer funds between John's
indebtedness and Reed's Promissory Note and John has not tendered payment of these funds to
Reed. This debt constitutes a personal loan from Reed to John. This account stated and/or debt
remains unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at
this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial.
9.3

Reed is entitled to the payment of all amounts owed by John as a result of all

transfers between Reed's Promissory Note and John indebtedness from AlA Services and/or AlA
Insurance. Reed is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on all amounts owed to him by John for
all such accounts stated and/or debts from the date of such transfers until payment in full is made
to Reed.
9.4

AIA Services reflected momes due to Reed on its financial statements and

statements, which constitutes written evidence of amounts due Reed on an account stated/monies
due as an alternative cause of action for the collection of sums owed under the Promissory Note.
III
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9.5

As a direct and/or proximate result of AlA Services and/or John's acts and/or

omissions, AIA Services and/or John are in breach of their obligations to pay Reed, and Reed is
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

X. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-UNJUST ENRICHMENT
10.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
10.2

Reed conferred the benefit of John being the controlling shareholder of AlA

Services when he agreed to sell his shares back to AlA Services. By and through his control of
AIA Services, John, Crop USA, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck have benefited from their
control of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or
Beck have retained the benefit of their fraud, fraudulent conveyances, wrongful, improper acts,
overreaching conduct, and/or conduct which constitutes the breach of their fiduciary duties owed
to Reed.
10.3

Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie andlor Beck would be unjustly

enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, securities, loans, advances and/or other
services received through AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, all of which funds should have
been paid to Reed as it would be inequitable for the them to retain the benefit without payment of
value.

XI. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
(As a Cause of Action and/or as Remedies)
11.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.

1/1
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11.2

Reed has a valid security interest in AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance's

commissions and all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, among other security interests.
The boards of AIA Services and AlA Insurance owed Reed fiduciary duties to Reed. AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos and/or Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully
and/or improperly used funds, transferred assets andlor provided services (which should have
been paid to Reed or benefited AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance) for investments, personal
use, inappropriate transactions, loans, advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful, fraudulent
and/or inappropriate purposes.
11.3

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, Crop USA John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or

Beck's acts and/or omissions resulted in Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or
Beck's acquisition of money, securities andlor services which should have been paid to Reed but
for their fraud, misrepresentation(s), bad faith, fraudulent conveyances, breaches of fiduciary
duties, and/or overreaching activities; and AIA Services, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman,
and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities and property would be
unjust.
11.4

Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to recover the

proceeds of all such fraud, fraudulent conveyances, breaches of fiduciary duties, overreaching,
improper, self-dealing, wrongful and/or inappropriate transfers, acts and/or omissions.

XII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY
(As a Cause of Action and/or Notice of Personal Liability)
12.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
III
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12.2

John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck are personally liable for all relevant

breached fiduciary duties, wrongful acts, improper acts, omissions, overreaching transactions,
fraud, loans, advances, loan guarantees and/or fraudulent conveyances which occurred during
their tenure as a member ofthe Board of Directors of AlA Service and AIA Insurance.
12.3

Because John, Duclos and Freeman were both directors and officers during

certain relevant times, they owed Reed

fiduciary duties for the damages set forth in this

Complaint.

XIII. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
(As a Cause of Action and/or as Remedies)
13.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
13.2

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and

Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of AIA Insurance (and all
ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the board and take all
actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged shares), sell the shares of AlA
Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the pledged shares in AlA Insurance, entitled to
timely receive audited financial statements and financial information, and/or seize all of the AIA
Insurance and AIA Services' commissions in the required Lock Box.

When AIA Services

became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged shares of AIA Insurance and the right
vested exclusively in Reed.
13.3

Despite Reed's demands for AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos,

Freeman, Connie and/or Beck to comply with the provisions in the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement, AIA Services, AlA
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Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and Beck have refused to comply. Reed is entitled to
the relief afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing agreements and such
other rights, remedies and/or relief as may be available under Idaho Code, including, without
limitation, any action, relief and/or order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. and/or I.e. §
28-9-101 et seq. (including the sale of the pledged shares, protection of security interest, seizure

of security, and any other available remedy).
13.4

Reed is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or before

trial, in enforcing any provision of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or at trial.

XIV. TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
14.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
14.2

During certain relevant times, John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman owes

and/or owed Reed fiduciary duties because of his status as the largest creditor of AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance and because AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance were insolvent as
described in this Complaint; and such fiduciary duties include, without limitation, the duties of
care and loyalty to Reed. During the relevant times that any of the Defendants acted as both a
director and an officer of AlA Insurance and/or AlA Services, he/she/they owed even more
elevated fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AlA Services and/or AlA
Insurance.
14.3

John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed

to Reed when they failed to operate AlA Services and AlA Insurance for the benefit of Reed.
John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman further breached their fiduciary duties when they
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failed to take legal action against past and/or present officers and/or directors of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance.
14.4

As a result of John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and Freeman's breaches of their

fiduciary duties owed to Reed, they are individually liable to Reed for all sums deemed the
product of their breached fiduciary duties, including without limitation, all damages attributable
to inappropriate transfers of assets and/or services, inappropriate use of assets and/or services,
the failure to pursue claims against other past and/or present officers and directors, inappropriate
guarantee of loans, and such other wrongful acts and/or omissions that Reed will demonstrate at
trial.

xv. PRAYERFORRELIEF
Without waiving any claims, rights and/or remedies under any of the above-referenced
agreements and/or Idaho Code as a secured party, Reed respectfully requests the following relief:
15.1

For a judgment against AlA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus accrued

pre-judgment interest, in the total amount to be proven at trial.
15.2

For the imposition of a constructive trust for all shares of common and/or

preferred shares in Crop USA owned and/or held by John, Connie, Freeman, Duclos, and Beck
for the benefit of Reed and for all ancillary actions necessary to transfer said shares to Reed.
15.3

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the Defendants from

preventing Reed from exercising his right under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement to vote
the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and taking any ancillary actions which relate in any way to
voting the pledged shares, including, without limitation, removing the board of directors of AIA
Insurance and appointing a revised board and such other actions he deems appropriate in his sole
discretion as the exclusive person entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance.
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15.4

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the Defendants from

interfering with the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Special
Meeting of Shareholders of AIA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to the February 22,
2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance.
15.5

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and any

entity owned, partially owned or operated by anyone or more of them from interfering with,
disturbing, and transferring any of AlA insurance's customers, contracts, agreements and
business.
15.6

Until such time that Reed Taylor's vote of the pledged shares is honored and he is

permitted to operate AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor requests a preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Defendants as follows:
(a) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of any
funds, assets, labor, facilities or services of AlA Insurance for any other
person, entity or business, unless such transactions are arms-length and
payment is received by AlA Insurance prior to providing such funds, assets,
labor, facilities or services (e.g., no credit arrangements for such activities).
(b) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, using, transferring or utilizing
any of the funds received from the lawsuit entitled In re: Universe Liquidator
Grain Growers Trust, et al. v. Idaho Department of Insurance a/kIa GGMIT
suit. All funds from the foregoing should be held in trust until further notice
from the Court.
(c) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans, credit
arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under any loan, line-ofFOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 29
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credit, credit facility, open account and the like for which AIA Insurance is a
guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for the exclusive benefit of AIA
Insurance to provide funding for AIA Insurance and approved by Reed Taylor
or such other party appointed by Reed Taylor or the Court.
(d) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging, and/or
removing any documents (including drafts, proposals, electronic files, email,
back-up media and the like), property, computers and the like from AIA
Insurance's office.
(e) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets or
services to R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor or
AIA Services without first obtaining written consent from Reed Taylor or the
Court.
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any substantive

contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval from Reed Taylor or
the Court.
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents in Lieu
of the foregoing without permitting Reed Taylor to vote the pledged shares or
take such other action permitted to him as the holder of the right to vote all
outstanding shares of AlA Insurance.
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets, or
services of AlA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers or
payments for the legal services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLee
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Duclos, and Connie Taylor.
(i) Enjoining R. John Taylor from being paid compensation for work performed
for AlA Insurance and/or AIA Services, required to disgorge all compensation
and benefits.

R. John Taylor's time expended for Crop USA Insurance

Agency, Inc. and any other entities partially owned by him shall be paid by
the appropriate entity and not AlA Insurance or AlA Services.
G) Enjoining the Defendants from not having AlA Insurance and AlA Services

accurately and properly itemizing every employee's daily time sheet to reflect
the number of hour(s) performed for AlA Services and AlA Insurance and
such other unrelated entities such as Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and
Sound Insurance.
(k) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be reasonably
contemplated from this Complaint, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
the Amended Security Agreement, the Restructure Agreement and/or which
would otherwise protect Reed Taylor's interests.
15.7

For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants requiring them

to timely and promptly provide Reed Taylor with all financial information required under the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
15.8

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining John and any of the other

Defendants from entering the offices of AlA Insurance, if necessary.
15.9

For an order and/or judgment permitting Reed to sell the pledged shares of AlA

Insurance at public or private sale or, in the alternative, judicially.

III
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15.10 For an order compelling an audit of AIA Services and AlA Insurance.
15.11 For a declaratory judgment or order requiring specific performance of AlA
Services and/or AIA Insurance's obligations and Reed's rights under the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, Promissory Note and/or Restructure Agreement.
15.12 For a preliminary injunction and/or order invalidating the appointment of Connie
and Beck from the Boards of AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
15.13 AIA Insurance and AlA Services have been operated as the alter-egos of John,
Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck, and they are personally liable for all sums owed to Reed
by AIA Services in an amount to be proven at trial.
15.14 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining John from appointing any
directors for AIA Services or AIA Insurance.
15.15 For a declaratory judgment and/or order enforcing the February 22,2007, Consent
in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to
the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, as
valid and duly executed Consents.
15.16 For a judgment for damages and attorneys' fees incurred by Reed as a result of
being wrongfully enjoined by the Defendants.
15.17 For such other relief that Reed may request before or at trial to enforce his rights
under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure
Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or order authorized under I.e. § 30-1-701 et

seq. and/or I.C. § 28-9-101 et seq.
15.18 For judgment, order and/or declaratory relief as may be necessary for Reed to
effectuate any and all rights and remedies under I.C. § 28-9-101 et seq. (including the sale of the
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pledged shares, protection of security interest, seizure of security, and any other available
remedy)
15.19 For the avoidance of the improper and/or fraudulent transfers of funds, assets
and/or services from AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance to John, Beck, Freeman, Connie,
Duclos, Crop USA, and any entity partially owned by John, and/or any other party who received
such transfers under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority.
15.20 For judgment against John for $307,271, plus accrued interest for the money he
owed AlA Services which was improperly paid by transferring his indebtedness to Reed's
Promissory Note.
15.21 For judgment against Connie Taylor to the fullest extent of her derivative liability
by virtue of her marriage to R. John Taylor and her interest in the community property in an
amount to be proven at the time of trial.
15.22 For judgment against Connie Taylor individually for an amount to be proven at
trial, plus pre-judgment interest.
15.23 For a judgment against John (both individually and through his marriage to
Connie Taylor) in an amount to be proven at trial, plus prejudgment interest.
15.24 For judgment against John, Duclos, and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, for all
funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently transferred and/or
fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred may not be avoided, rescinded and/or paid to
Reed.
15.25 For judgment against Crop USA for all sums and the value of all servIces
wrongfully, fraudulently, and/or inappropriately transferred, converted and/or conveyed from
AlA Insurance and/or AlA Services.
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15.26 For a declaratory judgment and/or order requmng AIA Services, Duclos,
Freeman, John and/or Connie to indemnify Reed for all amounts owed to Donna Taylor and paid
by Reed.
15.27 For judgment against John, Duclos and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, for
amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AlA Services and
AlA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos and/or Freeman.
15.28 For judgment against John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman and Beck disgorging all
compensation (including all salaries), benefits, assets, stock (including, without limitation, shares
held directly or indirectly in Crop USA) and other ill-gotten gains as a result of the breaches of
their fiduciary duties, fraudulent transfers, unlawful acts, and/or fraud.
15.29 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed on all funds,
investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or self-dealing
which were fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly made for the benefit of Duclos, Freeman,
John, Beck, Connie and/or other parties or entities, which sums should have been paid to Reed.
15.30 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or fraudulently obtained
and/or transferred assets under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority.
15.31 For a judgment against John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and Beck, jointly and
severally, for all damages resulting from the breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to Reed
during the periods of time of their relevant tenures as directors of AlA Insurance and AlA
Services, in an amount to be proven at trial.
15.32 For judgment and/or relief for all claims which conform to the evidence obtained
through discovery and/or forensic accounting.
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 34
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT

15.33 For an award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.e. § 12-121.
15.34 Reed expressly reserves the right to amend this Complaint upon the completion of
discovery and/or present causes of action and remedies which conform to the evidence at the
time of trial.
15.35 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial and/or that
the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time of trial.
DATED this _ _ day of June, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Roderick C. Bond
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this Fourth
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this Fourth Amended Complaint, and believe that the
facts in this Fourth Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and
belief.

Reed J. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of June, 2007.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
My commission expires: _ _ _ _ _ __

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 36
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint on the following party(s) via the
rnethod(s) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829

Signed this

day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _., 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderick C. Bond

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 37
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT

Hawley Troxell

PAGE

6/19/2007 3:21

2/7

FAX:

(208J342-3829

(
FILED
2lfJ1 JUN 19 PM L 38
Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
j ash@hteh.com

Attorneys for Defendants AlA Scrviccs Corporation
and AlA Insurance, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REEDJ. TAYLOR. a single person,
Plaintiff.

)
)

~

VS.

)
)

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION. an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR. individualIy and the
community property comprised lhereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN. a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

Case No. CV-07-00208
STATUS CONFERENCE
MEMORANDUM

)
)
)

---------------------------------)
Dcfendanls AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance. Inc. (collectively, "AIA"),
submit this Status Conference Memorandum in preparation for the status conference scheduled
for Wednesday. June 20, 2007. The purpose ofthis memorandum is to briefly address a few
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issues that AlA would like to discuss at the status conference so that all parties can be prepared
to discuss these issues at the status conference.
A.

Mediation
In its Order dated March 8, 2007, Lhe Court ordered that Lhe parties participate in

mediation. The parties have selected Retired Judge Ron Schilling as the mediator, Judge
Schilling has accepted the request l1mt he serve as a mediator, the parties have now all responded
to

Judge Schillings correspondence regarding the mediation, and l1le parties arc working towards

mediation some time this falL
Plaintiffs have served Requests for production of documents, to which AIA has
responded, produced documents, and objected to some of the requests. The parties recently held
a "meet and confer" conierence, which resulted in resolution ofsome of the discovery issues. but

the parties remain in disagreement with regard to many of the discovery requests. AIA suggests
that Retired Judge Ron Schilling's services may be very beneficial to Lhe discovery process.
Whether by Court order or by agreement oflhc parties, Judge Schilling's mediation services
would likely be able to help the parties resolve their discovery disputes and (hopefully) avoid or
minimize motions to compel and/or motions for protective order. AIA is not suggesting the
Judge SchiHing be appointed as an official discovery master, but that he could serve a more
infonnaI role in hclping the parties resolve their discovery disputes. Judge Schilling's role in the
discovery process would also scrve the purpose of getting him up to speed on the facts and the
parties' positions in this litigation, creating a higher likelihood of resolution through the
mediation process.
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Bifurcation
At the hearing on AlA's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel raised the issue of

bifurcation of the trial pursuant to LR.C.P. 42(b), which provides:
The court. in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice. or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy,
may order a separate tria1 of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim.
or third-party claim. or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims. counterclaims. third-party claims. or issues.
always preserving inviolate the right ofma! by jury as declared by
the Constitutions, statutes or rules of the court.
As an initia1 maUer, a detennination as to whether bifurcation is appropriate in this
matter is premature. A bifurcated trial is inappropriate unless there is a "clear separation of
issues" based on "a clear understanding between the court and counsel of the issues involved in
each phase and what proof will be required to pass .from one phase to the next." United States

Gypsllm Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 668 F.2d 172. 18] (3d Cir. 1981).
At this point in time. this case is nowhere near the point where the parties and the Court

have a dear understanding of the issues and causes of action that will ultimately be presented to
a jury. As evidenced by the five versions ofthe Complaint already on file, and the pending
motion to dismiss many ofthe causes ofaetion. it is far too eady to delcnnine whether this is one

of the rare cases where bifurcation is appropriate. Each time PlaintiIThas amended his
complaint, he adds new causes of action and new parties. TIle most recent version of the
complaint seeks to add two new causes of action and three new parties. AlA will likely file
additional counterclaims. Moreover. the parties have just barely begun the discovery process
that wiI! flush out the issues of the casco Upon completion of discovery. the parties will likely
file motions for summary judgment that will further refine the issues .for trial and present the
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Court with a sufficiently clear picture of the issues to detennine the procedure through which this
case should be presented to ajury.
Courts routinely decline to rule on a motion for bifurcation where, as here, discovery is
not completed and the issues. causes o[action, and parties are not clear. See, e.g.• AjJjm1efrix,
IlJc.

Y.

PE Corp .. 219 F.Supp.2d 390, 398 (S.D.N. Y. 2002) ("it would be premature at this eady

stage in discovery to decide the question of bifurcation in the trial context"); Kn{eger

Y.

New

York TeleplIoll? Co .• 163 F.R.D. 446,448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The motion is also premature
because discovery is not yet complete. The continuing development of tIle factual record in this
case may well affect the issues to be tried and the presentation of those issues in the Join[ Pretrial
Order.... Moreover, both plaintiffs and defendants have indicated their intention to move for
summary judgment. The disposition ofthose motions may alter or narrow the issues that remain
to be tried."); Medina v. City ofClricago. 100 F.8upp.2d 893, 897 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("At the
present time, discovery has just begun. The Court believes that it is far 100 early to determine
that the trial should be bifurcated .... But more importantly, at this point neither the parties nor
the Court has the least idea what evidence aetuaHy would be offered at trial ... ").
Finally, the decision of whether to bifurcate the trial should not be reached during a status
conference. The bifurcation issue is governed by LR.C.P. 42(b), and there is a large body orease
law discussing the factors courts should consider in detennining wllClher bifurcation is
appropriate. The party seeking bifurcation bears the burden of establishing that bifurcation is
appropriate, and that showing should be made by motion, giving all parties a full opportunity to
state their positions on the matter and allowing the Court to make it decision with a full
understanding of the facts and legal issues. For example. given that ajury is to be the ultimate
trial of fact in this case, the parties should briefthe issue of how the trial could be bifurcated
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consistent with the constitutional right to trial by jury. See I.R.C.P. 42(b) (providing that any
bifurcation order should "always preserve[e] inviolate tile right of trial by jury as declared by the
Constitutions, statutes or rules of the court"); see also, In re Visa Check/MasterMolley Antitrust

Litigatio1l, 280 F.3d 124. 141 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("A district court's ability to bifurcate a trial is
limited by the Seventh Amendment. See BlydelJ v. Maucusi, 186 F.3d 252. 268 (2d Cir. 1999)
CAt boltom. issues may be divided and tried separately. but a given issue may not be tried by
different, successivcjuries.·). Despite defendants' briefing on this issue, it would be premature
.for us to determine whether and under what circumstances bifurcation might be permissible in
this casco ").

AJA respectfully suggests that a determination on the issue ofbiTurcation is premature at
this stage in the litigation. Only after the parties have conducted discovery and rc.fined the

issues, causes of action, and parties should the Court determine whether bifurcation is
appropriate. Moreover. that determination should be made only upon the filing ofa Rule 42{b)
motion and only after the parties have had an opportunity to brief the issue. Finally, the parties
arc under a mediation order. The parties should be preparing lor mediation, and the question of
how the case will ultimately be tried should wait until after mediation.

DATED THIS

\ t1~1,.... day of June, 2007.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By:s~~~~~~~~-=~~_____________

. ohn Ashby TSB No. 7228
ttorneys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insttmncc. Inc.
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
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999 Third Avenue,Suite 3100
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[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]
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Jonathan D. Hally
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Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street. Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.. an
Idaho corporation; R. JOI-IN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR. individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN. a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

Case No. CV-07-00208

)
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF REED
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

---------------------------------)
Defendants AIA Services Corporation ("AlA Service") and AlA Insurance, Inc. ('·AIA
Insurancen ) (sometimes collectively referred to as "AIA"), submit this Opposition to Plaintiff
Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend Complaint.
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I. INTRODUCTION
AlA filed a motion to dismiss PlaintiWs Second Amended Complaint, and that motion to
dismiss is currently pending. AIA's motion to dismiss established that the majority ofthe causes
of action in the Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed .for a variety of reasons.
including: (1) that they are Lime-barred; (2) that they laillo state a claim; or (3) that they are not
causes of action at aIL Rather than wait lor a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a
Fourth Amended Complaint that purports to cure a few oflhe deficiencies in the Second
Amended Complaint. Then. the day after the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed
yet another version in Plaintiff's "Amended Motion And Memorandum Of Law To Amcnd And
Supplement Complaint," i.e., an Amended Fourth Amended Complaint, in an apparent attempt to
cure additional deficiencies identified at the hearing.
As repeatedly explained previously. the deficiencies in the complaint arc related to the
statute of limitations. the lact that several oflhe causes of action are not causes of action at all, or
that the facls Plaintiff did plead establish that various causes of action fail as a matter of law.
With the exception ofthe fraud cause of action, which fails because it is not pled with
particularity. AlA's motion to dismiss was not based on a failure to plead sufficient fncts.
Simply stated. this is not a notice pleading issue.
PlaintiiTs Fourth Amended Complaint, with very few exceptions, fails for exactly the
same reasons as the Second Amended Complaint. Although Plaintiffs complaint is now even
longer tilan it was before - now 34 pages long compared to the 23-puge Second Amended
Complaint - the majority ofthc causes ofaclion still fail, as a matter of law. for the very same
reasons as the Second Amended Complaint. The proposed Fourth Amended Complaint should
be denied because: (1) it contains allegations of breach of contract that arc barred by the statute
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oflimitations; (2) it conta.ins multiple causes of action that fail to stale a claim; and (3) it seeks to
add as defendants 1\'10 members of the AIA Services and AIA Insurance Board of Directors that
were appointed less than two months ago, without specifying any actions on the part of those
directors over the 1ast two months that would subject them to personal liability.
Given that PIaintitrs Fourth Amended Complaint fails for the same reasons as the
Second Amended Complaint, much of this opposition is duplicative ofthe briefing on AIA's
Motion to Dismiss. This opposition briefwili not repeat the arguments sct forth in the Motion to
dismiss. Instead, the Motion to Dismiss briefing is incorporated herein by reference, and this
briefwiH focus on the changes to the Fourth Amended Complaint and arguments raised by
PlaintiIT for the first time at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

The Motion to File the Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint Should be Denied
Leave to file an amended complaint is properly denied where the amended complaint,

itself., fails to slate a claim or otherwise fails as a matter ofJaw. As explained in Black Canyon
Racquetball Club. It/c. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171. 175,804 P.2d 900,904
(1991):

In determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed,
where leave of court is required under Rule 15(a), the court may
consider whether the new claims proposed (0 be inserted into the
action by the amended complaint stale a valid claim .... Ifthe
amended pleading docs not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing
party would be prejudiced by the dclay in adding thc new claim, or
ifthe opposing party has an availablc defense such as a statute of
limitations. it is not an abuse of discretion for the triaL court to
deny the motion to file the amended complaint.
Id. (emphasis added); see also 6 Wright & MiIler,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1487

C2d cd. 1990) CHlfthe proposed change clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is
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legally insufficient on its face. the court may deny leave to amend.") (analyzing the functionally
identical Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Here, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint should be denied because (1) it contains
allegations of breach of contract that are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) it contains
Illultiple causes of action that fail to state a claim; and (3) it seeks to add as defendants two
Illcmbers of the AIA Services and AIA Insurance Board ofDircctors that were appointed less
than two months ago, without specifying any actions on the part of those directors over the last
two months that would subject them to personalliabiliLy.
B.

The Complaint Contains Breach of Contract Allegations That Arc Barred By the
Statute of Limitations
1.

The Alleged Breaches Occurred Over Five Years Before The Filing Of
Plaintiff's Complaint

The Fourth Amended Complaint. just like its prior versions, alleges sevcml breaches of
contmct in addition to the alleged failure to pay a $6 million debt. The complaint continues to
alleged that Defendants have breached the Amended Agreements by not appointing him to the
board of directors (see Fourth Amended Complaint. 'lI2.17). failing to make timely interest
payments; becoming insolvent; failing to maintain a Loek Box to hold insurance commissions,
elc. Jd. at 'lI 2.16.
As set forth in the prior Motion to Dismiss, these alleged breaches are barred by the
statute oflimilations because Plaintiirs o'wn complaint alleges that these breaches occurred more
tllan five years before the filing ofthis lawsuit. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at'll2.13.
(Uln excess ofsix years, AIA Services, John Duclos andlorFrceman have intentionallyre[used to
appoint Reed to the Board as required."); id. at 'lI2.1S ("During all relevant times. the value of
AIA Services was less than the aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AlA Services'

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTlFF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 4
4000&.OOOO.I>2W71l.'

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Hawley Troxell

61 1/2007 3:42

PAGE

6/17

FAX:

(208)342-3829

insolvency. During all relevant times. AIA Services was in default of various provisions of the
agreements with Reed. insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During ali
relevant times, AIA Services has failed to comply with the tenos of the pWITlissory note.")
(emphasis added).
The Fourth Amended Complaint appears to be an attempt to recant the earlier version's
clear allegations of time-barrcd bl"eaehes. For example. rather than a11ege that the bl"eaches
occurred at "all relevant times," the Fourth Atnended Complaint makes slight wording changes
to allege that the breaches occurred at "certain l"elevant times." See, e.g., Fourth Amended
Complaint, ~ 2.22 (emphasis added). The change in language, however. does not change the fact
that Plaintiffhas repeatedly gone on record in this matter as alleging that the bl"eaches of contract
occurred ITluch more than five years prior to commencement of this litigation. See. e.g., Reed
Taylor's Affidavit in Support of Emergency Motion

"II 35 (attaching the financial statements for

AlA Services and AlA Insurance for 2001-2002 and asserting that '~these Financial Statements
show that AIA Services was insolvent in 2001 and 2002"); Plaintiff's Response To Defendants'
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion, p. 5 {alleging untimely and ITlissed interest payments every single year
between 1997 and 2006); Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing. p. 171 (plainliffstating
under oath that he does not remember the lock box ever being used othel." than around the time it
was set up (1996), and that he was not particularly concerned about whether it was being used);
Seeond Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Compel Audit. p. 3 (asserting that
the «Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement requires that AlA Services be audited
annually," and that Defendants arc in breach of that agreement because "AIA Services was last
audited in 1999"). With regard to the alleged breach for failing to appoint Plaintiff to the board
of directors. the Fourth Amended Complaint continues to allege that said breach first occurred at
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'1I 2.17 (<<Tn excess of six years. AIA Services, John Duclos andlor

Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Board as required.").
Plaintiffcan tinker with the language of his complaint, but it does not change the fact that
Plaintiffhas unambiguously and repeatedly taken the posiLion in this litigation that the various
alleged breaches occurred more than five years prior to the commencement ofLhis litigation.
To be cIear. for purposes of this Motion to Amend the Complaint. the argument with
regard to the statute oflimitations is limited to the alleged tangential breaches of contract, Le.,
that AlA is in breach of the Amended Agreements for railing to appoint Plaintiff to the board of
direclors; failing to make timely interest paymenLs; becoming insolvent; failing to maintain a
Lock Box, etc. While AlA reserves the right to raise the statute oflimitations on summary
judgment or at some other point in this litigation, in light ofPlaintifPs invocation of Idaho Code
§ 5-238, plaintiffhas raised the al1egation of a promise to pay the residue of the debt in a way

that Defendants cannot defeat on a motion to dismiss. However. Idaho Code § 5-238 creates a
"new promise ... to pay the residue of the debt." It does not revive the other alleged breaches
that arc already time barred. Id.; see also MeIJdini. 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. at 314 (applying tile
predecessor stature to Idaho Code § 5-238, and explaining that the acknowledgment ofthe debt
"did not therefore continue an existing contract, but created a new one"); Brower v. E.L DuPont

De Nemours arId Co., 117 Idaho 780,792 P.2d 345.347 ("[Idaho Code § 5-238] provides that an
acknowledgment or pI"Omise in writing and signed by the party to be charged may constitute
sufficient evidence ofa new or continuing contract in order to allow recoverY for a debt where
the statute oflimitations bars recovery under the original contract.") (emphasis added); see also
AIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-6, and Reply in Support orMotion
to Dismiss. pp. 3-9. which arc incorporated herein by reference).
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No New Cause Of Action Is Created Each Day Defendants Are In Breach

At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffrnised for the first time an argument
that Defendants have continuing contractual obligations to Plaintiff and that a new cause of
action accrues for each day Defendants are in breach.
Plaintiff's argument is inconsistent with Idaho law as established by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Skaggs v. JelTsell. 94 Idaho 179. 180, 484 P .2d 728 (1971). There. the parties entered
into a written leasing agreement in 1961 for the lease of an appliance store in the Overland
Shopping Center located in Burley, Idaho. The leasing agreement contained a restrictive
provision prohibiting the lessors from renting space in their shopping center to any otherparty
engaged in the sale of major appliances. In 1962, the lessors, the lensens, leased a portion of
their property to a Montgomery Ward Store which sold appliances and, in 1969, the lessors
entered another leasing agreement with Scars Roebuck and Co., which also sold appliances.
Despite the fact that the lease had been violated since 1962, the lessees, Skaggs, did not file suit
until 1969. In affirming the lower court's holding that the statute of limitations barred the action
related to the lease to the Montgomery Ward Slore, the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
In 1962. the Jensens rented space to Montgomery Ward in
violation of tIle first leasing agreement. Suit was not connnenced.
however. until 1969. Thus it is evident that more than five years
elapsed between the time the cause of action accrued and the time
suit was instituted. The Jensens (lessors) were entitled to rely on
the statute of limitations as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim
since actions in contract must be brought within five years in this
juriSdiction. See also Toellrrer v. McGil1nis, 55 Wash. 430, 104 P.
641 (1909) where the Washington Supreme Court held an action
on a lease covenant ,-vas barred after six years even though the
lease itselfwas intended to run for fifteen. III ·... iew of the length of
timc that Skaggs restcd on their rights, it would be inequitable
in this Court's opinion to allow them to now bring suit.. By
.failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their
rights were being violated, they ratified and modified the
restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force.
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ld., 94 Idaho at 180.484 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added).

Just as Plaintiff claims here. the contract in Skaggs created conlinuing obligations, i.e., a
continuing obligation over the term ofthe lease not to rent space to other appHance stores. The
Court did not, however. hold that a new cause of action would accrue evelY day that the lessors
were in violation of the restrictive covenant. Rather. the court held that failure to bring suit
within 5 years of the time the restrictive covenant was first breached meant that the lessees had
«ratified and modified the restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force." ld. Notably. the Idaho
Supreme Court relied approvingly on Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wn. 430. 104 P. 64l (1909)
"where the Washington Supreme Court held an action on a lease covenant was barred after six
years even though the lease itsc1fwas intended to run for fifteen." [d. (emphasis added). Thus,
under Idaho law, the fact that a contract creaLes obligations over a continuing period of time does
not result in a new cause 01ac1ion for evelY day a provision of the contract is in breach.
Notably. a differcnt rule arguably applies to the obligation to make payments under thc
Amended Agreements. Plaintiffhas previously cited to Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper,
91 Idaho 488. 492. 426 P.2d 209 (1967). which held that "Where money is payable in

installments, the statute oflimitations begins to run against a cause of action for the recovery ofa
delinquent installment as of the time it becomes due." In addition to the fact that this doctrine
continues to bar recovery orinstaHment payments due more than 5 years prior to suit. the
doctrine is limited to payments under an installment contract. It does not apply to breaches like
the tangential breaches alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. The Ninth Circuit recently address this
issue as follows;
Here, the district court was correct in bolding that the
"continuous breach" theolY does not extend the statute of
limitations for Ancala's breach of contract claim for failing to
operate the golf course as a premium private country club. Under
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S MOTrON TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 8
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Arizona law, the continuing violation notion is an exception to the
statute of limitations, not the rule, and it applies to recurring
payments that have become due. Once a party fails to pay the
agreed upon amount at the time the payment is due. a separate
breach occurs and a cause of action accrues. The damages for each
breach is severable from the damages suffered from the original
breach and any subsequent breach of the defendant's obligation to
pay an agreed upon amount.

In this case, American Golfs aI1eged breach for failing to
operate the golfcourse as a premium private country club was not
continuous in such a way as to qualifY for the exception to the
statute oflimitations. The breach began to accrue when Ancala
determined that American Golfwas failing to operate the Country
Club as a premium golf course, which could be as early as 1991,
but clearly was no later than September 1994. While the breach
continued to occur because American Golffailed to cure the initial
breach. it 'was not "continuous" in the sensc that a separate and
discrete obligation to operate the golf course in a certain manncr
accrued each day. Moreover, unlike a failure-lo-pay type of
continuous breach, the damages alleged by Ancala cannot be
severed for each alleged daily breach.
Allcala Holdings, L.L.G. v. Price, 2007 WL 387591. *3 (9th Cir. 2007).
Just like the breach in Atlcala for failing to maintain the golf course as a premium country

club does not constitute a separate and discrete breach each day it was not cured. the tangential
breaches alleged in Plaintiff's complaint are not separate and discrete breaches. According to
Plaintiff, he was not on the board of directors six years ago, and that same continuous breach has
been in existence every single day for the past six years. With regard to the lock box. plaintiff
alleges that thc lock box has not be used for approximately ten years. i.e., one continuous breach
covering evcry singJe day for the last ten years. According to Plaintiff. AIA Services has been
insolvent evcry single day since at least 200 L These alleged breaches are not the type that create
a new cause ofaetion every single day because they arc not "separatc and discrete" breaches for
which damages could be "severed for each alleged daily breach." Allcala Holdings, L.L.c. v.
Price. 2007 WL 387591. *3 (9th Cir. 2007).
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According to Plaintiff, the alleged tangential breaches occurred well over five years ago,
and have been in the same state of breach every single day for at least the enlire five year period
subsequent to the filing ofPlaintifPs complaint. As a matter of law, these breaches arc timcbarred. See Skaggs. 94 Idaho at 180 (by not bringing suit within 5 years of the alleged breach,
Plaintiff "ratified and modified the restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force.").
C.

Tile Majority ofPlaintifPs Causes Of Action Fail For the Same Reasons Set Forth
In AlA's Motion To Dismiss

1. Fourth Cause of Action - Conversion
The conversion cause of action fails for the same reasons set forth in AIA's briefing on
the Motion to Dismiss - an allegation of failure Lo pay money due under a contract is actionable
in contract, but, as a matter o flaw, docs not constitute conversion. (See Memorandum In
Support of Motion to Dismiss. pp. 9-10; Reply Memorandum, pp. 12-13 and the cases cited
therein). Again. this is not an issue of notice pleading, and the minor changes to the most recent
version of the comp1aint do not salvage the conversion cause of action.
2. Fifth. Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action - Alter Ego, Constructive
Trust, Director Liability, and Specific Performance
Plaintiff's "Alter Ego," "Constructive Trust," and "Director Liability" causes of action,
just like those SlliTIe causes of action in the previous versions ofllie complaint. fail because they
arc not causes of action at aIL Plaintiff appears to now be recognizing as much by adding to the

heading of each ofthes!! causes of action that these causes o:faction arc pled "As a Cause of
Action andlor as Remedies."
The newest version of the complaint adds a new cause of action for "Specific
Performance," again with the disclaimer that it is pled "As a cause of Action andlor as
Remedies." This disc1aimer is appropriate, given that specific performance is a remedy that may
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or may not be applicable ifPlaintiffprevaiIs on his breach ofcontrnct cause of action, but
«specific performance" is not a cause of action. See. e.g., LaSalle Nat. Ballk v. Metropolitan Life

Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1371. 1376 (7th Cil'. 1994) ("As to Count IV. specific perronnance is a remedy.
not a cause of action."); Eliibee v. Fox, 2006 WL 2802207, 10 (D.Kan. 2006) e<First. the Court
finds that plainliffcomp!etcly misapprehends the function of specific performance in contract

law. It is uremedy. not a cause of action or something thai maybe breached."); Harara v.
COllocoPhillips Co, 377 F Supp 2d 779, 796 {N.D. Cal 2005) (HSpecific performance is a form of

cont.ractual relief. not an independent claim.").
Defendants do not wish to belabor this point. Defendants acknowledge that they are on
notice that Plaintiff seeks the remedies ofaHer ego liability, constructive trust, director liability,
and specific perfonnance. and the question ofwhether those remedies arc appropriate under the
facts of this case can be determined at a later date. Those remedies. however. simply are not
separate causes ofaetion, and should not be pled as such. Those remedies belong in Plaintiff's
prnycr for relief. and. in fact. are already there. See e.g., Fourth Amended Complaint, '11'IJ 15.2.
15.11. 15.13. No AInended Complaint should bepennitted that continues Lo assert these

remedies as separate causes of action.
3. Sixth Cause of Action - Equitable Indemnification

Plaintiff's cause of action for Equitable Indemnification fails for the same reasons sct
f'orth in AlA's Molion to Dismiss. Equitable indemnification applies only to joint tortfeasors,
which AIA and Plaintiff are not. and any indemnification action is premature because PlaintifPs
complaint makes clear that he has not made payments to Donna Taylor for which he could be
indernni fi cd.
4. Seventh Cause of Action - Account Stated
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Plaintiff's account stated cause of action fails for the same reasons sct forth in AlA's
motion to dismiss.
5. Eighth Cause of AcUon - Unjust Enrichment

Idaho law is clear that. "where parties have entered into a contract. a claim for unjust
enrichment will be precluded." MamlOs v. Moss. 155 P.3d 1166. __ Idaho __ (February 22,

2007); see a/so Iron Eagle Development v. Quality Design Sys., 138 Idaho 487 (2003) ("When
parties enter into an express contract. a claim based in equity is not allowed because the express
contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims."); fYi/helm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152,
30 P.3d 300, 307 (Ct. App. 2001) Cocrecovery for unjust enrichment is not permissible where
there is an enforceable express contract between the parties covering the same subject matter.").
At oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss. PlaintifTraised for the first Lime an argument
that the unjust enrichment cause ofnction is only barred if the contracts are enforceable. and that
an unjust enrichment cause of action should be allowed Lo the extent the breach ofconLract cause
ofaclion is barred by the statute oflimitations. However. the statute ofIimitations does not
render a contract invalid, it simply precludes a remedy for a time-barred breach of that contract.
One court recently rejected the exact same argument presented by Plaintiff as follows:
Next, the parties move for summary judgment on the claim
of unjust enrichment. This claim is subsumed and barred by the 10
contracts covering the same subject matter. See California Medical
Ass'll 1'. Aetna U.S. Healtlrcare of California. 94 Cal.AppAth 151.
168. 114 CaI.Rptr.2d 109 (2001) ("[A]s a matter of1aw. a quasicontract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where. as here.
express binding agreements exist and define the parties' rights. If);
Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Illdemnity Co., 44
Cal.AppAth 194,203,51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 (1996) e,[A] n impliedin-fact or quasi-contract cannot He where there exists between the
parties a valid express contract covering the same subject matter. If).
Here, a written agreement governed the real estate venture,
just as a promissory note governed the art acquisition venture. The
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fact that the statute oflimitations expired on enforcement of those
contracts does not render them invalid .... Accordingly. the court
grants defendant's motion for summary judgment on the unjust
enrichment c1aim.

Ridgewood Associates, Inc. v. Tnmlpower. 2007 WL 1223666, *5 (B.D. CaL. Apr 25,2007)
(only the slip opinion is currently available).
At this point, Nobody is arguing that the Amended Agreements are invalid. Rather.
Plaintiff cannot claim damage for the alleged breach of the Amended Agreements because the
alleged breaches occurred more than five years prior to commencement of this litigation.

In any event, Plaintiirs unjust enrichment cIaim accrued at Lhe same time as the breach
of contract causes of action, ifnot earlier. Just like Lhe breach ofconf.mct claims. the unjust
enrichment c1aim sterns from the redemption ofPlaintifPs AIA stock in 1995, and P1aintiffs
own complaint establishes that it accrued in 1995. Sec Fourth Amended Complaint, 'II 10.2
("Reed conferred the benefit of John being the controlling shareholder of AlA Services when he
agreed to sell his shares back to AlA Services.") (emphasis added). A cause of action for unjust
enrichment is governed by the four year statute of limitations for an oral contract set forth in I.C.
§ 5-217. Sec Witt v. JOJles, 111 Idaho 165. 169,722 P.2d 474.478 (1986) ("claims of unjust

enrichment partake of the nature ola contract and are therefore governed by statute otlimitation
for orol contracts") (citing Templeton Patents, Ltd. v. J.R. Slinpiot Co., 220 F.Supp_ 48 (D. Idaho
1963». Thus, the unjust enrichment cause of action accrued "when [Plaintiff] agreed to sell his
shares back to AIA Services" in 1995, and the statute of limitations ran lour years later.
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The Complaint's AtternptTo Add New Parties Is Futile
The Proposed Fourth Anlended Complaint seeks to add new parties, including CropUSA,

Connie Taylorl. and James and Corrine Beck. With regULd to the addition of Connie Taylor and
James Beck. who are named as Defendants in their capacity as members ofthe BOULd of
Directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, the proposed amended complaint should be
rejected us futile becllUse it fails

(0

stale any claims against Connie Taylor and James Beck that

arose afierthose individuals were appointed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance.
Connie Taylor and James Beck were appointed to the Board ofDirecLors of AlA
Insurance and AIA Services on or around April 30, 2007. Notwithstanding the fact that Connie
Taylor and James Beck have been directors for less than two months now, Plaintiff's proposed
Fourth Amended Complaint simply lumps them together with the prior board members, Joue
Duclos and Brian Freeman, as if Connie Taylor and James Beck had been personally involved in
AlA's actions prior to their appointments to the board of directors.
The complaint brings a variety of allegations against defendants and their Boards of
Directors, all stemming from actions that tOt:>k place prior to Connie Taylor's and James Beck's
appointments to the boards. PlaintiITappears

(0

be asserting that Connie Taylor and James Bcck

arc liable for the debts, contractual obligations, or torts of the corporations by virtue alone of
their role as newly appointed board members. This assertion is contrary to the fundamental tenet

1 Prior versions of the Complaint named Connie Taylor only to the extent that Connie Taylor
and John Taylor shared community property interests. The proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint names Connie Taylor as a member of the board of directors of AIA Services and
AlA Insurance.
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of corporate law that a director is not personally Hable for the acts ofa corporation. VFP VCv.

Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326.334, 109 P.3d 714, 722 (2005) ("It is an established principle of
corporations [sic] law that corporate directors are not liable merely by virtue of their office for
fraud or other tortious wrongdoing committed by the corporation or its officers. Instead, to be
held liable a corporate director must specifically direct, actively participate in, or knowingly
acquiesce in the fraud or other wrongdoing of the corporation or its officers.").
IfPlaintiffwishes to amend his Complaint to add claims against Connie Taylor and
James Beck as members of the Board of Directors. then Plaintiff should be required to set forth
allegations oIwhat actions those individuals have taken over the Iast two months that subject
them Lo personal liability.
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is futile, and
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint should be denied.

DATED THIS

tJ. l S~
--a.L:- day of June. 2007.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

21

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day oflune. 2007, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR~S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLATh.TT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith. Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
-A.- Email

Paul R. Cressman. Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98] 04-4088
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Teleeopy
-K-Email

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.o. Box 191
Clarkston. WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_""_

U.S. MaH. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ TeJecopy
-i!!-Email

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys lor Defendant Connie Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delive:red
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Tclccopy

~Email

~Email
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JONATHAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Idaho State Bar No. 4979
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9516
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

9
10

11

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person>
Plaintiff>

12
13

Case No. CV 07-00208

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO AMEND COMPLAINT

VS.

14

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION~ an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.> an
15
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
16
community property comprised thereof;
17- -BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person

18
19

Defendant.

20

21

COMES NOW the Defendant, .Connie Taylor, by and through her attorney of record,

22

Jonathan Hally of the law fiml of Clark and Feeney, and opposes Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

23

Complaint. Connie Taylor incorporates the arguments contained within AlA Services Corporation

24

25
26
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and AlA Insurance Inc's Opposition to PlailltiffReed Taylor's Motion to Amend, and further argues

2 as follows:
3
4

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff seeks pennission to file a Fourth Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff's motion

5
comes ¥rer the Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint which said
6

7

motions remain pending before this Court,l The Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint which

8

affected Defendant Connie Taylor after this Court ordered the Plaintiffto provide specific allegations

9

attributed to Ms. Taylor. Based upon the Third Amended Complaint identifying that Ms. Taylor was

10

only being named as a p8.1ty solely due to her prior m8.1ital relationship with Defendant R. John

11
Taylor, Ms. Taylor has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint which is nOW

12
13

pending before this Court. The Fourth Amended Complaint added Ms. Taylor's name to new claims

14

based upon her very recent appointment to the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance and ALA

15

Services.

16

17

Given that Ms. Taylor cannot properly be named as a party due to her prior marital
relationship \vith Mr. Taylor and that the allegati.ons of misconduct precede her April> 2007

18
19

appointment to the Board of Directors, the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Fourth Amended

20

Complaint should be denied as to Ms. Taylor since its amended pleading does not set forth a valid

21

claim against her.

22
23
24
25
26

IDefendants AlA Insurance and AlA Services moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint and the remaining Defendants filed notices in which they Joined in said motion.
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2
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THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DENIED.
Although generally motions to amend complaints under I.R.C.P. 15(a) is liberally granted

4

whenjustice so requires, the decision is left to the discretion of the court which will not be disturbed

5
6

on appeal absent au abuse of discretion. Bissett v. State, III Idaho 865 (Ct. App.). It is not an abuse

7

of discretion to deny a motion to amend if the proposed pleading does not set forth a valid claim.

8

Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P Jd 623 628 (2004). In the case at bar, the new claims

9

asserted against Ms. Taylor are not valid and as such the motion to amend should be denied.

10

J

The initial complaint through the TIlird Amended Complaint, which was filed on May 31)

11

12

2007 did not assert any specific claims against Connie Taylor. Instead, as explained in the Third

13

Amended Complaint, Ms. Taylor was being named as a party solely due to her prior marital

14

relationship with Defendant R. John Taylor. As a result ofthe improper inclusion ofller as a party>

15

Ms. Taylor has filed amotion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. Obviously, the claims that

16

carry over from the Third Amended Complaint that relate only to Ms. Taylor's marital relationship

17
should not be allowed to be included within the Fourth Amended Complaint The invalidity of those

18
19
20

claims are addressed within COIDlie Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss that
was previously filed with the court and which is incorporated herein.

21

The Fourth Amended Complaint has also added Ms. Taylor'S name to general claims of

22

misconduct that were asserted in the Third Amended Complaint solely due to her recent appointment

23
24

25

26
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1

to the Board of Directors for AIA Insurance and AlA Services. However, these claims concern

2

matters that occurred prior to Ms. Taylor's April 30, 2007 appointment to the Board of Directors.

3
4

This fact alone evidences the invalidity of the claims as against Ms, Taylor and should prevent the
fIling of the Fourth Amended Complaint. "It is an established principle of corporations law that

5

6

corporate directors are not liable merely by virtue of their office for fraud

01'

other tortious

7

wrongdoing corrunitted by the corporation or its officers, Instead, to be held liable a corporate

8

director must specifically direct) actively participate in, or knowingly acquiesce in the fraud or other

9

\.VI'ongdoing of the corporation or its officers." L.B. Industries, Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9\h Cir.

10

1987)(internal citations omitted); VPF VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 334, 109 P.3d 714, 722

11
12

(2005). Accordingly, this Court should deny the Plaintiff s Motion to Amend.
CONCLUSION

13

14

15
16

Based upon the foregoing, this Court should deny the Plaintiffs Motion to. Am.end
Complaint.
DATED this _ _ day of June, 2007.

17

CLARK and FEENEY

18
19

20

21
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Paul R. Cressman, JI.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
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Seattle, WA 98104

0
0

0
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U,S, Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Michael McNichols
Clements, Bwwn & McNichols
321 13 th Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston,lD 83501
David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 71h Street
PO Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403

U.S. Mail

0
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Hand Delivered
Ovel1light Mail
T elecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Attorneys for Duclos and Freeman
GaryD. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Po box 1617
Boise, ID 83701~1617
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Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance
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Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)

vs.

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho)
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and )
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
)

R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER
IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

)

Defendants.

)

Defendant R. John Taylor joins in the OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT filed and served by

R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

-1-

defendants AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McN1CHOLS, P.A.

BY:~~~~'~~~~~
MICHAEL E. McN1CHOLS
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I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of June, 2007, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
X
-X
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HAND DELIVERED
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
Defendants.

Case No.: CV-07-00208
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS
AMENDED MOTION TO AMEND
AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT R.
JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER, REPLY
IN TO DEFENDANT CONNIE
TAYLOR'S RESPONSE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
12(B)(6) MOTION

Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits this Reply in Support of his Amended
,

Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, Objection to R. John Taylor'S Joinder, Reply to
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO JOINDER. .. - 1

i4S

ORlGlN l

Connie Taylor's Response, Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants' l2(b)(6)
Motions to Dismiss, and incorporates by reference Reed Taylor's Response in Opposition to
Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion into this Response:
I. INTRODUCTION

Reed Taylor is requesting leave to file an amended complaint that amends and
supplements the Third Amended Complaint, adds new parties, adds new causes of action and
clarifies other causes of action.

Defendants respond by inappropriately arguing that an

amendment would be futile and should not be permitted based upon self-serving and flawed
arguments. Reed Taylor's Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is appropriate and warranted to
prosecute his claims involving breaches of substantial obligations and corporate malfeasance to
further the interests of justice. In sum, the facts and corporate malfeasance in this action are
unlike any case seen by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Contrary to the Defendants' allegations, Reed Taylor'S Complaint does not allege a
single specific date of breach of contract, which is required for the relief sought by the
Defendants under their 12(b)(6) Motion and opposition to Motion to Amend.

Instead, the

Defendants disingenuously argue that all inferences should be interpreted in their favor to
support avoiding liability on alleged "technicalities." However, Reed Taylor's Complaint must
be interpreted and construed in his favor as required by Idaho law.

Reed Taylor should be

permitted to amend his complaint in the interests of justice.
Finally, even if Reed Taylor had alleged specific breaches on specific dates outside of the
statute oflimitations, all of Reed Taylor's breaches of contract claims remain valid and viable as
continuing obligations.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO JOINDER ... - 2

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
A. Contrary to the Defendants' Arguments, Idaho Has NOT Abandoned the Notice
Pleading Requirement.
Idaho has adopted a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33,
13 P.3d 857 (2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. .. " Id., quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230,
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly bound to
stating particular theories in its pleadings." Cook, 135 Idaho at 33.

All pleadings shall be so

construed as to do substantial justice. LR.C.P. 8(f).
Although the Defendants invite the Court to disregard Idaho's notice pleading status,
Reed Taylor has far exceeded the notice pleading requirement by providing substantial facts,
allegations and causes of action as demonstrated in his Fourth Amended Complaint.

The

Defendants' ongoing attacks against Reed Taylor's notice pleading complaints are simply a
waste of resources and time.
B. Reed Taylor Will Be Deprived of a Substantial Right if He is Not Permitted to
Amend His Complaint.
The twin purposes behind the court rule governing amendments to pleadings are to allow
claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings serve
the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue. Christensen
Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,993 P.2d 1197 (1999). If a complaint is capable of

being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a refusal to grant
permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a substantial right. Markstaller v. Markstaller,
80 Idaho 129, 135,326 P.2d 994 (1958).
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In contrast, the Defendants cite Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat.
Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991), as authority in opposition to Reed Taylor's

Motion to Amend. However, Black Canyon Racquetball Club, involves an action where the
plaintiff alleged that the bank had orally agreed to loan it money. Id. at 172. One and one-half
years after filing the complaint, the bank moved for summary judgment on the alleged oral
agreement. Id. After the bank: moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint and allege new tort claims based upon the alleged oral agreement. !d. In contrast to
Reed Taylor'S claims, the plaintiffs new belated tort claims were based upon the same facts as
the alleged oral agreement, occurred at the exact same time, and involved invalid tort claims. Id.
at 172-79.
Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint contains twelve valid causes of action based
upon different facts, different parties, and different periods of time. Moreover, Reed Taylor
moved to amend and supplement his complaint less than six months after filing his complaint.
Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint is timely, warranted and required to
in the interests of justice.
C. Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint Has Alleged Twelve Valid Causes of
Action and the Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting His Twelve Causes of
Action is Irrelevant
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. Christensen Family Trust v.
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) citing Duffin v. Idaho Improvement
Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013,895 P.2d 1195,1206 (1995) (Emphasis added).

III
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO JOINDER ... - 4

Here, Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint states twelve valid causes of action and
the Court may not consider the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the twelve causes of action
when considering the motion to amend. Although the Defendants invite the Court to make an
inquiry into the limited evidence presently available while the Defendants deny Reed Taylor
discovery he seeks, the Court should decline such an invitation as the sufficiency of the evidence
may not be considered at this point in time.
Specifically, Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint states valid causes of action for
(1) Breaches of Contract; (2) Fraudulent Transfers; (3) Misrepresentations/Fraud (See e.g., Smith
v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266,561 P.2d 1299 (1977)); (4) Conversion (See e.g., Luzar
v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984»; (5) Director Liability (See e.g., Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 440, 849 P.2d 107 (1993)); (6) Alter
EgolPierce Corporate Veil (See e.g., Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,
438, 849 P.2d 107 (1993)); (7) Breaches of Fiduciary Duties (See e.g., Board of Trustees of
Teamsters v. Foodtwon, Inc., 296 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2002)); (8) Equitable Indemnification (See
e.g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822 (1993)); (9) Account Stated/Monies
Due (See e.g., M.T. Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614, 759 P.2d 905 (1988)); (10) Unjust
Enrichment (See e.g., Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 152 P.3d 638 (2006); (11)
Constructive Trust (See e.g., Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935»); and (12)
Specific Performance (See e.g., Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho
276,92 P.3d 526)).
Contrary to the Defendants' allegations, Reed Taylor has not alleged any specific dates in
any of his complaints regarding the dates of alleged breaches of contract, the dates of insolvency,
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breaches regarding the lock box agreement, or the dates he was not a board member. 1
Also contrary to the Defendants' allegations, all of the Defendants are alleged to be
tortfeasers and all of the Defendants bear potential liability for equitable indemnification and
other claims. See e.g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822 (1993).
Finally, Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment claim is simple. The Defendants have been all
unjustly enriched through their receipt of salaries, benefits, stock options, stock and the like,
while cheating Reed Taylor out of the over $8,000,000 owed to him. AIA Services and AIA
Insurance do not have the resources or assets to pay the amounts due to Reed Taylor because of
the Defendants' actions, and he is entitled to recover all such ill-gotten gains from the
Defendants. See e.g., Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 152 P.3d 638 (2006)(The essence of a
cause of action for unjust enrichment is the claim that the defendant has been enriched by the
plaintiff and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain that benefit without
compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit). Again, the Defendants attempt to
misconstrue Idaho's notice pleading requirement to support their flawed arguments.

The

Defendants are on notice that Reed Taylor intends to recover all amounts and property that the
Defendants have unjustly received.
Of course, in the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover all of the
approximately $8,500,000 owed to him from AIA Services, he will gladly withdraw unjust
enrichment as a cause of action.
III
1 Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants have refused to appoint Reed Taylor to the
board of AlA Services for over 6 years. However, this was an error as Reed Taylor was last listed as a member of
the board in 2001. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, Ex. C. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in this
Response, Defendants' arguments regarding statute oflimitations fail as a matter oflaw.
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Finally, the Defendants (including Connie Taylor) argue that the newest members of the
board of AIA Insurance and AlA Services are not liable.

However, as noted above, AIA

Services and AIA Insurance are insolvent and the Defendant directors owe Reed Taylor fiduciary
duties. The Defendant directors have breached their fiduciary duties by paying the attorney fees
of directors, failing to take action against certain Defendants on behalf of the corporations,
wrongfully allowing a tenant of AIA Insurance to transfer to a building owned by John Taylor,
failing to take action to terminate the $15,000,000 line-of-credit guaranteed by AIA Insurance,
and permitting the corporations' assets to be utilized by others, among other breached duties.
In sum, Fraud is the only claim that is required to be plead with specificity and the Court
should decline the Defendants' invitation to extend such a pleading requirement to all causes of
action.

D. The Promissory Note is An Installment Contract Secured by the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreemeut.
If there was no election to accelerate the terms of a note under an installment contract, the
statute of limitations applies to each installment separately, and does not begin to run on any
installment until it is due. Thomas v. Goff, 100 Idaho 282, 285, 596 P .2d 794 (1979).
Here, AIA Services was obligated to pay Reed Taylor monthly interest installments with
a balloon payment of the principal balance and accrued interest being due on August 1, 2005.
See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Ex. A. However, when the Defendants failed to timely
pay certain interest installments, Reed Taylor never elected to accelerate the terms of the
$6,000,000 Promissory Note. See Fourth Amended Complaint,

~

2.25.

The $6,000,000

Promissory Note expressly states that upon default (the failure to timely pay an installment):
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the entire remaining balance of principal and interest and all interest accrued thereon
may, at the option of the holder hereof, be declared to be immediately due and payable
without notice (the "Acceleration") and the lien given to secure its payment may be
foreclosed.
See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Ex. A.

Because Reed Taylor, in his sole discretion, never accelerated the amounts due under the
$6,000,000 Promissory Note, the statute of limitations only accrued on each interest installment
as it became due and the $6,000,000 principal payment when it became due on August 1, 2005,
with "all interest accrued."

!d.

Moreover, the indebtedness due under the $6,000,000

Promissory Note is secured by the obligations and security interests set forth in the Amended
,

Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement.

See Hearing on Preliminary

Injunction, Exs. A-C and E.
Accordingly, Reed Taylor'S cause of action to sue for the $6,000,000 under the
Promissory Note accrued on August 1, 2005, when the balloon payment and all accrued interest
came due. Thus, all interest installments for the five years preceding the filing of his original
complaint are not barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, Reed Taylor is entitled to seek
all remedies and relief available under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended
Security Agreement, as such agreements secured the payment of all sums owed to Reed Taylor
under the $6,000,000 Promissory Note.
For the same reasons above, the Defendants' arguments regarding I.C. § 5-238 are moot.
See AlA

Services/In~urance's

Response, p. 6. Because Reed Taylor never exercised his optional

right to accelerate the obligations under the $6,000,000 Promissory Note and all amounts
presently owed to Reed fall within the five-year statute of limitations, Reed Taylor need not
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make any claims or arguments regarding the acknowledgement of a new debt.
E. The Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement Are
Continuing Contracts To Reed Taylor Until the Earlier of Ten Years or
Payment in Full of the $6,000,000 Promissory Note, Plus All Accrued Interest.

In a continuing contract pertaining to the redemption of stock, the pledgee is under no
obligation to "act, and, by acting, exhaust his remedy the moments the first default occurred ... "
and the statute of limitations is only applicable to the appropriate period of time preceding the
commencement of the action. Austin v. Wright, 156 Wn. 24,29,286 P. 48, 50 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
1930)(holding that a pledgee is not barred by the statute of limitations from suing on a stock
redemption agreement as it was a "continuing contract"). The doctrine of continuing contractual
obligations has also been followed by Idaho District Court:
There are contracts, however, that have been said to require continuing (or continuous)
performance for some specified time, a period that may be definite or indefinite when the
contract is made. These contracts too are capable of a series of 'partial' breaches, as well
as of a single total breach by repudiation or by such a material failure of performance
when due as to go to the 'essence' and to frustrate substantially the purpose for which the
contract was agreed to by the injured party. For each 'partial' breach a separate cause of
action is maintainable, just as in the case of an 'installment' contract; and for a series of
'partial' breaches occurring before any action is brought only one action is maintainable.
4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 956 (1951).
The period fixed by a statute of limitations begins to run from the 'accrual of the cause of
action.' Since 'cause of action' is so uncertain and variable a concept, serious injustice
may be done unless the court uses judicial discretion in applying such a statute in the case
of 'partial' breaches of a single contract. No doubt there is much authority for the
statement that where separate actions would lie for a series of breaches, the statute
operates against each one separately as of the time when each one could have been
brought, and that this rule is not affected by the fact that after two or more such breaches
have occurred the plaintiff must join them all in one action. Of course, if an action for
the first installment is barred by the statute, it can not be properly included in an action
for later installments that are not yet barred. Corbin, supra, § 956.
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The statute of limitations applies separately to the alleged breach of 1983. The fact that
other partial breach claims, not raised in this litigation, are now time-barred is of no
consequence. Because the final alleged breach occurred in October 1983, within the sixyear statute oflimitations, the District's cause of action is not time barred.
Minidoka Irr. Dist. v. Department of Interior of

us.,

154 F.3d 924, 926 (D. Idaho

1998)(Emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions have also adopted the continuing contract doctrine. Haywood Street
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Harry S. Peterson, Co., Inc., 120 N.C.App. 832, 463 S.E.2d

564, (1995)(a new cause of action for breach of warranty accrued each day the work was not free
of defects); Ballantyne House Associates v. City of Newark, 269 N.J. Super. 322, 635 A.2d 551
(1993)(plaintiff could maintain an action for all breaches occurring within 6 years); West Haven
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1990)(If the breaches are partial and
ongoing, each one re-commences the statute of limitations such that damages can be awarded
beginning "from the date calculated by subtracting the limitations period from the date of
filing"); The Singer Company v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, 79 Md.App. 461, 558
A.2d 419 (1989)(statute of limitations on claims by customer against utility for breach of
contractual obligation to supply power began running anew after each power outage, rather than
accruing at the time of the first outage); Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Col. App.
1984)(damages for breach of covenants only barred for damages accruing outside of the statute
oflimitations).
Significantly, Austin was heard over 20 years after the inapplicable landlord-tenant case
cited by the Defendants, Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wn. 430, 104 P. 641 (1909)(the same case
relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in a similar landlord-tenant case which was also

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO JOINDER... 10

ongoing contractual obligations and for the security the payment of all amounts owed under a
promissory note. Moreover, Skaggs applies to a ruling on summary judgment and does not hold
that an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion should be granted or a motion to amend should be denied. In
short, Skaggs and Toellner are both not on point and inapplicable to the facts and law in this
case. Finally, it would be inequitable for AlA Services to avoid liability for any partial breaches
outside of the applicable statute of limitations. See 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 956
(1951)("Since 'cause of action' is so uncertain and variable a concept, serious injustice may be
done unless the court uses judicial discretion in applying such a statute in the case of 'partial'
breaches of a single contract").
In contrast to Toellner and Skaggs, Reed Taylor's claims do not involve a lease. Reed
Taylor's claims pertain to perfected security interests and pledged stock.

Significantly, the

Defendants are required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement to name Reed Taylor to
the board of AL<\' Services every year. Since under the Bylaws of AlA Services a board member
may only serve until the next annual meeting, Reed Taylor has a new cause of action for each
day/year he is not named to the board as this is a continuing obligation.

See Affidavit of

Roderick C. Bond, Exs. B-C.
Similarly, because insolvency is also an ongoing obligation, every quarter/year that ALA
Services issues a financial statement and such financial statement indicates insolvency, a new
cause of action accrues for insolvency. See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Exs. AL-AV.
The Defendants have ongoing obligations under all of the applicable agreements. Significantly,
the Defendants were required to abide by all obligations under the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement and the Amended Security Agreement until the earlier of ten years or the payment of
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO JOINDER ... - 12

erroneously relied upon by the Defendants, Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 484 P.2d 728
(1971)).
In this case, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are subject to continuing contractual
obligations under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and
$6,000,000 Promissory Note for the earlier of a period of ten years or until the $6,000,000 (Plus
accrued interest) has been paid in full. AIA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to comply
with such continuing obligations.

Although the Defendants disingenuously argue that the

obligations owed to Reed Taylor were "one time" contractual duties, the $6,000,000 Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement show otherwise.
The Agreements are continuing contracts and Reed Taylor is entitled to all damages that
flow from all breaches within the applicable statute oflimitations.
For the same reasons above, the case cited by the Defendants, Ancala Holdings, L.L. C. v.
Price, 2007 WL 387591, *3 (9th Cir. 2007), is yet another inapplicable lease convent case as
distinguished below.

F. The Obligations Owed To Reed Taylor Under the Agreements are Ongoing and
the Defendants Erroneously Rely on Skaggs v. Jensen.
The Defendants rely on Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 484 P.2d 728 (1971), for the
proposition that Reed Taylor's breach of contract claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
In Skaggs, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash. 430, 104
P. 641 (1909), wherein the Washington Supreme Court held that a lease covenant action was
barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. Toellner at 729. Significantly, however,
Skaggs and Toellner do not pertain to a security interest in commissions, a pledge of stock for

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
OBJECTION TO JOINDER ... - 11

all sums owed to Reed Taylor. The Defendants failed to do both.
Instead, applying the proper Washington case law to the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement and Amended Security Agreement results in an entirely different holding. In Austin
v. Wright, 156 Wash. 24, 29, 286 P. 48, 50 (1930)(a Washington Supreme Court case decided

some 20 years after the case, Toellner v. McGinnis, which was the authority cited in Skaggs v.
Jensen), the Washington Supreme Court held that when a stock redemption agreement was to

run for a period of twenty years, the plaintiff need not act upon the first default and that the
statute of limitations only barred claims exceeding six years from the commencement of the
action. Id. at 29. Applying Austin to the facts in this case leads to but one conclusion-Skaggs
and Toellner are inapplicable to security agreements and pledge agreements with ongoing
contractual obligations such as the case in Reed Taylor's causes of action.
Reed Taylor's causes of action involve a $6,000,000 Promissory note, an Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement and an Amended Security Agreement-not a breached covenant in a real
property lease agreement as in Skaggs. The Court should disregard the Defendants erroneous
and misplaced reliance on Skaggs, 94 Idaho 179 (1971). Instead, the Court should follow the
proper rationale as set forth in Austin, 156 Wash. 24 (1930) and Minidoka Irr. Dist., 154 F.3d
924 (D. Idaho 1998).
G. Even if the Statute of Limitations Defenses are Applicable to the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, the Defendants'
Obligations Under These Agreements Were Revived When Reed Taylor Sued
Under the $6,000,000 Promissory Note.
If an action is barred by the statute of limitations under a stock pledge agreement because
a portion of the notes are no longer within the statute of limitations, a plaintiff keeps an action
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alive by bringing suit upon the principal obligation within the statute of limitations. Riverside
Portland Cement Co. v. Anchor Laundry, 94 Cal.App. 407,408-09,271 P. 367 (1928).

Here, even if Reed Taylor was somehow barred from bringing claims under the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement and Security Agreement based upon the Defendants' flawed arguments,
he revived al1 of the obligations and causes of action under the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement and Amended Security Agreement when he sued on the $6,000,000 Promissory Note,
which is secured by these Agreements. See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Ex. A.

H. Sufficiency of Evidence is More Properly Determined At the Summary
Judgment Stage of Litigation.
The sufficiency of evidence pertaining to a complaint is more appropriately determined at
the summary judgment stage, not in a motion to amend or a 12(b)(6) motion. Duffin v. Idaho
Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013,895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995).

Here, the Defendants are requesting that the Court make evidenciary decisions in a
motion to amend and LR.C.P 12(b)(6) motion.

However, the Defendants' request is not

appropriate and should be denied.

I. Connie Taylor Is a Required Party Because of Her Role as a Director, Her Joint
Ownership of Crop USA and AlA Services Stock, and Because the Community
Benefited from the Various Wrongful Acts.
"The obvious purpose of joining the spouses is to give each notice and an opportunity to
defend ... [and] a judgment entered against a wife who had neither been served nor named, and
had not appeared, was void insofar as it attempted to bind her or the community." Vikse v.
Johnson, 137 Ariz. 528,531,627 P.2d 193,195 (1983).

III
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Here, Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint is requesting the return of wages paid to
John Taylor and a constructive trust for all shares and ill-gotten gains. In addition, Reed Taylor
has specific claims which would impose liability to the shareholders of the corporations.
Connie Taylor's role in this matter cannot be underemphasized as she has exerted
significant effort to assert her community property interests in an email dated January 19, 2007:
Rod:
I'd like to confirm our conversation of this afternoon, in which I advised you that I still
own an undivided one-half interest with John Taylor in all shares of AIA Inc., AIA
Services, and CROP USA. My approval is required prior to entering into any agreement
which would impact those shares. I understand you will provide me with a copy of any
documents which are filed with the court.
Connie
Affidavit of Roderick Bond, Ex. A.
As the co-owner of the shares in AlA Services and Crop USA, Connie Taylor is liable for
claims under alter-ego, fraud, fraudulent transfers and such other causes of action applicable to
shareholders/owners who benefited from wrongful acts or are otherwise held liable under the
law. This is further codified in AIA Service's Bylaws, which provides that co-owners of shares
are jointly liable for acts of either owner's vote of the shares. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond,
Ex. B,p. 4.
Moreover, Connie Taylor's email clearly set forth two significant issues.

First, she

makes clear her ownership interest in the shares and her desire to protect those property interests.
Second, Connie Taylor advises of her desire to have copies of pleadings filed in this action.
If Connie Taylor were not named a party in this action and her property rights were
affected, she would certainly exercise her right to void any decision which negatively impacted
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her in this action. Likewise, she is now complaining of being named, even after sending the
above-referenced email.
Regardless, Connie Taylor has been appointed as a board member of AlA Services and
AIA Insurance and she is liable for all breached fiduciary duties flowing from her role as a
director, among other claims as a shareholder and recipient of funds from AIA Services.
J. R. John Taylor's Joinder Is Untimely and Does Not Address Identical Issues.
An untimely Joinder is only appropriate when the issues raised are identical and no

objection is made to the timeliness of the Joinder. Ramos v. Dixon, 156 P.3d 533, 535-36 (Idaho
2007).
Here, John Taylor's Joinder was untimely served. Reed Taylor objects to his untimely
Joinder, and John Taylor's Joinder does not address identical issues raised in AIA Services and
AIA Insurance's Response. Thus, John Taylor's Joinder should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement
Complaint and deny the Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
DATED: This 26 th day of June, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

annon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiffs Reply in Support of his Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement
Complaint, Objections to John Taylor's Joinder, Reply to Connie Taylor's Response, and
Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants' LR.C.P. l2(b)(6) Motion on the following
party(s) via the methode s) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Gary D. Babbitt
D . John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AIA Insurance

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829

Signed this 26th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,
v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TA YLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO AMEND AND IN
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR'S
12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND - 1

~lo1-

ORIGINAL

1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor in the above-entitled

action. I make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A is an email that I received from Connie Taylor dated

January 19,2007, wherein Ms. Taylor advised me of her undivided interest in the shares in AIA
Services and Crop USA and the requirement that she be involved with any agreement impacting
the shares. This email was in response to Connie Taylor learning of settlement discussions
between Reed Taylor and John Taylor. She made clear to me her community property interest in
the shares of AlA Services and Crop USA.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B is the Bylaws of AlA Services Corporation which were

provided to me by AlA Services Corporation.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C are copies of the annual reports submitted by AlA Services

to the Idaho Secretary of State disclosing the officers and directors of AlA Services, which I
downloaded from the Idaho Secretary of State website. The reports show that Reed Taylor was
listed as a member of the board of AlA Services in 2001, but not in the five subsequent years.
DATED: This 26 th day of June, 2007.

Roderick C.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of June, 2007.

Notary Public or Idaho
LetlJiCfJ tm
Residing at:
My commission expires: J.12.4-lfOJ2
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Roderick C. Bond
From:

Connie [ctaylor@clarkandfeeney.com]

Sent:

Friday, January 19, 2007 3:29 PM

To:

Roderick C. Bond

Subject: Reed Taylor - AlA

Rod:
I'd like to confirm our conversation of this afternoon, in which I advised you that I still
own an undivided one-half interest with John Taylor in all shares of AlA Inc., AlA
Services, and CROP USA. My approval is required prior to entering into
any agreement which would impact tbose shares. I understand you will provide me
with a copy of any documents which are filed with the court.
Connie
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NEW RESTATED BYLAWS

OF
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
(an'Idaho corporation)
,

,

ARTICLE I

OFFICES '
Section 1.1
Registered Office..
The registered office of the
corporation required by the Idaho Business Corporation Act to ~e
maintained in the State of Idaho may, but need not be, identical withtpe
principal office' in the State of Idaho; and the address of the registered
office may be changed from time to time by the Board of Directors or the
President of the corporation. (Idaho Code Sections 30-1-12{a) and 3D-lB. )
Section 1.2 Principal Office; Other Offices. The corporation shall
and maintain an office or principal, place o,f business in
Lewiston, Idaho or at such other place as may ,be fixed by the Board of
Directors, and may also have offices at such other places,both within and
without the State of Idaho. as the Board of Directors may from time to
time determine or the business of the corporation may require.
alsoh~ve

ARTICLE II
CORPORATE SEAL

Section 2.1 Corporate Seal. The corporate seal shall consist of
a die bearing the name of the corporat.ion and the inscril?tion, "Corporate
Seal -- State of Idaho".
The seal may be use~ by causing it or a
facsimile thereof to be impressed or affixed or in any other. manner
reproduced.
The seal may be altered at the pleasure of the Board of
Directors. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-4{c)).
'
ARTICLE III

STOCKHOLDERS I HEETINGS
Section, 3.1
Place of Meetings.
The Board of Directors may
designate any place, either within or without'the State of Idaho, as the
place of meeting for any annual meeting or for - any special meeting of
stockholders called by the Board of Directors. A waiver of notice signed
:,<'~"1

.' '_.-" ,
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by all, stockholders entitled to vote at a meeting may designate any place,
either within or without the State of Idaho, as the place for the holding
6f such meeting. If no designation is made, or if a special meeting be
otherwise called, the place of meeting shall be the principal office of
the corporation in the State of Idaho. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-28).
Section 3.2
Annual Meetings.
The annual meeting of the
stockholders of the corporation shall be held on the first Monday in the
month of May each year at the hour of 10: 00 0 I clock a. m.) or on such other
date and at such other time which may from time to time be designated by
the Board of Directors. for the purpose of electing directors and for the,
transaction 'of such other busin~ss as may properly come before the
meeting. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-28).
Section 3.3 Special-Meetings. Special meetings of the stockholders
of the corporation may be called a1:. any tim~. for any purpose or. purposes,
by the Board of Directors Or by the holders of not less than one-fifth
'(1/5) o~ all outstanding shares of stock of the corporation entitled to
vote at' the meeting or by the president of the corporation.
Special
meetings of the stockholders of the corporation may not be called by any
other person or persons. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-28).
Section 3.4 Notice of Meetings. Written notice stating the place,
day and hour of the meeting end, in case of a special meeting, the purpose
or purposes for which tlir- meeting is called, shall, unless otherwise
prescribed by statute, be delivered not less than ' ten nor more than fifty
days before the date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, by~r
at'the direction of the president, or the secretary, or the officer or
other persons calling the meeting, to each stockholder of record entitled
,to vote at such meeting, or 'to, each specified beneficial stockholder
certified for the purpose of receiving such notice under Section 3.10.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-29).
Such notice of any meeting of stockholders may be waived in writing,
signed by the person entitled to notice thereof, either before or after
such meeting, and will be waived by any stockholder by his attendance
thereat iIi person or by proxy, except when the stockholder attends a
meeting for the express purpose of objecting. -at the beginning of the
meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting is not
lawfully called or convened. Any stockholder so waiving notice of such
meeting shall be bound by the proceedings of any such meeting in all
'respects as if due notice hereof had bee~ given. (Idaho Code Section 301-144).
Section 3.5 Quorum. Except as otherWise provided in the Articles
of Incorporation, a majority of the outstanding shares, of the corporation
entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy. shall constitute a
quorum at a meeting of stockholders. Any shares, the voting of which at
said meeting has been enjoined, or which for any reason cannot be lawfully
voted at such meeting, shall not be counted to determine a quorum at such
meeting. In the absence of a quorum any meeting of stockholders may be
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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adjourned, from time to time, -by vote of the holders of a majority of the
shares represented thereat; but no other business shall be transacted at
such meeting. The stockholders present at a duly organized and convened
meeting where a quorum has been presen,t can continue to transact business
as a quorum until adjournment, notwithstanding the withdrawal 6f enough'
stockholders to leave less than a quorum. Except as otherwise provided
by law. the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws. if .; quorum is
present, the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares represented at
the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act
of the stockholders. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-32).
Section 3.6 Adjournment and Notice of Adjourned Meetings.
Any
meeting of stockholders at which a quorum is present, whether annual or
special, may be adjourned from time to time by the vote of a majority of
the shares, the holders of which are present either in person or byproxY.When a meeting is adjourned to another time or place, notice need not be
given of the adjourned meeting if the' time and place thereof are announced
at the meeting at which the adjoux:nment is taken.
At the adjourned
meeting the'corporation may transact any business which might have been
transact-ed at the original meeting. If the adjournment is for more than
thirty (30) days, or if after the adjournment a new record date is fixed
for the adjournment meeting, a notice of the adjourned meeting shall be
given to each stockholder of record entitled to vote at the meeting.
Section 3.7
Proxi:'e'S.
At all meetings of stockholders. a
stockholder may vote either in person or by proxy executed in writing by
the stockholder or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact. Such proxy
shall be filed with the secretary of the corporation before or at the time
of the meeting. No proxy shall be valid after eieven (11) months from the'
date of its ,execution, unless otherwise provided in the proxy. (Idaho
Code. Section 30-1-33(c».
Section 3.8 Voting Rights. Except as otherwise provided in the
Articles of Incorporation, each outstanding share, regardless of class,
entitled to vote shall be entitled to one vote upon each matter submitted
to a vote at a meeting of stockholders. Cumulative voting of shares shall
not be permitted in the election of directors.
For the purpose of
determining those stockholders entitled to vote in any meeting of the
stockholders~ excep~ as otherwise provided'by law, only persons in which
names shares stand on the stock record of the corporation on the record
date, as provided in Sections 3. 11 and 7.4 - of these By laws, shall be
Emtitled to vote at any meeting of_ stockholders.
All elections of
directors shall be by written ballot.

~.

.,'-,

Section 3.9 Voting of Shares by Certain Holders. Shares standing
in the name of another corporation, domestic or foreign. may be voted by
such officer, agent or proxy as the bylaws of such other corporation may
prescribe or, in the absence of such provision, as the Board of Directors
of such other corporation may determine. {Idaho Code Section 30-1-22(e».
Shares held by an administrator, executor, guardian or conservator
, ..
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may be voted by him, either in person or by proxy, without a transfer of
such shares into his name. Shares standing in the name of a trustee may
be voted by him, either in person or by proxy; but no trustee shall be
entitled to vote shares held by him without a transfer of such shares into
his name. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-33(f».
Shares standing in the name of a receiver may be voted by such
receiver; and shares held by or under the control of a receiver may be
voted by such receiver without the transfer thereof into his name if
authority so to do be contained in an appropriate order of the court by
which such receiver was appointed. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-33(g».
A stockh~lder whose shares are pledged shall be· entitled to vote
such shares unt.il the shares have been transferred into ·the. name of the
pledgee; and thereafter the pledgee shall be entitled to vote the shares
. so transferred· unless the pledgor sh.all have obtained from the pledgee a
proxy to vote or take other action 'thereon in accordance with law. (Idaho
Code Section 30-1-33(c)(3),(h».
Neither treasury shares of its own stock held by the corporation,
nor shares held by another corporation if a mahority of the shares
entitled to vote for the elections of directors of such other corporation
. is held by the corporation, shall be voted at any meeting or counted in
determining the total number of outstanding shares at any given time.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-35(b»).
Section 3.10 Joint Owners of Stock. . If shares or other securities
having voting power stand of record in the names of two (2) or more
persons, whether fiduciaries, members of a partnership. joint tenants,
tenants in c·ommon, tenants by the entirety, or otherwise, or if two (2)
or more persons have the same fiduciary relationship respecting the same
shares, unless the Secretary is given written notice to the contrary and
is' furnished with a copy of the instrument or order appointing them or
creating the relationship wherein it is so provided, their acts with
respect to voting shall have the following effect: (a) if only one votes,
his a"ct binds all; (b) if more than one votes, the act of the majority so
voting binds all; (c) if more than one votes, but the vote is evenly split
on any particular matter, each faction may vote the securities in question
proportionally. If the instrument filed with the secretary shows that any
such ·tenancy is held in unequal interests, a majority or even-split for
the purpose of this Section 3.10 shall be a majority or even-split
interest.
T

The Board of Directors may adopt by resolution a procedure whereby
a stockholder of the Corporation may certify in writing to the corporation
that all or a portion of the shares registered in the name of such
stockholder are held for the account of a specified person or persons.
The resolution shall set forth (a) the classification of stockholder who
may certify, (b) the purpose or purposes for which the certification may
be made. (c) the form of certification and information to be contained
therein, (d) the number of days before or after any record date or date
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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of closing of the stock transfer books. and (e) such other provisions with
respect to the procedure as are deemed necessary or desirable.
Upon
receipt by the corporation of a certification complying with the
procedure, the persons specified in the certification shall be deemed, for
the purpose or purposes set forth in the certification, to be the holders
of record of the number of shares specified in place of the shareholder
making the certification. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-2(f)).
Section 3.11 List of StoCkholders. The secretary shall make, at
least ten (10) days before every meeting of stockholders, a' complete'
recorl'l of the stockholders entitled to vote at such meeting or any
adjournment thereof. arranged in alphabetical order and shOWing the
addresses of each stockholder and the number of shares registered in the
name of each stockholder. Such record shall be open to the examination
of any stockholder, for any purpose germane to the meeting. during
ordinary business hours, for a period of at least ten (10) days prior to
the meeting, either at a place within the city where the meeting is to be
held, which place shall be specified in the notice of the meeting or, if
not specified, at the place where the meeting is to be held. The list
shall b~ produced and kept open at the time .and place of meeting •. and
shall be subject to inspection by any stockholder during the whole time
of the meeting for the purposes thereof. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-31).
Section 3.12 Organization. At every meeting of stockholders, the
Chairman of the Board o£fD"irectors, or, if a Chairman has not been
appointed or is absent, the president, or, if the president is absent, the
most senior vice president present, or. in t1).e absence of' any such officer,
a chairman of the meeting chosen by a' majority in interest of the
stockholders entitled to vote, present in person or by proxy, shall act
as chairman. The secretary or, in his absence, an assistant secretary
directed to do so by the president, shall act as secretary of the meeting.
Section 3.13 Nomination of·Directors. Nominations of persons for
. election to the Board of Directors of this corporation at the annual
meeting of stockholders may be made at such meeting by or at the direction
of the Board of Directors, by any nominating committee or person appointed
by the Board of Directors, or by any stockholder of the corporation
entitled to vote for the election of directors at the meeting who timely
complies with the notice procedures herein set forth.
To be timely, a
stockholder's notice must be delivered to, ~r mailed to and received by,
the secretary of the corporation at the corporation t s principal executive
offices not later than the December 31 immediately preceding the annual
meeting.
Section 3.14
Business Introduced by Stockholders at Annual
Meetings. Where business introduced by a stockholder is not specified in
the notice of annual meeting, then (in addition to any other applicable
requirements) for business to be properly introduced by a stockholder at
an annual meeting of stockholders, the stockholder must have given timely
notice thereof in writing to the secretary of the corporation. To be
timely, a stockholder's notice must be delivered to, or mailed to and
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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received by, the secretary of the corporation in the same manner and
subject to the same time requirements provided in Section 3.13 of these
Bylaws for stockholder notice of nominations to the Board of Directors.
A stockholder's notice must set forth, as to each matter the stockholder
proposes to bring before the meeting, (a) a brief description of the
business desired to be brought before the meeting and the reasons for
conducting such business at the meeting. (b) the name and record address
of the stockholder proposing such business, .(c) the class, series and
number of shares of the corporation's stock which are beneficially owned
by the stockholder, and Cd) any material interest of the stockholder in
such business.
Section 3.15 Informal Action by Stockholder. Any action required
or permitted to be taken at a meeting of the stockholders may be taken
without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so
taken,' shall be ,signed by all of the stockholders entitled to vote with
respect to.the subject matter thereof. Such consent shall have the same
effect as a unanimous vote of stockholders. (Idaho Code Section 30-1145).

ARTICLE IV
DIRECTORS

Section 4.1
Nt.miber;",. Qualifications.
The number of directors
presently authorized is six (6). The authorized number of directors of
the corporation shall be fixed. and may be increased to a~many as nine
or decreased to as few as one, from time to time by the Board of Directors
ei ther by a resolution or a byTaw duly adopted by the Board of Directors.
No decrease in the number of directors constituting the Board of Directors
shall shorten the term of any incumbent director. Directors need not be
residents of the State of Idaho or stockholders unless so required by the
Articles of Incorporation. If for any cause the directors shall not have
been elected at an annual meeting, they may be elected as soon thereafter
as convenient at a special meeting of the stockholders called for that
purpose in the manner provided by law or in these Bylaws.
(Idaho Code
Sections 30-1-28, 30-1-35 and 30-i-36).
Section 4.2 Tenn. Each director shall serve until the next annual
meeting of stockholders and his successor is duly ~lected and qualified,
or until his death, resignation or removal. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-36).
Section 4.3
Newly created Directorships and Vacancies.
Newly
created directorships resulting from any increase in the number of
directors and any vacancies on the Board of Directors resulting from
death, resignation; disqualification, removal or other cause shall be
filled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors
then in office (and not by stockholders), even if less than a quorum of
the authorized Board of Directors. A director elected to fill a vacancy
shall be elected for the unexpired term of his predecessor in office. The
stockholders may elect his successor at the next annual meeting of
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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stockhold~rs or at any special meeting duly called for that purpose and
held prior to the next annual meeting.

Section 4.4 'Powers. All corporate powers shali be exercised by and
under the authority oft and -the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed under the direction of, the Board of Directors except as
may otherwise be provided in_ the Idaho Business Corporation Act or the
A~ticles of Incorporation.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-35).
Section 4.5 Resignation. Any director may resign at any time by
delivering his written resignation to the secretary, such resignation to
specify whether it will be effective at a particular time. upon receipt
by the secretary or at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. If no such
specification is made. it shall be deemed effective at 'the ple-asure of the
Board of Directors.
When one or more directors shall resign from the
Board of Directors, effective at ..a future date. a majority of the
directors then in office, including those who have so resigned, shall have
power to fill such vacancy or vacancies, the vote thereon to take effect
when such resignation or resignations--shall hecome effective; and, subject
to Section 4.3, each director so chosen shall hold office for the
unexpired portion 6f the terms of the director whose place shall be
vacated and until his successor shall have been duly elected and
qualified.
Section 4.6 Remov~:'At a special meeting of stockholders called
for the purpose in the manner hereinabove provided, the entire Board of
Directors, or any individual director, may be removed from office, with
or without cause, and one or more ne~ directors may be elected. by a vote
of stockholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares then entitled
to vote at an election of directors. The holders of the corporation IS
Stated Value Preferred Stock being entitled to elec~ one (1) director by
the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation. the provisions of this
Section 4.6 shall apply, in respect to the removal of the director so
elected, to the vote of the holders of the outstanding shares of-Stated
Value Preferred Stock and not to the vote of the outstanding shares'as a
whole. (Idaho Code Section 30-39.)
Section 4-.7

Meetings.

(a) Annual Meetings. The annual meeting of the Board of
Directors shall be- held imm~diately after the annual meeting of
stockholders and at the place where such meeting is held. No notice of
an annual meeting of the_Board of Directors shall be necessary; and such
meeting shall be held for the purpose of electing officers and transacting
such other business as may lawfully come_before it. (Idaho Code Section

30-1-43) .
(b) Other Meetings.
Regular and special meetings of the
Board of Directors, or of any committee designated by the Board. may be
held at any place within or without the State of Idaho
(Idaho Code
Section 30-1-43).
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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(c)
Telephone Meetings.
Any membe.r of the Board of
or of any committee thereof" may participate in a meeting by
means of conference telephone or similar communications equipment by means
of which all persons participating in the meeting can hear each other at
the same time; and participation in a meeting by such means shall
constitute presence in person at such meeting. (Idaho 'Code 30-1-43).
Directors~

(d) Notice of Meetings. Notice of the time and place of any'
regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors shall be given at
least three (3) days previously thereto by written notice delivered
personally or mailed to each director at his business address, or by
telegram;
provided that the Board of Directors may provide, by
rescitution, the time and' place, either within or without the State of
Idaho, for the holding of regular meetings without notice other than such
resolu~ion.
Any director may waive notice of any meeting, in writing, at
any time before or after the meeting. The attendance of a director at a
meeting shall constitute a waiver of notice of such meeting, except where
a director attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the
transaction' of any business because the meeting is not lawfully called or
convened. Neither the business to be transacted at, nor the purpose of,
any regular Dr special meeting of the Board of Directors need be specified
in the notice or waiver of notice of such meeting.
(Idaho Code Section
30-1-43).
(e)
Waiver of Notice; Consent.
The transaction of all
·business at any meeting of the Board of Directors, or. any committee
thereof, however called or noticed, or wherever held" shall be as valid
as though taken at a meeting duly held after regular call and notice, if
a quorum is present and if, either before or 'after the meeting, each of
the directors not present signs a written waiver of notice, or a consent
to ho 1ding such meeting, or an approval of the minut~s thereof. All such
waivers, consents or approvals shall be filed with the corporate records
or made a part of the minutes of the meeting. (Idaho Code Section 30-143, 30-1-144).
Section 4.8

Quorum'and Voting.

(a) Quorum. A majority of the number of directors fixed by
or in the manner prOVided in Section 4.1 shall constitute' a quorum for the
transaction of business at any meeting of the Board of Directors. If less
than such majority is present at any meeting, a majority of the directors
present may adjourn the meeting from time to time until the time fixed for
the next regular meeting of the Board of .Directo!s, without further notice
other than by announcement at the meeting. (Idaho Code Section 39-1-40).
(b) Majority Vote. At each meeting of the Board of Directors
at which a quorum is present, all questions and business shall be
determined by a vote of a majority of the directors present; and the act
of the majority of the directors present shall be the act of the Board of
Directors, unless a different vote is required by law; the Articles of
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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Incorporation or these Bylaws.

(Idaho Code Section 30-1-40).

(c) PreSumption of Assent. A director of the corporation who
is present at a meeting of the Board of Directors. (or any committee
thereof) at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be
presumed to have assented to the action taken unless his dissent shall be
entered in the minutes of the meeting or unless he shall file his written
dissent to such action with the person acting as the secretary of the
meeting before the adjournment thereof or shall forward such dissent by
registered mail to the secretary of the corporation within three (3) days
after the adjournment of the meeting.
Such right to dissent shall not
apply to a direc·tor who voted in favor of such action.
(Idaho Code
Section 30-1-35).

:;.

1

a

Section 4.9 Action Without Meeting. Unless otherwise restricted
by the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, any action required or
permitted to be taken at any meetihg' of the Board of Directors or of any
committee thereof may be taken without a meeting. if a consent in writing,
setting forth the action so takeri is signed by all members of the Board
of Directors or of the committee, as the case may be. (Idaho Code Section
30-1-44) .
Section 4.10 Fees and Compensation. By resolution of the Board of
Directors, a fixed fee or ~!ilary payable in cash or the corporation IS
stock or any combination t-liereof. with or without expenses or attendance,
may be allowed for serving on the Board of Directors and I or. attendance at
each meeting of the Board a£". Directors and at each meeting of any
commi ttee of the Board of Dire~tors. Noting herein contained shall be
construed to preclude any director from serving the corporation in any
other capacity as an officer, agent, consultant, employee, or otherwise
and receiving compensation therefor. (Idaho Code-Section 30-1-35),
Section 4.11 Performance of Duties. A director shall perform his
duties as director, including his duties as a member of any committee of
the Board of Directors on which he may serve, in good faith, in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
use 'under similar, circunistanc~s"
In performing -his duties, a direct~r
shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements,
including financial statements ann other financial data, in each casc
prepared or presented.by:
Ca) One (1) or more officers or employees of the corporation
whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent
in the matters' presented;
(b)
Counsel, public accountants or othe~ persons as to
matters which the director reasonably believes to be within such
. persons' professional or expert competence; or
(c)

A committee of the Board upon which he does not serve,
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duly designated in accordance with a prOV1S10n of the Articles of
'Incorporation or the Bylaws, as to matters within its designated
authority,. which committee the director reasonably b~lieves to merit
confidence; but he shall not be considered to be acting in good
faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that
would cause such reliance to be unwarranted.
A person who so performs his duties shall have no liability by reason of
being or having been a director of the corporation. (Idaho Code Sections
30-1-35, 30-1-42).
Section 4.12

Committees.

(a) Executive Committee.
The Board of Directors may, by
resolution adopted by a majority of the full Board of Directors, appoint
an Executive Committee to consist of one (1) or more members of the Board
of Directors. The Exe~utive Committee, to the extent permitted by law and
specifically granted. hy the Board of Directors. shall have and may
exercise when the Board of Directors is not in session all powers and
authority of the Board of Directors in the management of the business and
affairs of the corporation, except such committee shall not have the power
or authority to (i) declare dividends or distributions, (ii) approve or
recommend to stockholders actions or proposals' required by the Idaho
Business Corporation Act to be approved by stockholders, (iii) designate
candidates for the office 6f:director, for purposes of proxy solicitation
or otherwise, or fill vacancies on the Board of Directors or any committee
. thereof, (iv) amend the By laws, (v) approve a plan of merger not requiring
stockholder approval, (vi) reduce earned or .capital surplus, (vii)
authorize or approve the reacquisition of shares unless pursuant to a
general formula or method specified by the Board of Directors, or (viii)
authorize or approve the issuance or sale of, or ny contract to issue or
sell, shares or designate the terms of a series of a class of shares,
provided that the Board of Directors, having ·acted regarding general
authorization for the issuance or 'sale of shares, or any contract
therefor, and, in the case of a series, the designation thereof, may,
pursuant to a general formula or method specif ied by the Board by'
resolution or by adoption of a stock option or other plan, authorized a
committee to fix the terms of any contract for the sale of the shares and
to fix the terms upon which such' shares may be issued or sold, including,
without limitation, the price, the ,dividend rate~ prov1s10ns for
redemption, sinking fund, cc;mversion, voting or preferential rights" and
provisions for other features of a.class of shares,-or a series ofa class
of shares, with full power in such committee 'to' adopt any final resolution
setting·forth all the terms thereof and to authorize the statement of the
terms of a series for filing with the Secretary cif State under.the Idaho
Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-42).
(b)
Other Conmitte.es.
The Board of Directors may, by
resolution adopted by a majority of the full Board of Directors, from time
to time appoint such other committees as may be permitted by law. Such
other committees appOinted by the Board of Directors shall consist of one
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(1) or more members of the Board of Directors, and shall have such powers
and perform such duties as may be prescribed by the resolution or
resolutions creating such committees; but in no event shall such committee
have the powers denied to the Executive Committee in Section 4.12(a).
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-42).

(c) Terms. The members of all committees of the Board of
Directors shall· serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors.
The
Board of Directors, subject to the provisions of subsections (a) or (b)
of this Section 4.12, may at any time increase or decrease the number of
members of a committee or terminate the existence of a committee. The
membership of a committee member shall terminate on the date of his death
or voluntary resignation. Any committee member may resign at any time by
giving written notice to the presldent or secretary of the corporation.
The Board of Directors may at any time for any reason, with or without
cause, remove any individual committee member; and the Board of Directors
may fill any committee vacancy created by death, resignation, removal or
increase in the number of members of the committee.
The Board of
Directors may designate one or more directors as alternate members of any
committee~ who may .replace any absent or disqualified member at any
meeting of the committee; and,
in addition, in the absence or
disqualification of any member of a committee, the member or members
thereof present at any meeting and not disqualified from voting,'whether
or not he or they constitute a quorum, may unanimously appoint another
member of the Board of Di--tef'tors to 'act at the meeting in place of any
such absent or disqualified member .

.

(d) Meetings. Unless the Board of Directors shall otherwise
provide, regular meetings of the Executive Committee or any other
committee appointed pursuant to this Section 4.12 shall be held at such
times and places as are determined by the Board of Directors, or by any
such committee; and when notice. thereof has been g-iven to each member of
such committee, no further notice of such regular meetings need be given
thereafter. Special meetings of any such committee may be held at any
place which has been designated from time to time by resolution of such
committee or by written consent of all members thereof, and may be called
by any director who is a member of such committee, upon written notice to
the members of such committee of the time and place of 'such special
meeting given in the manner provided for the giving of written notice to
members of, the Board of Directors of the time and place of special
meetings of the Board of Directors; proyided that notice of a special
meeting need not state the business proposed to be transacted at the
meeting. Notice of any special meeting of any committee may be waived in
writing at any time before or after the meeting and wi~l be waived by any
director by attendance thereat, except when the director attends such
special meeting for the express purpose of objecting, at-the, beginning of
the meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting is not
lawfully called or convened.
Each committee shall elect a presiding
officer from its members and may fix its own rules of procedure which
shall not be inconsistent with these Bylaws.
It shall keep regular
minutes of its proceedings and report them to the Board of Directors for
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its information at the meeting thereof held next after the proceedings
shall have been taken. A majority of the authorized number of members of
any such committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business; and the act of a majority of those present at any meeting at
which a quorum is present shall be the act of such committee.
(e) Responsibility. Neither the designation of an Executive
Committee or other committee. the delegation thereto of authority, nor
action by such committee shall relieve the Board of Directors> or any
member thereof, of any responsibility or duty imposed by law.
Section 4.13
Organization.. At every meeting of the Board of
Directors, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, or, if a chairman has
not been appointed or is absent, ··the president, or if the president i~
absent, ·the most senior vice preSident, or. in the absence of any such
officer. a chairman of the meeting chosen by a majority of the directors
present, shall preside over the' meeting.
The secretary, or in his·
absence. an assistant secretary directed to do so by the president shall
act as secretary of the meeting and shall keep regular minutes of the
proceedings of the Board of Directors.
Section 4.14 Director Conflicts of Interest. No contract or other
transaction between the corporation and one or more of its directors or
any other corporation, firm. association or entity in which one-or more
of its directors are direc~ts or officers or are financially interested.
shall be either void or voidable b.ecause of such relationship or interest
or because ·such director or directors are present at the meeting· of the
Board of Directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or
ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or their votes are
counted for such purposes, if:
(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed
or known to the Board of Directors or committee which authorizes, approves
.or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient
for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of such interested
directors; or
(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed
or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve
or ratify such contract or transaction by vote or written consent, in
which vote or consent such interested directors may participate to the
extent that they are also shareholders; or
(c) the contract or transaction is fair .and reasonable to the
corporation and the fact of such relationship or interest is fully and
fairly disclosed or known to the corporation.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the Board of Directors or a committee
thereof which autorizes, approves
or ratifies such contract or
transaction.
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ARTICLE V
OFFICERS
Section 5.1 Officers Designated. The officers of the corporation
consist of. a president, one or more vice presidents (the number thereof
to be determined by the Board of Directors), a secretary, and a treasurer ~
each of whom shall be elected by the Board of Directors.. The order of
seniority of vice presidents shall be the order of their nomination,·
unless otherwise determined by .the Boared 'of Directors.
Such other
officers and assistant officers as may be deemed necessary may be elected
or appointed by the Board of Directors. Any two or more offices may be
held by the same person, except the offices of president and secretary.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-50).
.
Section 5.2

Tenure and Duties of Officers.

(a) Term of Office. All officers shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board of Directors and until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified, or until their 'resignation or removal.
If the office of any officer becomes v'acant for any reqson, the vacancy
may be filled by the Board .of Directors. (Idaho Code·Section 30-1-50).
(b) The Pres..ufent.
The president shall be the principal
executive officer of the corporation and, subject to the control of the
Board of Directors, shall in general supervise and control all. of the
business and affairs 0f the corporation .. He shall, when present, preside
at all meetings of the stockholders and of the Board of Directors. He may
sign. with the secretary or any other proper officer of the corporation
thereunder authorized by the Board of Directors, certificates for shares
.of th~ corporation, any deeds, mortgages, bonds,' contracts, or other
instruments which the Board of Directors has authorized to be executed,
except in cases where the signing and execution thereof shall be expressly
delegated by the Board of Directors or by these Bylaws to some other
officer or agent of the corporation, or shall be required by law to be
otherwise signed or executed; and in general the president shall perform
all duties commonly incident·to the office of president and such other
. duties as maybe prescribed by the Board of Directors from time to time.
7

(c) The Vice President. In the absence of the president or
in the event of his death, inability or refusal to act. the vice president
(or in the event there is more than one vice president, the vice
presidents in the order designated at the time of their election, or in
the absence of any designation, then in the order of their election) shall
perform the duties· of the president and. when so acting, shall hae all the
powers of and be subject to all the restrictions upon the president. 'Any
vice president may sign. with ~~e secretary or an assistant secretary,
certificates .for shares of the corporation; and the vice president shall
perform other duties commonly incdent to the office of vice president and
such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to him by the
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president or by the Board of Directors.
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(d) The Secretary.
The secretary shall:
(a) attend all
meetings and keep the minutes of- the proceedings of the stockholders and
of the Board of Directors in one or more books provided for that purpose;
(b) see that all notices are duly given in accordance with the provisions
of these Bylaws or as required by law; (c) be custodian of the corporate
records and of the seal of the corporation and see that the seal of the
corporation is affixed to all documents the execution ~f which on behalf
of the corporation under its seal is duly authorized; (d) keep a register
of the post office address of each sbareholder which shall be furnished
to the secretary by such shareholder; (e) sign, with the president, or a
vice president, certificates for shares of the corporation, issuance of
which shall have been authorized by resolution of the Board of Directors;
(f) have general charge of the. stock transfer books of the corporation;
and (g) in general perform all duties commonly incident to the office of
secretary and such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to
him by the president or by the Board of Directors.
(e) The: Treasurer. The treasurer shall: (a) h~ve charge and
custody of and be responsible for all funds and securities of the
corporation; (b) receive and give receipts for monies·tlue and payable to
the corporation from any source whatsoever, and deposit all such monies
in the name of the corporation in such banks, trust companies or other
depositories as shall be .se~ected in accordance with the provisions of
Article VI of these Bylaws; and (c) in .general perform all of the duties
commonly incident to the office of t~easurer and such other duties as from
time to time maybe assigned to hi~ by the president or by the Board of
D.irectors. If required by the Board of Directors, the treasurer shall
give a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties in such sum and with
such surety or sureties as the Board of Directors shall det.e~ine.
(f)
Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Treasurers.
The
assistant secretaries, when authorized by the Board of Directors, may sign
with the president or a vice president certificates for shares of the
corporation the issuance of which shall have been authorized by a
resolution of the Board of Directors.
The assistant treasurers shall
respectively, if required by the Board of Directors, give bonds for the
faithful discharge of their duties in such sums and with such sureties as
the Board of Directors shall determine: The assist.ant secretaries apd
assistant treasurers, in general shall perform such duties as shall be
assigned to them by the secretary or the treasurer, or by the president
or the Board of Directors.

Section 5.3 ResiJmCi.tions. Any officer may resign at any time by
giving written notice to the Board of Directors or to the president or to
the secretary. Any such resignation shall be effective when received by
.the person o'r persons to whom such notice is given, unless a later time
is specified therein, in which event the resignation shall become
effective at such later time. Unless otherwise specified in such notice,
the acceptance of any such resignation shall not be necessary to make it
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effective.
Section 5.4 Removal. Any officer or agent may be temoved by the
,Board of Directors whenever, in its judgment, the best interests of the
corporation will be served thereby; but such removal shall be without
prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed.
Election or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create
contract rights. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-51).
Section 5.5 Compensation. The compensation of the officers shall
be fixed from time to time by the Board of Directo~s. No officer shall
be prevented from receiving such compensation by reason of the fact that
such officer is also a director of the corporation.
ARTICI.K VI

EXECUTION OF CORPoRATE INSTRUMENTS AND
VOTING OF SECURITIES OWNED BY THE CORPORATION

Section 6.1
Execution of Corporate Instruments.
The Board of
Directors may, in its discretion. determine the method and designate·the
signatory officer or officers, or' other person or persons, to execute on
behalf of the corporation any corporate instrument or document, or to sign
on beha1f·of the corporation the corporate name without limitation, or to
enter into contracts on beKaif of the corporation. except wher.e otherwise
provided by law or these Bylaws; and such execution or signature shall be
binding upon the corporation.
Authorization granted to any person
hereunder may be general or confined to specific instances •
. Unless otherwise specifically determined by the Board of Directors
or otherwise required by law, promissory notes, deeds of trust, mortgages
and other evidences of indebtedness of the corporation, and certificates
of shares of stock owned· by the corporation,· shall be executed, signed or
endorsed by the president or any vice president., and by the secretary or
treasurer or any assistant secretary or assistant treasurer. All other
instruments and documents requiring the corporate signature may be
executed as aforesaid or in such manner as may be directed by th.e Board
of Directors.
Section 6.2 Loans. No.loan shall be cOh.tracted on behalf of the
corporation and no evidence of indebtedness shall be issued in its name
unless authorized by resolution of the Board of Directors.
Such
authorization may be general or confined to specific instances.
Section 6.3 . Deposits and Checks. All funds of the corporation not
otherwise employed shall. be deposited from time to time to the credit of
the corporation in such banks, trust companies or other depositories as
the Board of Directors may select. All checks and drafts drawn on banks
or other depositaries on funds to the credit of the corporation or in
special accounts of the corporation shall be signed by 'such person or
persons as the Board of Directors shall authorize to. do so.
Such
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authorization may be general or confined to specific instances.
Section 6.4 Voting of Securities Owned by the Corporation. All
stock and other securities of other corporations own~d or held by the
corporation for itself, or for other parties in any capacity, shall be
voted, and all proxies .with respect thereto shall be executed, by the
person authorized to do so by resolution of the Board of Directors, or,
in the absence of such authorization, by the president or any vice
president.
ARTICLE VII
SHARES OF STOCK

Section 7.1 Foun and Execution of Certificates.· Certificates
representing shares of the corpor~tion shall be in such form as shall be
determined by the Board of Directors. Such certificates shall be signed
by the president or a vice president and by the .secretary or an assistant
secretary and may be sealed with the corporate seal or a facsimile
. thereof.
The signatures of such officers upon' a certificate may be
facsimiles.if the certificate is manually signed on behalf. of a transfer
agent or a registrar, other than.! the corporation itself or one of its
employees.
In case any officer, transfer agent, or registrar who has
signed or whose facsimile signature has been placed upon a certificate
shall have ceased to be suth- officer, transfer agent or registrar before
such certificate is issued, it may' be issued by the corporation with the
same effect as if he were such officer transfer agent or registrar at the
date of issue. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-23).
Section 7.2 Lost Certificates. The corporation may issue a new
certificate of stock in place of any certificate theretofore issued by the
corporation alleged to have been lost, stolen, destroyed or mutilated; and
the corporation may require the owner of such lost,' stolen, destroyed or
mutilated' certificate, or his legal representative, to give the
corporation a bond sufficient to indemnify it against any claim that may
be made against the corporation on account of the alleged loss, theft,
destruction or mutilation of any such certificate or the issuance of such
. new certificate.
Section '7.3
Each certificte for shares shall be
Transfers.
consecutively numbered or otherwise identified,. The name:and address of
the person to whom the shares represented thereby are issued, with the
number of .shares and date of issue. shall be entered on the stock transfer
books of the corporation. All certificates surrendered to the corporation
for transfer shall be cancelled; and, except as.provided in Section 7.2,
no new certificate shall be issued until the former certificate for a like
number of shares shall have been surrendered and cancelled. Transfer of
record shares of stock of the corporation shall be made only on the stock
transfer books of the corporation by the holder of record thereof Or by
his legal representative, who shall furnish proper evidence of authorfty
to transfer, or by his attorney thereunto authorized by power of attorney
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duly executed and filed with the secretary of the corporation. and on
surrender for cancellation of a properly endorsed certificate or
certificates for a like number of shares.
Section 7.4 Fixing Record Dates. In order that the corporation may
determine the stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote at any meeting
of stockholders or any adjournment thereof, or to express consent to
corporate action in writing without a meeting, or to receive payment of
any dividend or other distribution or allotment of any rights or to
exercise any rights in respect of any change, conversion or exchange of
stock or for the purpose of any other lawful action. the Board of
Directors may provide that the stock transfer books shall be closed for
a stated period but not to exceed. in any case, fifty (50) days.
If the
stock transfer books shall be closed for the purpose of determining
stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote at a, meeting of
stockholders. 'such books shall be closed for at least ten (10) days
immediately preceding such meeting: In lieu of closing the stock transfer
books, the Board of Directors may fix, in advance, a record date for any
such determination of stockholders. Such record date shall be not more
than fifty (50) days and, in the case of a meeting of stockholders. not
less than ten (10) days prior to the date on which the particular action,
requiring such determination ofs,tockholders, 'is to be taken.
If the
stock transfer books are not-closed and no record date is fixed: (a) the
record date for determining stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote
at a meeting of stockholderS~shall be'at the close of business on the day
on which notice is mailed, or, if notice is waived, at the close of
business pn the day next preceding the day on which the meeting is held;
(b) the ~ecord date for determining stockholders entitled to express
consent to corporate action in writing without a'meeting, when no prior
action by the Board of Directors is necessary, shall be the day on which
the first written consent -is expressed; and (cl the record date for
determining stOCkholders for any other purpose shall be at the close of
business on the day on which the Board of Directors adopts the resolution
relating thereto. A determination of stockholders of record entitled to
notice 'of or to vote at a meeting of stockholders shall apply to any
adjournment of the meeting; provided, however, that the Board of Directors
may fix a new record date for the adjourned meeting. (Idaho Code Section
39-1-30)'.
Section 7.5
Registered Stockholders.
The corporation shall be
entitled to recognize the exclusive right of a person registered in its
books as the owner of shares to receive dividends and to vote as such
owner, and shall not be bound to recognize any equitable or other claim
to or interest in such share or shares on the part of any other person
whether or not it shall have express or other notice thereof. eXcept' as
~therwise provided by the laws of Idaho.
Secti<m 7. 6 Issuance,. Transfer and Registration of Shares. The,
Board of Directors may make such rules and regulations, not inconsistent
with law or with these Bylaws, as it may deem advisable concerning the
issuance, transfer and registration of certificates for shares of the
/-

"
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capital stock of the corporation. The Board of Directors may appoint a
transfer agent or registrar of transfers or both; and may require all
certificates for shares of the corporation to bear the signature of either
or both.
ARTICLE VIII
OTHKR. SEClJRITIKS OF

TIi:K

CORPORATION

Section 8.1 Execution of Other Securities. All bonds, debentures
and other corporate securities· of the corporation, other than stock
certificates, may be signed by the president or any vice president, or
sucn other person as may be authori~ed by the Board of Directors; and the
corporate seal may be impressed· thereon or a facsimile of such seal
imprinted thereon and attested by the signature of the secretary or an
assistant secretary; provided, however, that where any such bond,
debenture or other corporate security shall be.authenticated by the manual
signature of a trustee under an ind,enture pursuant to which such bond.
d~benture or other corporate security shall be issued, the signatures of
the persons signing and attesting the corporate seal on such bond,
debenture or other corporate security may be the imprint facsimile of the
signature of such persons.
Interest COUp1::ms . appertaining to any such
bond, debenture or other corporate security, authenticated by a trustee
as aforesaid, shall be signed by the treasurer or an assistant treasurer
of the corporation. or such~iher person as may be authorized by·the Board
of Directors, or be imprinted thereon the facsimile signature of such
person. In case any off~cer who shall have signed or attested any bond,
debenture or other corporate security, or whose.facsimile signature shall
appear thereon or on any such interest coupon, shall have ceased to be
such officer before the bond, debenture or other· corporate security so
signed or attested shall have been delivered, such bond, debenture or
other corporate security nevertheless may be adopted by the corporation
and issued and delivered as though the person who signed the same or whose
facsimile signture shall have been used thereon had not ceased to be such
officer of the corporation.
ARTICLE IX

DIVIDENDS

Section 9.1 Declaration and Payment of Dividends • Dividends upon
the capital stock. of the corporation, subject to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation. if any.. may be declared . by the Board of
Directors pursuant to law at any regular or special meeting. Dividends
may be paid by the corporation in cash. in property~ or in shares of its
capital stock, subject to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-45).
Section 9.2 Dividend Reserve. Before payment of any dividend,
there may be set aside out of any funds of the corporation available for
dividends such sum or sums as the Board of Directors may from time. to
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time, in its absolute discretion, think proper as a reserve or reserves
to meet.contingencies, or for equalizing dividends, or for repairing or
maintaining any property of the corporation, or for such other purpose as'
the Board of Directors shall thirik conducive to the interests of the
corporation; and the Board of Directors may modify or abolish any such
reserve in the manner in which is was created .

.ARTICLE XI
INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS t

EMPLOYEES AND 0'l'BER .AGENTS

Section 11.1 Directors and Executive Officers
The corporation
shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of the corporation
or another .enterprise to ·the full extent permitted by the Idaho Business
Corporation' Act, as the same exis~s or may hereafter be amended (but. in
the case of any such amendment, only to the extent that such amendment
permits the corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than
siad Act permitted the corporation to provide prior to such amendment);
provided. however, that the corporation may limit the exte.nt of' such
indemnification by individual contracts with its directors and executive
officers; and provided. further, that the corporation shall not be
required to indemnify any director or executive officer in connection with
any proceeding (or part ......tilereof) initiated by such person or any
proceeding by such person against the corporation or its directors,
officers, employees or other agents unless (a) such indemnif~cation is
expressly required to be made by la~; (b) the. proceeding was authorized
by the Board of Directors of the corporation or (c) such indemnification
is provi~ed by the corporation under the Idaho Business Corporation Act.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-S(a),(b».
Section 11.2 Other Officers! Employees and Agents. The corporation
shall have the power to indemnify other officers ~ employees and other
agents of the corporation or another enterprise as set forth in the Idaho
Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-S(a), (b».
Section 11.3 Good Faith. For purposes of any determination under
this Bylaw, a director, officer. employee or other agent of the
corporation or another enterprise shall be deemed to have acted in good
.faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be· in or not opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding. to have had no reasonable cause to believe that his
conduct was unlawful, if his action is based on the records or books of
account of the corporation or another enterprise, or on information
supplied or reports made to him by the officers of the corporation or
another enterprise in the course of their duties, or on the advice of
. legal counsel for the corporation or another enterprise or on information
or records given or reports made to the corporation or another enterprise
by an independent certified publiC accountant or by an appraiser or other
expert selected with reasonable care by the corporation or another

., .
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.-enterprise. The provisions of this Section 11.3 shall not be deemed to
be exclusive and/or to . limit in any way the circumstances in which a
person may be deemed to have met the applicable standard of conduct set
forth by the Idaho Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Sections 30-1S(a),(b); 30-1-35).
Section 11.4 Another Enterprise. The term' "another enterprise ll as
used in this Article XI shall' mean any other corporation, partnership.
joint venture, trust or other enterprise, including any employee. benefit
plan.. or which a person is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or other agent. (Idaho Code
Section 30-I-5(a),(b)).
Section 11.5 Expenses. The corporation shall advance .. prior to the
final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following request therefor.
all expenses incurred by any director.. officer, or e1)lployee or other agent
of the corporation or another 'enterprise in connection with such
proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person
to repay said amount i f it should be determined ultimately that such
person is not entitled to be indemnified under this Article XI or
otherwise. (Idaho Code Section 30-I-S(e)).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, unless otherwise determined pursuant
to Section 11.6, no advance shall be made by the corporation if a
determination is reasona1:tl:fand promptly made (a) by the Board of
Directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who.were
not parties to the proceeding, or (b) if such quorum is not obtainable or,
even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested.directors so directs, by
independent iegal counsel in a written opinion that, based upon the facts
known to the decision-making party at the time such determination is made,
such person acted in bad faith or in a manner that such person did not
believe to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation,
or, with respect to any criminal proceeding, such person believed or had
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. (Idaho Code
Section 3D-I-Sed)).
Section 11.6 Enforcement. Without the necessity of entering into
a~ express. contract, all rights to indemnification and advances under this
Article XI shall be deemed to.be contractual rights and to be effective
to the same extent and as if provided for in a contract betwe.en the
corporation and the perso~ who serves as a director, officer, employee or
other agent of the corporation or another enterprise at any time while
this Article XI and relevant provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation
Act and other applicable law. if any, are in efefct.
Any right 'to
indemnification or advances granted by this Article XI to any person shall
be enforceable by or on behalf of the person holding such right in any
court of competent jurisdiction if (a) the claim for indemnification or
advances is denied,' in whole or in part, or (b) nO'disposition of such
claim is made within ninety (90) days of request therefor. The c;taimant .
in such enforcement action, if successful in whole or in part, shall be
entitled to be paid also the expense'of prosecuting his claim. It shall

'J
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be a

defense tOo any such action that the claimant has not met the
standards of conduct which make it permissible under the Idaho Bus·iness
Corporation Act for the corporation >to indemnify the claimant for the
amount· claimed; but the burden of proving such defense shal.! be on the
corporation. Neither the failure of the corporation (including its Board
of Directors, independent legal counselor its stockholders) to. have made
a determination prior> to the commencement of such action that
indemnification of the claimant is proper in the circumstances because he
has. met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, nor an actual determination by the corporation (including
its Board of· Directors. independent legal counselor i tsstockholders)
that the claimant has not met such applicable standard of conduct, shall
be a defense to the action or create a presumption that claimant has not
met the applicabe standard of conduct.
Section 11. 7 Non-exclusivitv of rights. The rights conferred on
any person by this Article XI shall not be exclusive of any other right
to which such person may now or hereafter ~e entitled under any statute,
provision of the .Articles of Incorporation, >or Bylaws, agreement, vote of
stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action
in :his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while
holding office. -The corporation is specifically authorized to enter into
individu~l contracts with any or all directors, officers, employees or
other agents of the corporation or another enterprise respecting
indemnification and advancl'!§~· as prOVided by law. (Idaho Code Section 30I-S(f».
.
>

Section 11.8· Survival of rights.
The rights conferred on any
person by this Article XI shall continue as to a person who has ceased to
be a director, officer. employee or other agent of the corporat"ion or
another enterprise and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors
and administrators such a person. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(i».
Section 11.9
Amendments.
Any repeal or modification of this
Article XI shall only be prospective and shall not affect the rights under
this Article XI in effect at the t~e of the alleged occurrence of any
action or omission to act that is the cause of any proceeding against any
agent of the corporation or another enterprise.
Section 11.10 Savings Clause. If this Article XI of the Bylaws or
any portion hereof shall be invalidated on any ground by any court of
competent jurisdiction, then the corporation shall nevertheless indemnify
each agent to the full extent permitted by any applicable portion of this
Article XI that shall not have been invalidated, or by any other
applicable law.

ARTICLE XII
NOTICES

Section 12.1

Notice to StoCkholders.

Whenever under >any provision
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of these Bylaws notice is required to be given to any stockholder, it
shall be given in writing, timely and duly deposited in the United States
mail,· postage prepaid. and addressed to his last known post office address
as shown by the stock transfer books of the corporation or its transfer
agent -or to such other last known address of which the corporation may
have notice.
Such notice to any stockholder shall be deemed to be
delivered when deposited in the United States mail in accordance with this
Section 12.1. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-29).
Section 12.2 Notice to Directors. Any notice required to be given
to any.director may be given by'the method stated in Section 12.1, or by
telegram except that such notice other than one which is delivered
personally shall be .sent to such address as such director shall have filed
in writing with the secretary, or;-in the absence' of such filing, to the
last known post office address of such director. (Idaho Code Section 30-

1-43).
Section 12.3 Address Unknown.
If no .address of a stockholder or
director be known, notice may be sent to the office of the corporation
required to be maintained pursuant to Section 1.1 hereof .
.. Section 12.4
Affidavit of Hailing.
An affidavit of mailing,
executed by a duly authorized and competent employee of the corporation
or its transfer: agent appointed with resp~ct to the class of stock
affected, specifying' the na:nle and address or the names and addresses ot
the stockholder or stockholders, or director of directors, to whom any
such notice or notices was or ~ere given, and the time and method of
giving the same, shall be conclusive evidence of the statements therein
contained.
- Section 12.5 Time Notices Deemed Given. All notices given by mail,
as above provided, shall be deemed .tohave been given at the time of
mailing; and all notices given by telegram shall be deemed to have been
given at the sending time recorded by the telegraph company transmitting
the notices.
Section 12.6 Methods of Notice. The period or limitation of time
within which any stockholder may exer·cise any option or right, or enjoy
any privilege or benefit, or be required to act, or within which any
director may exercise any power or right, or enjoy any privilege, pursuant
to any notice sent him in the manner abov~ provided, shall not be affected
or extended in any manner by the failure of such stockholder or such
director to receive such notice.
Section 12.7 Failure to Receive Notice. The period or limitation
of time within which any stockholder may exercise any option or right. or
enjoy any privilege or benefit, or be required to act, or within which any
director may exercise any power or right. or enjoy any privilege, pursuant
to ~my notice sent him in the manner above provided, shall not be affected
or . eXtended in any manner by the failure of such stockholder or such
director to receive such notice.
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Section 12.8 Notice to Person with 'Whom Communication is Unlawful.
Whenever notice is required to be given, under any provision of law or of
the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws of the corporation, to any person
with whom communication is unlawful, the giving of such notice to such
person shall not be required and there shall be no duty to apply to any
governmental authority or agency for a license or permit to give such
notice to such person. Any action or meeting which shall be taken or held"
without" notice to any such person with whom communication is unlawful
shall have the same force and effect as if such notice had been duly
given. In the event that the action taken by the corporation is such as
to require the filing of a certificate under any provision of the Idaho
BuSiness Corporation Act, the certificate shall state, if such is the fact
and if notice is required, that notice was given to all persons entitled
to receive notice except such persons with whom communications is
unlawful.
Section 12.9 Waiver of Notice. Whenever any notice is required to
be given to any stockholder or director of the corporation under the
provisions of these Bylaws or under the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation or under the provisions of the ~daho Business Corporation,
a waiver thereof in writing signed by the person or persons entitled-to
such notice, whether before or after the time stated therein, shall be
deemed equivalent to the giving of such notice.
(Idaho Code Section 301-144) .
_;r~"

ARTICLE XIII

Section 13.1 Amendments." These Bylaws may be altered, amended-or
repealed and new Bylaws may be adopted by the Board of Directors or by the
stockholders at any regular or special meeting.

ARTICLE XIV
LOANS TO DIRECTORS AND OTHERS

Section 14.1
Certain Corporate Loans and Guaranties.
The
corporation may make loans of IDoney or property to, or guarantee the
obligations of, or otherwise use "its credit to assist any officer or other
employee of the corporation, its "parent or a subsidiary, including any
such person who is also a director of the corporation or its parent or any
subsidiary. or adopt any employee benefit plan or plans authorizing such
loan, guaranties or other assistance, upon the approval of the Board of
Directors alone if the Board of Directors determines that such a loan or
guaranty or plan may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation.
In all other circumstances. the corporation shall not lend money or USe
its credit to assist its directors without authorization in the particular
" case by its stockholders. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-47).

r". ..
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R.JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
Defendants.

ERRATA SHEET FOR PLAINTIFF
REED J. TAYLOR'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT, OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S
JOINDER, REPL Y TO DEFENDANT
CONNIE TAYLOR'S RESPONSE
AND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION

Plaintiff Reed Taylor submits this Errata Sheet for corrections made to his his Reply in
Support of Motion to Amend Complaint, Objection to R. John Taylor's Joinder, Reply to
Defendant Connie Taylor'S Response and Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants'
ERRA TA SHEET - 1

~q'-l

ORIGI

l

I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion:

ERRATA SHEET
Page 9:

Deleted "has also been followed by Idaho District Court" after
"contractual obligations" and inserted "involves contracts where"

Page 10:

Inserted "San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District v. Us., 23 Cl.Ct.
276,279-80 (U.S. Cl. Ct. 1991)(Emphasis added); see also" before

"Minidoka"
Page 10:

Inserted "9th Cir." in place of "D. Idaho"

Page 10:

Inserted "(In a continuing obligations contract, either the U.S. repudiated
the contract or it did not repudiate the contract and the statute of
limitations does not bar claims for disputed years)" after "1998)"

Page 13:

Inserted "9th Cir." in place of "D. Idaho"

Various:

Inserted several "III" and hard returns after Page 10 to ensure sentences
and headings were appropriately located.

DATED: This 2ih day of June, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By:-r---"''---_ _ _ _..........._ _ _ _ __

Ned A. Cannon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AGAINST REED J.
TAYLOR

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court to dissolve the Preliminary
Injunction previously entered against him:

III
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM
TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-1

~q~

ORIGI Al

I. RELIEF REQUESTED AND EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

Reed Taylor requests an order dissolving the preliminary injunction issued against him.
Reed Taylor relies on this Motion and Memorandum of Law, the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond,
and the Court's file as evidence.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2007, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order against Reed Taylor and set cash bond at $10,000. The Defendants' posted
cash security of$10,000. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond,

~

2. On March 8, 2007, the Court

granted the Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor. See Opinion
and Order on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 7.
On May 31, 2007, the Court denied Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, but
increased the amount of the required bond for the preliminary injunction issued against Reed
Taylor to $200,000.

See Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration,

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, p. 13.
As of the morning of June 28, 2007, the Defendants have failed to post the required
$200,000 ordered by the Court. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond, ~ 2.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

"No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of
security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper. .. " I.R.c.P. 65(c).
The requirement for the posting of a bond for a preliminary injunction is mandatory.
Valley View Farms v. Westover, 96 Idaho 615, 615, 533 P.2d 736 (1974); Hutchins v. Trombley,

95 Idaho 360,365,509 P.2d 579 (1973).

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM
TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2

In Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho at 365, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically
addressed the mandatory requirement of security for a preliminary injunction to be issued:
[W]e hold that before an injunction is issued under Rule 65 the giving of security by the
applicant for the payment of costs, damages and attorneys fees as provided in Rule 65(c)
is mandatory, unless the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent
evidence that no such costs, damages or attorneys fees will result to the restrained party
as a result of a wrongful issuing of the injunction or restraining order. Since there is no
such finding in this case, the trial court improperly issued the order pendente lite without
requiring security as provided for in Rule 65(c).

Id (Emphasis in original).
Here, the Court ordered the Defendants to post a bond in the amount of $200,000 as
security for the preliminary injunction issued against Reed Taylor on May 31,2007. However,
the Defendants have failed to post the required bond or cash equivalent.
Reed Taylor is entitled to have the preliminary injunction against him dissolved and he
should be awarded his attorneys fees and costs from the $10,000 cash bond presently held by the
Court as provided under LR.C.P. 65(c).

IV. CONCLUSION
The Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor should be dissolved and he should be
awarded his attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED: This 28 th day of June 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

'kC~J"d
Rd
o enc
. rn<,~<ft;;';'"~J!'
Ned A. Cann'on /~.
Paul R. Cre
~, Jr.
Attorneys or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM
TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiffs Notice of Hearing, Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum of Law to Dissolve
Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, and Proposed Order Dissolving
Preliminary Injunction on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman
Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 l3 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
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Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
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Attorneys for AIA Services and AlA Insurance
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Signed this 28 th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person;
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Plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), submits this Motion to Compel the
Production of Documents from AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
(co llectivel y "AlA").
I. BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Motion is in regards to the AlA's responses to Reed Taylor's First Requests
for Production of Documents to AlA ("Requests for Production"). In response to Reed
Taylor's Request for Production, AlA has refused to provide relevant and discoverable
documents without a valid basis. Reed Taylor now requests that the Court enter an Order
compelling AIA to produce documents identified below in this Motion.
Reed Taylor served AlA with his Requests for Production on March 23, 2007.
See Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. ("Cressman Aff.") Exhibit A. AlA provided its

responses to Requests for Production to Reed Taylor on approximately May 22, 2007.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B. On May 30, 3007, counsel for Reed Taylor contacted counsel for
AlA for the purpose of scheduling a discovery conference in accordance with I.R.C.P. 37.
On Thursday, June 7, 2007, counsel for Reed Taylor and counsel for AlA engaged in a
telephonic discovery conference in which the parties discussed each of AlA's responses
to Reed Taylor's requests for production. Cressman Aff.,

~

5.

After the discovery conference, Reed Taylor sent a letter to counsel for AlA
which confirmed the matters discussed in the discovery conference aJ;ld set forth in
writing Reed Taylor's positions with respect to each of the requests for production.
Cressman Aff., Ex. C. On June 13, 2007, AlA responded with a letter which raised the
same objections and refused to produce documents again requested by Reed Taylor.
Cressman Aff., Ex. D. On June 13,2007, AlA also served supplemental responses to its
discovery requests in which it agreed to produce certain documents, but again refused to
produce documents which were discussed during the LR.C.P. 37 discovery conference.
Cressman Aff, Ex. E. This Motion to Compel concerns only the request for production
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documents which were the subject of the CR 37 discovery conference and which AlA
continues to refuse to produce to Reed Taylor.

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether Reed Taylor is entitled to an Order compelling AlA to produce, pursuant
to LR.C.P. 26(b)(1), relevant and discoverable documents in response to Reed Taylor's
Requests for Production?

III. LEGAL AUTHORITY
A.

Reed Taylor Attempted to Resolve This Matter Without Court Action, But
AlA has Refused to Produce Discoverable Documents.
I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) governs this motion to compel, and the rule provides as follows

in pertinent part:
(2) Motion.... [1]f a party, in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted
as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering
party may move for an order compelling ... inspection in accordance with
the request. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the
disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
Reed Taylor, through his counsel, complied with l.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) by
participatirig in a telephonic discovery conference with counsel for AlA in which the
parties discussed each of the issues that are raised below in this motion. Cressman Aff.

~

5. Reed Taylor in good faith attempted to resolve this dispute without court action, but
due to AlA's refusal to produce relevant documents this motion is required. !d.

B.

The Documents Requested by Reed Taylor Are Discoverable in This Action.
The Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure that governs the scope of discoverable

information is broadly drafted to pennit the discovery of all relevant admissible evidence
and the discovery of inadmissible evidence if it could lead to the discovery of admissible
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evidence. The only limit on discovery is if the evidence sought is privileged. The rule,
LR.C.P. 26(b)(1), provides as follows in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these
rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, ... It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
Federal Courts interpreting the identical Federal rule have consistently held that
the rule allowed the broadest possible discovery. See, e.g., Hicman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495,67 S.Ct. 385,91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). In Hicman, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed
the scope of discovery under this rule and observed that:
No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case.
329 U.S. at 507, 67 S.Ct. at 392. The only limitation on discovery of unprivileged
material under the rule is that it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, which
is such a broad standard that at the discovery stage a party may in fact engage in a fishing
expedition. See 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc., sec. 2008.
For the reasons stated below, the documents requested in Reed Taylor's Requests
for Production are discoverable under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) and the Court should enter an
order compelling AlA to produce the requested documents.
1.

Broad Discovery Is Appropriate Based on Reed Taylor's Contract
and Fraud Based Causes of Action and AlA's Affirmative Defenses
and Counterclaims.

Broad discovery is appropriate in this case based on the numerous causes of
action alleged by Reed Taylor and AlA's numerous defenses and counterclaims it has
alleged.

Reed Taylor'S Fourth Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of

action against AlA, and certain individuals:

(1) breach of contract; (2) fraudulent
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transfers; (3) misrepresentation and fraud; (4) conversIOn; (5) alter ego/piercing the
corporate veil; (6) equitable indemnification; (7) account stated/monies due; (8) unjust
enrichment; (9) constructive trust; (10) director liability; (11) specific performance; and
(12) breach of fiduciary duties. See Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint.
In response to Reed Taylor's complaint, AlA raised nine affirmative defenses,
including an affirmative defense that an agreement the parties allegedly entered into on
July 1, 1996 modified the Promissory Note and an affirmative defense that the parties
orally modified the agreements at various times since the Promissory Note was entered
into on August 1, 1995.

See AlA Answer.

counterclaims against Reed Taylor:

AlA has also alleged the following

(1) intentional interference/good faith and fair

dealing; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage/intentional inducement of termination of contracts with
companies; (4) declaration of invalidation of proxy; (5) injunctive relief; and (6) trespass.
The numerous causes of action alleged in this case by both Reed Taylor and AlA
demonstrate that this case is not a "run of the mill" breach of contract case. Given the
complex nature of this lawsuit, broad discovery is appropriate and it is AIA's burden to
prove that evidence is not discoverable. Reed Taylor is entitled to obtain discovery from
AlA regarding his causes of action against AlA and AlA's affinnative defenses and
counterclaims against him.
2.

RFP No. 10: The E-mails of the AlA Officers John Taylor, Bryan
Freeman and JoLee Duclos are Discoverable.

Electronic information, including e-mails, are discoverable under the recently
enacted LR.C.P. 34( a), which provides that a paliy may obtain discovery of "electronic
and data storage devices in any medium which constitute or contain matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) ... " LR.C.P.34(a). Although no reported decisions in Idaho have
addressed this rule, Federal courts interpreting the analogous Federal rules have
consistently held that electronic data, including e-mails, are discoverable. Rowe
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 5
71315.1 (#100021.1)

Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

(There is no justification for precluding discovery of defendants' e-mails on the ground
that such discovery was unlikely to provide relevant information or would invade the
privacy of non-parties); Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. CaL
1999) (E-mails contained on defendant's hard drive are discoverable).
Reed Taylor's RFP No.1 0 provides as follows:
Request for Production No. 10: All e-mails sent, carbon-copied or
received by R. John Taylor, Byran Freeman, JoLee Duclos, and all other
officers, directors, and managers of AlA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.
AIA responded by refusing to produce the e-mails and raising a number of
objections. Specifically, AlA objected on the grounds that the request was "overbroad,
unreasonable, burdensome and oppressive." Cressman Aff., Ex. B. AlA further stated
that "[t]here exist millions of e-mails which cannot be sorted (11.3 Gig of infonnation)."
Id. After the discovery conference, AlA's counsel conceded that the e-mails were kept in

an electronic format that could be searched and sorted, and AlA removed this objection
in its supplemental responses to RFP No. 10. Cressman Aff., Ex. E (AlA's Supplemental
Responses). In response to a request from counsel for Reed Taylor, AlA's counsel also
stated that AlA's e-mails are kept on a Microsoft Exchange 5.5 server.

Cressman Aff.,

Ex. F (E-mail to Mr. Ashby).
a.

RFP No. 10 is Not Overbroad, Unreasonable, Burdensome and
Oppressive.

Contrary to AlA's objections, RFP No. lOis not overbroad, unreasonable,
burdensome and oppressive. E-mails that are kept on a Microsoft Exchange 5.5 server
can be searched, sorted, and downloaded with ease by any IT professionaL Affidavit of
Allan Muchmore ("Muchmore Aff."), '9. AlA has two IT professionals on its staff who
could sort these e-mails and convert them to a format to be produced to Plaintiff.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B (Attached Ex. E to Supplemental Responses identifies Bryan
Freeman and Ken Goods in IT for AlA Insurance). Based on the size of AlA's e-mail
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 6
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file, 11.3 gigabytes as stated by AlA, the entire process of sorting these e-mails and
putting them on disks that could be produced would be approximately six hours.
Muchmore Aff.,

~

10. For much of this time, the process can be unattended. Id. In

addition, 11.3 gigabytes of data is not large. Id. at

~

8. For example, 11.3 gigabytes of

data is one-third of the overall capacity of most I-Pods currently in the pockets of
millions of teenagers across the country. !d.
Finally, Reed Taylor also attempted to lessen the cost of privilege review of the emails by offering to AlA that the parties entering into a "Claw-Back Agreement".
Cressman Aff., Ex. G.

These Agreements are specifically pennitted under the new

Federal rules, and allow the parties to enter into an agreement whereby any privileged
documents inadvertently produced in discovery must be immediately returned by the
party issuing the requests and the privilege is not waived by the production of the
document. AIA has not responded to that offer.
b.

E-mails Are Highly Relevant to This Cause of Action.

E-mails have become the most important piece of discovery in this digital age and
thus are commonly referred in the legal community as "truth mails." The truth is often in
e-mails due to their contemporaneous authorship denying the events in question.
Similarly, in this case, the truth is in the e-mails sent and received by the officers of AlA,
and Reed Taylor is entitled to discover those e-mails.
For example, Reed Taylor has already obtained, in infonnal discovery, an e-mail
that is highly relevant and conflicts with the affinnative defenses raised by AlA that the
Promissory Note was modified. In an e-mail to Reed Taylor's accountant, John Taylor
stated as follows with regard to Reed Taylor's Promissory Note: "I hope that you and
[Reed Taylor] can come up with some specific proposals to modify the debt and move us
toward putting the two companies back together." Affidavit ofEmie Dantini, Ex. A (see
attached). The e-mail was sent on October 7,2005. ld. The e-mail rebuts AIA's current
claim that the note was modified prior to this date and the e-mail is a writing that
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-7
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acknowledges that the debt is owed to Reed Taylor. [d. This e-mail demonstrates the
relevance and discoverability of the information sought in RFP No. 10.
There are undoubtedly more e-mails like the e-mail John Taylor sent to Mr.
Dantini that are relevant and will allow Reed Taylor and the Court to reach the truth in
this action. Also, the credibility of John Taylor is a key component of the case for a
number of reasons, including but not limited to his allegations that the Note was orally
modified, and John Taylor's e-mails will be directly relevant to his credibility. AlA's
complete refusal to produce the e-mails is in violation of the Civil Rules and, at the same
time, demonstrates the value of these e-mails to Reed Taylor's case. The production of
the e-mails is not burdensome, and the Court should order that they be produced by AlA.
c.

RFP No. 10 is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

RFP No. lOis also reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. AlA will likely object to RFP No. 10 on the grounds that it seeks all e-mails
and is not narrowed to request only e-mails regarding particular topics. However, RFP
No. 10 is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence because AlA
has already demonstrated that it cannot be trusted to sort and produce discoverable
information.
Counsel for AlA has redacted infonnation from documents produced to Reed
Taylor which was considered not relevant. Redactions are appropriate only to conceal
information that is privileged, not information that is allegedly not relevant. Documents
produced by AlA have demonstrated that AlA has also been redacting relevant and
discoverable infonnation as well. For example, AlA produced the same document twice
to Reed Taylor and each document contained different redactions than the other, and a
comparison of the two shows that AlA redacted relevant infonnation in each instance.
Cressman Aff., Ex. H, I (12/15/04 Monthly Car Allowance Memo). In the first memo
(bates AIAOOOI019), AlA redacted the infonnation regarding the $41,450.49 paid by
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 8
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AlA to purchase John Taylor's BMW.

ld. at Ex. H.

In the second memo (bates

AIAOOOI031), AlA redacted the amount paid by AlA to John Taylor for rental of certain
properties. Id. at Ex. 1. The redactions concealed information that was responsive to
Reed Taylor's discovery requests and which Reed Taylor would have never learned of
had AlA not inadvertently produced the same document twice.
Before learning of AlA's redactions of relevant information, Reed Taylor had
offered to narrow his request to specify only e-mails regarding specific topics. Cressman
Aff., Ex. G. However, based on the above referenced conduct of AlA, Reed Taylor is no
longer willing to make this offer. Regardless, it would in fact be more burdensome on
AlA if Reed Taylor had narrowed his request for e-mails to only those e-mails regarding
specific topics because AlA would then be forced to perform additional searching and
sorting of the e-mails to find e-mails responsive to specific topics.
For the reasons stated above, the e-mails sought in RFP No.1 0 are discoverable,
the request is not overbroad or unduly burdensome, and the request is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Court should order that
AlA produce the e-mails in accordance with 1.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) and 34(a).
3.

Documents Created Prior to 5 years Before the Filing of the
Complaint are Relevant and Discoverable.

AlA has refused to produce any documents created more than five years prior to
commencement of this litigation to Reed Taylor on the grounds that Reed Taylor's claims
are barred by the five year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims.
Specifically, AlA raised this objection in response to the following discovery requests:
RFP Nos. 2, 8, 11, 17, 23, 26, 28, 29, and 32. Reed Taylor's discovery requests had
requested the production of all documents created in the period January 1, 1995 to the
present (the Promissory Note was entered into on August 1, 1995). For the reasons stated
below, AlA's documents created prior to five years before the filing of the complaint are
relevant and discoverable in this action and should be produced by AlA.
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 9
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For the reasons stated in Reed Taylor's Opposition to AlA's CR 12(b)(6) Motion
and in Reed Taylor's recently filed Reply to AlA's Opposition to his Motion to Amend
and Supplement Complaint, Reed Taylor's breach of contract claims are not barred by the
statute of limitations and the documents created prior to five years before the filing of the
Complaint are discoverable.

Although the Promissory Note was original signed on

August 1, 1995, the note was not due and payable until August 1, 2005. In addition, to
the extent that any statute of limitations began to run in 1996 (as alleged by AlA), it has
been tolled by partial payments made by AlA.

The evidence of partial payments,

occurring prior to five years from the date of the complaint, and any acknowledgments of
the debt being owed in AlA's financials, are relevant to Reed Taylor's tolling arguments.
In addition, the affinnative defenses and counterclaims raised by AlA in its
Answer to Reed Taylor's complaint allege causes of action and facts arising prior to five
years before the date of the filing of the Complaint. See AIA's Answer, p. 7 (Alleging
numerous modifications, the first of which occurred on July 1, 1996). Based on AL<\' s
reasoning, Reed Taylor is not entitled to discover the basis for these causes of action
because they arose prior to five years before the complaint was filed. This is contrary to
the discovery rules and the Court should order that all responsive documents be
produced, including those created more than five years before the complaint was filed.
The accounting infonnation sought by Reed Taylor is directly relevant to AlA's
counterclaims and affirmative defenses because the documents will reflect, for example,
whether AlA's financials confirmed the modifications that AlA now alleges.

The

accounting infonnation of AlA is also directly relevant to Reed Taylor's fraud based
causes of action, reference above in section B.1.
Finally, AlA's objections that documents created more than five years before the
filing of the Complaint are based on the incorrect assumption that only admissible
evidence is discoverable. Under the broad I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1), evidence is discoverable
even if it is not admissible at trial, if the "information sought is reasonably calculated to
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lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." LR.C.P. 26(b)(1) (Emphasis added).
Thus, even if the statute of limitations barred the admissibility of evidence or documents
created prior to five years before the filing of the complaint, the information

IS

nonetheless discoverable because it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
4.

The Financial Information of AlA is Discoverable And Production of
the Audits Alone is Not Sufficient.
~

As previously stated in this action, Reed Taylor as the holder of the $6,000,000
Promissory Note is the single largest creditor of AlA.

There is also a significant

possibility that AlA will not be able to pay Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor has valid reason to
believe that AlA will not be able to pay the Note as a result of the fraudulent acts of its
officers.

For example, as stated in the Complaint, in 2004, AlA Insurance paid

$1,510,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AlA Services from Crop USA, an
entity in which John Taylor was the single largest shareholder, when AlA Services was
insolvent. Third Amended Complaint,

~

2.25. In addition, AlA has entered into a lease

for $1,250 per month of a parking lot owned by John Taylor, but the lot is not being used
by AlA. Third Amended Complaint,

~

2.26, Cressman Aff., Ex. H. In 2004, AlA also

paid $41,450.49 to purchase a BMW £i'om John Taylor. Cressman Aff., Ex. I. These
transactions are the basis for Reed Taylor's fraud, conversion, fraudulent transfer, and
other fraud based claims. Further fraudulent transactions will not be discovered without
the production of the accounting information of AlA.
AlA also takes the position in its discovery responses that it will not produce
certain accounting information because AlA has produced audited financial statements
for AlA Insurance. Cressman Aff., Ex. D (Babbitt Letter), p. 2. However, financial
audits are in very large part based upon information provided to the auditors by AlA's
management. The reason that Reed Taylor seeks additional infonnation is because, based
on the above transfers, it is likely that transfers have not been disclosed by AlA's
management to AlA's auditors. In addition, the audits do not disclose the background
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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and factual support, which is the source for more discoverable information regarding
fraudulent conduct.
a.

RFP No.1, 2: The General Ledgers and Journal Entries are
Discoverable.

Reed Taylor's RFP No. I requested the "general ledgers and journal entries" for
AlA and RFP No.2 requested the supporting documentation for the general ledgers and
journal entries. Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AIA refused to produce responsive documents.
Jd. at Ex. E.

The general ledgers and journal entries for AlA contain relevant and

discoverable information. The general ledgers will show the back-up documentation for
AlA's financial statements, and will describe in detail the debits and credits to the various
AlA accounts. The journal entries will show the descriptions of accounting transactions
for AlA, how AlA accounted for them, whether AlA changed how it accounted for the
transactions, why the changes were made, and all adjusting entries.

Obviously, this

information is relevant to Reed Taylor's fraud based claims and his fraudulent transfer
claims. In addition, the general ledgers and journal entries may contradict the allegations
of modification AlA has alleged in it Answer to Reed Taylor's Complaint.

For the

reasons stated, the general ledgers and journal entries of AlA are discoverable and the
Court should order that the documents be produced.
b.

RFP No.3: The Bank Statements Are Discoverable.

Reed Taylor's RFP No.3 requested "monthly and other periodic bank statements
for all bank accounts of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., including all
checks, wire transfers, automatic deposits and withdrawals, credits and debits."
Cressman Aff, Ex. A. AlA has refused to produce any of the requested documents. Id.
at Ex. E.

The bank statements and checks of AlA will show the deposits and the

payments of AlA and will provide Reed Taylor with any evidence of additional transfers
such as those described above. This infonnation is discoverable for Reed Taylor's fraud
based claims, conversion claims, and fraudulent transfer claims.
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 12
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c.

RFP No.5: Accountant Information is Discoverable.

RFP No. 5 requested "working papers of outside accountants of AlA Services
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and all correspondence and e-mails involving such
accountants." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA has refused to produce any of the requested
documents. Id. at Ex. E. The documents are relevant to all of Reed Taylor's causes of
action, including the fraud based causes of action. In addition, the information is not
protected by the accountant-client privilege for the reasons stated in Reed Taylor's
Opposition to AlA Motion for a Protective Order. At the very

l~ast,

the working papers

of AlA's outside accountants are clearly discoverable even ifIdaho law applies because,
as stated in Reed Taylor's Opposition, the Federal courts and even the states that
recognize an accountant-client privilege have not extended the privilege to an
accountant's work product.
RFP No. 13: Transfers to John Taylor are Discoverable.

d.

RFP No. 13 requested "documents pertaining to all funds, services, or assets
advanced or owed at any time by R. John Taylor to AlA Services Corporation or AlA
Insurance, Inc., including all documents pertaining to any prepayment of such
obligations." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded that it produced the general ledger
detail for John Taylor, but it refused to produce all responsive documents including the
documents upon which the general ledgers were based. Id. at Ex. E. Reed Taylor is not
required to accept only what AlA desires to produce to him. He is entitled to review all
documents responsive to his request for production. The documents requested in RFP
No. 13 are relevant to each of Reed Taylor's fraud based and fiduciary duty claims. The
Court should require that all responsive documents be produced.
RFP Nos. 16, 19: Legal Fee Information is Discoverable.

5.
a.

RFP No. 16: Fee Agreements and Billings In This Case Are
Discoverable.

RFP No. 16 requested "documents pertaining to indemnification of any of the
Defendants in this action or payment of their legal fees and expenses by AlA Insurance
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-13
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or AlA Services Corporation, together with all Notices of Meetings of Shareholders or
the Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation of AlA Insurance to address such
issues." Cressman Aff., Ex. A.

This evidence is discoverable because, given Reed

Taylor's position as the largest creditor for AlA, and that the note is unpaid, Reed Taylor
has a security interest in the funds used to pay those fees paid by AlA. This evidence is
also discoverable based on the fraudulent transfer claims.
AlA produced the AlA Services Corporation Special Meeting of Shareholder
Minutes, but refused to produce the same for AlA Insurance. !d. at Ex. E. Any Special
Meeting of the Shareholders of AlA Insurance to authorize the payment of fees is not
privileged, is relevant, and must be produced.
In addition, AlA refused to produce any information regarding the payment of
fees for the defendants on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at Ex. E.
Courts have uniformly held that fee agreements and billing statements are not protected
by the attorney-client privilege. See Clarke v. American Commerce Nat '[ Bank, 974 F.2d
127 (9th Cir. 1992) (Attorney billing statements containing infonnation regarding the
identity of the client, case name, an10unt of fee, and general nature of services provided
were not protected). To the extent that disclosure of a billing record would reveal a
confidential client communication the document must be produced, but can be redacted.
Leach v. Quality Health Sen l ., 162 F.R.D. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Billing records were to

be produced in redacted form to protect any description of legal services that would
reveal a client confidence.). Thus, the fee agreements, billing statements, and evidence of
payment made by AlA on behalf of the Defendants in this action must be produced.
b.

RFP No. 19: Fee Agreements Regarding GGMIT Lawsuit Are
Discoverable.

RFP No. 19 requested "[a]ll agreements, fee arrangements, contracts and related
documents involving AlA Insurance, Inc. or AlA Services Corporation pertaining to the
litigation known as In re: Universal Liquidator Grain Growers Trust, et al. v. Idaho
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Department of Insurance (a/k/a GGMIT lawsuit), and the status of such litigation."
Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded in its letter after the discovery conference by
stating that "[t]his request seeks document [sic] protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The fee agreements that AlA Insurance or AlA Services have in the case of Universal

Liquidators Grain Growers Trust v. Idaho Dep't of Insur. are privileged." !d. at Ex. D.
For the reasons stated above in the discussion of RFP No. 16, the fee agreements are not
privileged and are discoverable. Thus, the Court should order that AIA produce the fee
agreements and billing statements that AlA Insurance and AlA Services have in regards
to the GGMIT lawsuit.

6.

RFP No. 29: Addresses of Officers and Directors of AlA is
Discoverable.

It is fundamental that the contact information of potential witnesses is

discoverable. The officers and directors of AlA, and its former officers and directors, are
potential witnesses in this case and Reed Taylor is entitled to discover their contact
information, to the extent known by AlA.
RFP No. 29 requested "[d]ocuments pertaining to the names and addresses of the
officers and directors of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc." Cressman
Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded by stating it would produce the names of the officers and
directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance for the previous five years but refused to
produce the addresses on the grounds that it was an "invasion of privacy." !d. at Ex. D,
E. For the reasons stated above in section B.2., the names and addresses of the officers
and directors AlA in their positions more than five years before the complaint was filed
are relevant and discoverable.

In this instance, for example, the former officers and

directors may have knowledge regarding modifications alleged by AlA in its Answer.
The former officers and directors may also have knowledge regarding Reed Taylor's
claims against AlA and AlA's defenses and counterclaims. Reed Taylor is entitled to
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contact these individuals to detennine their knowledge, if any, regarding these alleged
modifications.
In addition, the addresses of the officers and directors of AlA Services and AlA
Insurance are discoverable. The addresses of these individuals are necessary for Reed
Taylor to conduct additional discovery, such as noting depositions if necessary. AlA's
only objection to producing this infonnation is that it is "an invasion of privacy".
Cressman Aff., Ex. D, p. 5. However, there is no right to privacy with respect to an
individual's address.

AlA's objection is not valid and its refusal to produce this

infonnation is in violation of the Idaho Civil Rules. Thus, the Court should order that the
addresses of the officers and directors AlA Services and AlA Insurance be produced.
7.

RFP No. 31: Documents Regarding the Sale ofKATW FM are
Discoverable.

AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance are the fonner owners of a radio station
known as KA TW FM. At some point, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance sold the radio
station. RFP No. 31 requested "[ d]ocuments pertaining to the spin off, transfer, or sale of
the radio station owned at one time by AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc.,
known as KA TW FM." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded by refusing to produce
any documents and objecting based on the "Work Product Doctrine and/or the AttomeyClient Privilege." Id. at Ex. E. There is no basis for AlA's privilege objections given
that the request seeks only the sale documents regarding KA TW FM, which are not
privileged.

AlA also objected to the RFP on the grounds of relevance. Id.

AlA's

relevance objection, like its privilege objection, is also without merit.
As stated above, Reed Taylor is the single largest creditor of AlA. Reed Taylor is
entitled to discover whether the sale of KA TW FM was an arms-length transaction and
whether AlA received fair value for the sale of the radio station. If for example, the sale
was to an interested party for less than fair value, Reed Taylor may have an additional
claim for fraudulent transfer against the purchaser. These documents are discoverable
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under the broad I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) and thus the Court should order that AlA produce the
documents.
8.

RFP No. 35: Names, Addresses, and Positions of Employees and
Officers of AlA are Discoverable.

RFP No. 3S requested "[d]ocuments identifying the names, addresses and
positions of all employees and officers of AlA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services
Corporation." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA objected based on relevance and agreed to
produce only one document identifying the names and positions of the employees for
AlA at the year end 2006. ld. at Ex. E. For the reasons stated above in section B.S., the
names, addresses and positions of AlA's former employees are discoverable and are
necessary so that Reed Taylor can conduct additional discovery. Under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l),
evidence is discoverable if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. AlA's former employees may have knowledge of the modifications
alleged by AlA, the fraudulent transfers made by AlA, and AlA's acknowledgement of
the Promissory Note owed to Reed Taylor. Thus, their contact information, known to
AlA, including addresses, is discoverable in this action.

C.

An Audit of AlA Services Is Not Sufficient to Address the Discovery Issues in
this Case.
It is expected that AlA will point to its offer for Reed Taylor to audit AlA

Services, according to its terms, to show that it has complied with the discovery requests.
Cressman Aff., Ex. D (Letter from Mr. Babbitt offering AlA Services audit). AlA's
anticipated argument in this regard is without merit.
First of all, AlA Services is insolvent and has been for years according to John
Taylor and thus it is unlikely that AlA Services will have any financial information in
which to audit.

March 1, 2007, Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Testimony of John

Taylor, p. 82, II. 20-22 ("We discontinued having audited financial statements for AlA
Services in 1990 because AlA Services has virtually no material assets except for AlA
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[Insurance], Inc.").

Given AlA Service's financial conditions the offer to audit AlA

Services is really not an offer at all.
Second, AlA's offer to audit AlA Services was only if the audit was subject to its
own unreasonable restrictions. For example, AlA would control what documents could
be copied by Reed Taylor during the audit.

Cressman Aff., Ex. D, p. 1-2.

AlA's

restrictions are baseless and not acceptable to Reed Taylor.
The Court should disregard AlA's arguments with regard to its offer to audit AlA
Services and require AlA to respond to the Requests for Production of Documents issued
by Reed Taylor to AlA in accordance with the Civil Rules.
D.

AlA Must Produce a Privilege Log of the Documents It Has Withheld from
Production to Reed Taylor.

AlA must produce to Reed Taylor a privilege log identifying documents it has
withheld from production to Reed Taylor based on privilege.

I.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A)

requires AlA to produce a description of the documents it withholds from Reed Taylor on
the basis of privilege:
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these
rules by claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as trial
preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall
describe the nature of the documents, communication, or things not
produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information
itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
Under the rule, AlA was required to prepare a privilege log of the documents it
has withheld from production from Reed Taylor based on privilege.

AlA failed to

provide a privilege log with its responses to Reed Taylor'S discovery requests. Counsel
for Reed Taylor requested that a privilege log be produced in a letter to counsel for AlA
dated June 8, 2007.

Cressman Aff., Ex. C, p. 7.

However, contrary to I.R.C.P.

26(b)(5)(A). AlA has failed to provide a privilege log and failed to respond to Reed
Taylor's request.

Thus, the Court should order that AlA comply with LR.C.P.

26(b)(5)(A) and produce a privilege log to Reed Taylor.
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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion to
Compel Production of Documents from AlA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services
Corporation.
DATED: This 28 th day of June, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By: - - - - - --F--.e"---- - - - nnon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roder' k C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy 0
eed Taylor's Motion to Compel, Affidavit of Paul Cressman Jr. and
supporting documents, Affidavit of Allan Muchmore and supporting documents,
Proposed Order Granting Motion to Compel on the following party(s) via the methodes)
indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, Washington 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
e ) Overnight Mail
eX) Facsimile

Signed this 28th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

AFFIDA VIT OF ALLAN
MUCHMORE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
: SS
COUNTY OF KING
)
Allan Muchmore, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
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ORIGI AL
qZ/

1.

I am Allan Muchmore, a computer consultant doing business under the name

Muchmore Consulting, located in Seattle, Washington, am over the age of eighteen years, and
am competent to testify. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

Muchmore Consulting has provided network and computer expertise to law firms

and other businesses since 2000. I have been working in the field of technology as a technician,
programmer, network administrator, and consultant since 1986, when not in school. I graduated
from Georgetown University Law Center with a J.D. in 1994.
3.

I currently maintain seventeen mail servers for seventeen different small

businesses in Washington State.

In the past I maintained mail servers using Microsoft

Exchange 5.5 software for seven different businesses. Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is
a copy of my Resume.
4.

I have knowledge of available file recovery and database extraction techniques

dating back to 1985. Since e-mail has become a ubiquitous mode of communication, I have been
asked to extract messages by various criteria in hundreds of instances, and in dozens of instances
in response to formal discovery requests.
5.

As a technology consultant for law firms, I routinely advise and assist attorneys

with matters involving electronic discovery.
6.

Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 10 requests e-mails sent or received by

select members of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc.

Defendants' only

objection on technical grounds is that the request is "unreasonable, burdensome and oppressive."
In support of this objection, Defendants' initially stated, "There exist millions of emails which
cannot be sorted (11.3 Gig of information)" on pages 9-10 of their May 22, 2007 Response to
Request for Production. However, in its June 14, 2007 response, Defendants drop the claim that
the e-mails in question "cannot be sorted," as the Response to Request for Production No. lOis
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLAN MUCHMORE
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repeated verbatim without this clause. In a conversation with Defendants' counsel on June 19,
2007, Paul Cressman confirmed that Defendants "have withdrawn the statement that the e-mails
are not searchable."

Mr. Cressman also confirmed that "AlA Insurance uses Microsoft

Exchange Version 5.5 for its e-mails."
7.

Defendants' remaining justification as to why this Request for Production is

burdensome involves the total storage size of their e-mails and the quantity of messages they
have stored. The quantities specified by Defendants are not large for even a very small business.
Extracting and transporting the number and size of messages specified is a simple matter using
hardware available at most consumer computer stores and software Defendants should already
possess.
8.

The storage SIze of the e-mails specified by Defendants does not make it

burdensome to extract or transport to Plaintiff in order to fulfill the Request for Production. In
support of the claim that Request for Production No. 10 is "burdensome and oppressive,"
Defendants note their e-mail is "11.3 Gig." This clause appears to state that the requested e-mail
storage size is 11.3 Gigabytes, typically abbreviated GB. This amount of data is trivial to store
and transport using even consumer-grade products available at any computer retailer. To put this
size into perspective, 11.3 GB is about one-third the capacity of a typical iPod music player
found in millions of teenagers' pockets. This amount of data will fit on three writeable data
DVD disks, available at a combined cost of under a dollar.
9.

Searching and extracting the requested messages from a store of "millions of

e-mails" would not be burdensome using a mainstream e-mail system. Defendants reportedly
store their e-mailsonaserverrunningMicrosoftExchange5.5software.This software stores
e-mail messages in an organized database, with the ability to query and retrieve groups of
messages according to various criteria such as sender, recipient, and delivery date. Extracting
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLAN MUCHMORE
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and producing the requested messages would not require more steps, as the number of e-mails in
the database increase. Of course the number of seconds or minutes required to retrieve desired
results will increase with the database size.
10.

I conservatively estimate that the amount of time required by AIA to extract 11.3

Gigabytes of e-mails to DVDs to produce to Plaintiff would be approximately six hours, though
for the majority of that time, information could be transferred unattended. I expect any IT
professional who maintains an exchange server would have the knowledge needed to perform
these tasks. Also, given that the e-mails are held in a searchable format, the privilege review
should also require minimal time.
11.

Defendants can extract and produce the requested e-mails stored on an

Exchange 5.5 server using their existing systems, without the need of purchasing special
software to extract the e-mails. For example, Outlook includes an "export" function which
allows a user to save groups of messages to a "PST" file. A PST file is commonly used to
transport a large quantity of e-mails outside an organization and is ideal for discovery
production. Once these files are extracted, Outlook could be used to remove privileged content
by using its powerful search function to find all messages to or from Defendants' counsel, and
then delete them in a single operation.
12.

If Defendants also have relevant messages stored in a format other than

Exchange 5.5, similar methods should exist for producing the requested messages in a PST file
or other transportable format.

For example, many firms remove older messages from their

Exchange server and save them in another format.

The most common method of archiving

messages used by a small business running Exchange software is the PST format mentioned
above. If Defendants have archived messages to PST files, then those existing files could be
used for production. If Defendants had archived messages using another software program,
AFFIDA VIT OF ALLAN MUCHMORE
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similar methods should exist to export those messages to a PST file, or other transportable
format, for production.
DATED at Seattle, Washington, this 26 th day of June, 2007.

dA4~/~
Allan Muchmore

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to on this 26 th day of June, 2007, before me, a Notary
Public for the State of Washington, by Allan Muchmore, known to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same.

l endy M. Wheat-McCoy
Notary Public in and for the State of Washington,
residing at Bothell.
My Commission Expires: June 9, 2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I,
, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true
and correct copy of the Affidavit of Alan H. Muchmore in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel on the following parties via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, Washington 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AIA Insurance

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Signed this

day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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EXHIBIT A

AFFIDVIT OF ALLAN MUCHMORE IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL

CfZ7

ALLAN MUCHMORE
55 18 17Ul Ave NE
Seattle, Washington 98105
(206) 985-6881 allan@muchmorecollsulting.com
Versatile professional with unique combination of technical, legal and computer industry knowledge.
Over eighteen years experience with computer security, web design, data recovery, network design,
programming, security, and small business systems.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Technical Consultant, Muchmore Consulting, Seattle, WA
2000 - Present
Provide full service technical consulting to area business, focusing on the legal industry. Assist firms
with planning and designing computer networks. Design computer security systems and procedures for
firms protecting highly confidential data. Assist with data recovery and mining of infonnatiol1 produced
during discovery. Consult with firms regarding their web presence and site design. Design and program
custom database applications.
Director of Information Services, Aiken, St. Louis & Siljeg, Seattle, W A
1994 - 2000
Focused on technology product management and assistance including: designing and installing Microsoft
network; creating virtual private network for remote access over the internet; designing security policy
and internet firewalls; programming customized applications; overseeing computer technician and
database programmers; and training employees.
Associate, Hogan Information Services, Oklahoma City, OK
1992
Developed database with several million records. Designed and implemented a remote information
retrieval system. Database information now available through Lexis-Nexis service.
Program Developer, Ikarus Software Gesmbh., Zell am See, Austria
1991
Developed and programmed The Anti-Virus Utilities, a top selling anti-virus program in Europe. Reverse
engineered and decrypted viruses to determine removal methods. Published articles describing newly
released computer viruses.
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Are We There Yet? The State a/Technology, ALA Region 5 Conference, Calgary, September 2002.
Security You Can Use, ALA Region 5 Conference, Calgary, September 2002.
"Virus Defense - A Practical Approach", Peer To Peer Magazine, published by the International Legal
Technology Association, May 2001.
EDUCATION AND CERTIFICATIONS
Admitted to Washington State Bar, 1995
Juris Doctor, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., 1994
Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Political Science, RICE UNIVERSITY, Houston, Texas, 1990
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL R.
CRESSMAN, JR. IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON )
: SS
COUNTY OF KING
)
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
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ORIGINAL

1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, am over the

age of eighteen years, and am competent to testify.

I make this Affidavit based upon my

personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's First Request for

Production of Documents to Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., R. John
Taylor, Bryan Freeman, and JoLee Duclos ("Requests for Production"), which were issued to
Defendants on March 21,2007.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B is a copy of Defendants AlA Services Corporation and AlA

Insurance, Inc. 's responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production, which I received on May 22,
2007.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C is a copy of the letter dated June 8, 2007, which I sent to

counsel for AlA that confirmed our discovery conference on June 7, 2007.
5.

On June 7,2007, I conferred with counsel for AlA, in good faith, in an attempt to

resolve the discovery issues that are the subject of this Motion to Compel, without resort to this
Court. We were unable to resolve these discovery issues, and Reed Taylor has been forced to
file the present Motion to Compel.
6.

Attached as Exhibit D is a copy of a letter from counsel for AlA in response to the

June 7, 2007 discovery conference.
7.

Attached as Exhibit E is a copy of Defendant AIA'a Supplemental Responses to

Plaiiltiffs Requests for Production which I received on June 13, 2007.
8.

Attached as Exhibit F is a copy of an e-mail I drafted to counsel for AlA, John

Ashby, which confinned our conversation that AlA Insurance uses Microsoft Exchange Version
5.5 for its e-mails, and that AlA was withdrawing its objection that the e-mails were not
searchable.
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9.

Attached as Exhibit G is a copy of the letter I sent to counsel for AlA on June 20,

2007, in which I offered to narrow the scope of our Requests for Production No.1 0, and that the
parties enter into a "Claw-Back Agreement" to address AlA's concerns regarding the costs of the
production of the e-mails requested in Request for Production No. 10.
10.

Attached as Exhibit H is a copy of a document received in discovery from AIA

entitled "Interoffice Memo-Monthly Car Allowance," and bates labeled AIAOOOll9.
11.

Attached as Exhibit I is a copy of a document received in discovery from AlA

entitled "Interoffice Memo-Monthly Car Allowance," and bates labeled AIAOOOI 031.

.,

~

DATED at Seattle, Washington, this

li day of June, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to on this ,,)8~ day of June, 2007, before me, a Notary
Public for the State of Washington, by Paul R. Cressman, Jr., known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same.

endy M. Wheat-McCoy
Notary Public in and for the State of Washington,
residing at Bothell.
My Commission Expires: June 9, 2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,
, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true
and correct copy of the Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Protective Order on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendants, AlA Services
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and
R. John Taylor

Via:

Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:

(
(
(
(

(
(
(
(

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Signed this _ _ day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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RODERlCK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAULR. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
DEFENDANTS AIA SERVICES
CORPORATION, AIA INSURANCE, INC.,
R. JOHN TAYLOR, BRYAN FREEMAN,
AND JOLEE DUCLOS

Defendants.
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TO:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, AIA INSURANCE, INC., and R. JOHN
TAYLOR, Defendants; and MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, their attorney;

AND TO:

BRYAN FREEMAN and JOLEE DUCLOS, Defendants; and DAVID A.
GITTINS, their attorney

You are to make available to Plaintiff, pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, the below documents in your possession, custody, and control for the purpose of
inspecting, photographing, and copying within thirty (30) days from the service hereof. All
documents are to be produced in their original files.
1.

DEFINITIONS
A.

The term "document" means and includes any and all tangible things and

documents, whether written, electronic, recorded, graphic, typewritten, printed or otherwise
visually reproduced, whether in draft or final form, regardless of how obtained or stored,
including, but not limited to all: papers, general ledgers, check registers, agreements, contracts,
letters, e-mails, e-mail attachments, electronic calendar entries and notes, electronic files, .pdf
files, word processing documents and files, cables, spreadsheets, financial statements, balance
sheets, bank statements, payroll documents,notes, memoranda, correspondence, telegrams,
commission reports, income statements, vouchers, estimates, patents, books, planners, annual
reports, diaries, logs, time sheets, reports, studies, minutes, records, checks, wire transfers, video
tapes, models, studies, schedules, compilations, accounting software, letters of credit, accounting
books, maps, plans, blueprints, sketches, charts, drawings, diagrams, photographs, movies, films,
assignments, notebooks, ledgers, bills, statements, invoices, receipts, analyses, surveys,
transcriptions, and recordings.
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B.

The term "identify" when used with respect to a document, or the description or

identification of a document, shall be deemed to include a request for the following information
with respect to that document:
1)

The nature and substance of the document;

2)

The date, if any, which the document bears;

3)

The "identity" of the persons to whom the document is addressed;

4)

The "identity" of all persons having possession, custody, or control of
each original or legible copy of the document.

C.

The term "identity" or "identify", when used with respect to a person or entity or

a request for the description or identification of a person or entity, shall be deemed to include a
request for the following information with respect to such person:

D.

1)

The person's or entity's name;

2)

The person's or entity's last known address; and

3)

The person's or entity's telephone number.

The word "you", "your", or "yours" refers to any of the above-named Defendants,

and all or any of their agents, representatives, employees, and attorneys.

2.

REQUESTS ARE CONTINUING / TIME PERIOD
These Requests are ongoing, and you have a duty to supplement and provide additional

information as it becomes available to you. These Requests for Production cover the time period
January 1, 1995, through the date this litigation is concluded.

3.

OBJECTIONS

In the event you seek to withhold any documents on the basis that they may be privileged
or otherwise not discoverable, you are to supply Plaintiff with a list of the documents for which
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limitation on discovery is claimed, indicating for each document the date; the author; the name of
each recipient, addressee, or party for whom such document was intended, if any; the general
subject matter of the document; and a description of the document.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
1.

All detailed general ledgers and all journal entries for AIA Services Corporation

and AIA Insurance, Inc.
RESPONSE:

2.

All supporting documents for the general ledgers and journal entries of AlA

Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
RESPONSE:

3.

All monthly and other periodic bank statements for all bank accounts of AIA

Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., including all checks, wire transfers, automatic
deposits and withdrawals, credits and debits.
RESPONSE:
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4.

All check registers for AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

RESPONSE:

5.

All working papers of outside accountants of AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc., and all correspondence and e-mails involving such accountants.
RESPONSE:

6.

All documents describing the type of accounting system utilized at any time by

AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the type of software for such systems, the
ability to transfer or download accounting and financial information electronically and into
Excel, and all other documents pertaining to the accounting systems of AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
RESPONSE:

7.

All documents pertaining in any way to AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. sharing, lending, or advancing expenses, personnel, funds, resources, and
premises with any other company, including, but not limited to, Crop USA Insurance Agency,
PLAlNTIFF'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR
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Inc., Sound Insurance, Pacific Empire Communications Corporation, Pacific Empire Holdings
Corporation, Pacific Empire Radio Corporation, Radio Leasing, LLC., Radio Leasing II, LLC.,
and any other entity, association, or party, including all checks and other documents pertaining to
reimbursement or payments to AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and any
associated accounts receivables, loans, or credit arrangements.
RESPONSE:

8.

All credit authorizations, lines of credit, credit arrangements, and related

documents of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
RESPONSE:

9.

All corporate books and records of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance,

Inc.
RESPONSE:
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